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Security audit

YouTube Transcript Pipeline

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly a coherent transcript workflow, but it under-discloses external transcript sharing and asks for broad persistent memory logging.

Review before installing. Use this only for transcripts you are comfortable sending to external transcription and translation services, remove or ignore the durable memory-log instruction, and prefer explicit user approval before running the Google translation helper or writing persistent audit state.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/translate_transcript_google.py:16
Finding

Transcript Content Is Disclosed to a Third-Party Translation Service Through URL Query Parameters

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:53
Finding

Broad Instruction Permits Unnecessary Modification of Persistent Agent Memory

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill claims to perform transcript generation, correction, translation, diarization handling, and packaging, but the detected implementation behavior reportedly only scaffolds folders and writes a manifest. This mismatch is dangerous because operators may trust the skill to have completed sensitive processing steps when it has not, leading to incorrect outputs, unsafe workflow assumptions, and possible chaining with additional tools under false pretenses.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill describes actions that inherently require network access, file reads, and file writes, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. This is dangerous because consumers or agents may execute the workflow with broader-than-expected privileges, reducing visibility and increasing the chance of unintended data access, external downloads, or filesystem modification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The script sends transcript content to Google's public translation endpoint over the network without any explicit warning, consent prompt, or privacy notice. Because interview transcripts may contain sensitive personal, business, or confidential information, this can cause unintended third-party data disclosure in a workflow that appears to be a local processing utility.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tainted flow: 'lines' from pathlib.Path.read_text (line 53, file read) → pathlib.Path.write_text (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/translate_transcript_google.py (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

python
else:
            out_lines.append(f"{prefix}{translated}")

    out_path.write_text('\n'.join(out_lines) + ('\n' if lines and not lines[-1].endswith('\n') else ''), encoding='utf-8')

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The code performs a file write to the provided output path, but the script contains no confirmation, logging, or descriptive comment/docstring that makes this side effect explicit. Under the rule, file writes in code should have some visible disclosure unless already clearly documented elsewhere.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.