T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:146- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Packages Are Installed and Executed
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 146 and 158–161
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from mutable, unverified npm dependencies
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash npm install -g @pacifica-dev/clibash # MCP server (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code Copilot, etc.) claude mcp add pacifica npx @pacifica-dev/mcp # Standalone CLI npm install -g @pacifica-dev/cliTechnical Analysis
The installation commands do not specify exact package versions or verify package integrity. Consequently, npm resolves a mutable release—normally the package's current
latestdistribution tag—rather than a version whose source was audited with this skill.The
npx-based MCP registration is particularly sensitive because it can download and execute package content from the registry. The global CLI installation similarly trusts package code and any applicable npm lifecycle scripts. The project contains neither the source of these packages nor a lockfile, checksum, signature, or provenance policy through which their effective contents could be verified.This does not establish that the referenced packages are currently malicious. It creates an unsafe supply-chain boundary in which a compromised publisher account, registry response, package release, or transitive dependency can change the code executed after the skill itself has been reviewed.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, package distribution process, registry account, or an included dependency.
- The attacker publishes a malicious release under the package name or changes the version selected by the mutable distribution tag.
- A user follows the documented installation instructions without an exact version or integrity constraint.
- npm downloads the attacker-controlled package content.
- Package installation hooks or the invoked MCP/CLI program execute with the privileges of t ...[truncated 944 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every referenced package to a specific, reviewed version, for example by using an exact version rather than a mutable distribution tag.
- Maintain and distribute a lockfile that fixes all transitive dependency versions.
- Verify package integrity using registry integrity hashes, trusted signatures, and npm provenance where available.
- Document the expected publisher, registry, source repository, release hash, and verification procedure.
- Prefer installing from an audited local bundle or controlled internal registry instead of downloading executable content at invocation time.
- Avoid implicit
npxdownloads. Preinstall a verified package and invoke the pinned local executable. - Disable npm lifecycle scripts where operationally possible, and review any scripts required by the package before installation.
- Run the MCP server and CLI in a sandboxed, least-privileged environment with restricted filesystem, environment-variable, network, and wallet access.
- Require a fresh security review before updating either package or any transitive dependency.
