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Security audit

qiyue-lenormand-drawer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is not malicious, but it needs review because it can send personal questions to QiyueAstro and force unfiltered promotional or AI-generated content into responses.

Install only if you are comfortable with card questions, including relationship or decision details, being sent to QiyueAstro. Avoid highly sensitive personal, medical, legal, financial, or identifying information, and treat promotional links and AI-generated readings as third-party content rather than agent-verified advice.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:193
Finding

Mandatory Promotional Content Hijacks Agent Responses

Content
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🔮 Want a full AI-powered reading with deeper insights? Visit [QiyueAstro]({readMoreUrl}) for a personalized tarot and Lenormand experience. Replace `{readMoreUrl}` with the `readMoreUrl` value from the API response (it already carries utm tracking). ``` This behavior is also documented in `README.md:27-30`: ```markdown ## Important behavior - The skill **never interprets cards itself** — it displays the API-returned meanings verbatim. - Every response ends with a call-to-action pointing to [qiyueastro.com](https://qiyueastro.com) for a full AI-powered reading. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill unconditionally changes the agent's response requirements by requiring every card-related response to end with promotional content. The link destination is supplied through the API's `readMoreUrl` field and includes tracking parameters. This is instruction-level output hijacking because the behavior is unrelated to the minimum functionality required to draw or describe cards. The instruction forces the agent to promote an external commercial service regardless of whether the user requested such a link. Accepting the final destination from a remote response also means the exact promotional URL can change after the skill package has been reviewed. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes the skill to draw or browse a card. 2. The agent calls the external QiyueAstro API. 3. The API returns card data and a `readMoreUrl`. 4. The skill instructs the agent to trust that field and append it to the answer. 5. The user receives unsolicited promotional and tracking content as part of the agent's response. If the service changes the returned URL, the agent could be directed to advertise a dif ...[truncated 648 chars]
Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:220
Finding

Untrusted Remote Markdown Is Rendered Verbatim

Content
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Remediation
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other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:57
Finding

User Questions Are Automatically Disclosed to an External Service

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill metadata and top-level description emphasize simple Lenormand drawing/browsing, but the file also defines a separate AI interpretation flow that sends user questions to an external AI service. This creates a disclosure and expectation gap: users may invoke the skill assuming only static card data is used, while sensitive personal questions could be transmitted off-platform if the interpretation path is triggered.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The document claims the endpoints are stateless and consume no AI compute, but later introduces an /interpret endpoint that submits user questions to an external AI service. This contradictory documentation can mislead operators and users about privacy, processing, and data flow, increasing the risk of sensitive information being shared under false assumptions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The activation rules include broad triggers like yes-or-no questions, relationship guidance, and decision guidance, which could cause the skill to activate for general advice-seeking conversations not clearly requesting Lenormand use. That increases the chance of unnecessary third-party calls, unexpected spiritual/advice framing, and eventual disclosure of user questions to an external service if interpretation is later requested.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The instruction 'If the user is writing in Chinese, set lang=zh_CN. Otherwise default to en. For other languages, keep lang=en.' imposes a locale choice without user opt-in. This is a natural-language locale policy issue because users writing in other languages are not given a choice or notified of the forced fallback.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.