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Security audit

Sticker Pack Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This sticker-generation skill does what it claims, but it handles an API token unsafely and its install/data-flow disclosures are not tight enough.

Install only if you are comfortable sending prompts, optional reference IDs, and a Neta/TalesOfAI API token to the external image service. Prefer a pinned/verifiable install method, use a low-privilege or disposable token, avoid sensitive prompt content, and rotate any token previously pasted directly into shell commands.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:28
Finding

Unpinned npm Package Execution in Installation Instructions

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:28-31 and README.md:6-10
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party executable dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

SKILL.md:28-31:

markdown
## Install
```bash
npx skills add blammectrappora/sticker-pack-skill
text

`README.md:6-10`:

```markdown
## Install

```bash
npx skills add blammectrappora/sticker-pack-skill
text

### Technical Analysis

The documented installation command invokes the npm package named `skills` through `npx` without specifying a version or integrity constraint. If that package is not already installed locally, `npx` can retrieve its currently resolved release from the configured npm registry and execute its command.

Consequently, the code executed during installation is not limited to the audited project. Its behavior can change independently after this skill has been reviewed. The repository provides no lockfile, package version, integrity hash, or verification procedure for the executable installer.

This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the currently resolved package is malicious.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the publisher account or distribution pipeline for the npm package resolved as `skills`, or otherwise influences the registry used by the victim.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the package/version that an unpinned `npx skills` command resolves.
3. A user follows the installation instructions.
4. `npx` downloads and executes the compromised package.
5. The package executes with the privileges of the user running the installation command.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. Depending on that account's permissions, attacker code could read or modify user-accessible files, steal environment credentials, alter installed skills, or make outbound 
...[truncated 169 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin the installer to a reviewed, exact version, for example npx --yes skills@X.Y.Z ....
  • Verify and document the official npm package scope, publisher, and registry.
  • Use a lockfile and npm integrity metadata where the installation workflow permits it.
  • Prefer a trusted, locally installed installer whose version is managed by the surrounding platform.
  • Document a package-signature, checksum, or provenance-verification procedure before execution.
  • Review new installer versions before updating the pinned version.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
stickerpack.js:3
Finding

API Token Exposed Through Process Arguments and Shell History

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: stickerpack.js:3-23, with usage documented in SKILL.md:11-18 and README.md:49-63
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive credential passed through command-line arguments
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

stickerpack.js:3-23:

javascript
const args = process.argv.slice(2);

// Parse CLI arguments
let prompt = null;
let size = "square";
let tokenFlag = null;
let ref = null;

for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
  if (args[i] === "--token" && i + 1 < args.length) {
    tokenFlag = args[++i];
  } else if (args[i] === "--size" && i + 1 < args.length) {
    size = args[++i];
  } else if (args[i] === "--ref" && i + 1 < args.length) {
    ref = args[++i];
  } else if (!prompt && !args[i].startsWith("--")) {
    prompt = args[i];
  }
}

const TOKEN = tokenFlag;

README.md:49-55:

markdown
Get a free trial API token at [neta.art/open](https://www.neta.art/open/), then pass it with the `--token` flag:

```bash
node stickerpack.js "your prompt" --token YOUR_TOKEN
text

### Technical Analysis

The program requires the API token to be supplied as a command-line argument and reads it from `process.argv`. Command-line arguments are not an appropriate secret transport mechanism because they may be recorded in shell history and can be exposed through process inspection facilities, monitoring agents, diagnostic tooling, audit logs, or wrapper scripts.

The documented environment-variable example still expands the secret into the final command-line argument:

```bash
node stickerpack.js "your prompt" --token "$NETA_TOKEN"

Although this avoids writing the literal token in that particular history entry, the expanded value remains present in the process argument vector while the program runs. The script can poll for up to approximately three minutes, increasing the observation window.

...[truncated 1164 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Read the token directly from a protected environment variable such as NETA_TOKEN instead of requiring --token.

  • For interactive use, support a hidden prompt that does not echo or place the token in the process argument vector.

  • If backward compatibility requires retaining --token, mark it as deprecated and display a warning explaining the exposure risk.

  • Update all examples to use direct environment access:

    javascript
    const TOKEN = process.env.NETA_TOKEN;
    
    bash
    NETA_TOKEN="your-token-here" node stickerpack.js "your prompt"
    
  • Ensure logs, exception handlers, and debugging output never serialize request headers or the token.

  • Recommend short-lived, minimally privileged tokens and provide clear rotation and revocation guidance.

  • Advise users who previously entered literal tokens on a command line to remove affected shell-history entries and rotate the credentials.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (8)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The declared behavior says the skill uses the Neta AI API, but the analysis indicates the implementation actually calls TalesOfAI endpoints and has additional behavior not clearly disclosed. This kind of description-behavior mismatch is dangerous because it undermines informed consent, can misdirect where tokens and prompts are sent, and may conceal unexpected data flows or capabilities.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to install the skill via npx skills add blammectrappora/sticker-pack-skill without pinning a specific version. This creates a supply-chain risk because users may fetch whatever version is current at install time, including a later compromised or malicious release, and README-driven install commands are often copied and executed directly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises use of Bash and an external image-generation API but does not declare any explicit tool scope or allowed network permissions. That omission weakens reviewability and containment because users cannot easily tell that the skill will make outbound requests and handle API tokens.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages users to submit free-form prompts and optional reference identifiers to an external third-party API without clearly warning that this data leaves the local environment. That creates privacy and confidentiality risk, especially if users include sensitive prompts, proprietary concepts, or internal asset identifiers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Using npx skills add blammectrappora/sticker-pack-skill without a pinned version makes installation non-reproducible and exposes users to supply-chain risk if the package or referenced content changes later. An attacker who compromises the upstream package or publisher could deliver different code than what was originally reviewed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This finding identifies the hardcoded external domain used for image generation requests. A hardcoded remote endpoint creates a fixed exfiltration path for prompts, reference identifiers, and authentication material, and here the destination domain differs from the user-facing site mentioned in the help text, which makes the trust boundary less transparent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · stickerpack.js (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

js
async function main() {
  // Submit the image generation task
  const createRes = await fetch("https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image", {
    method: "POST",
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This finding identifies the hardcoded external domain used for image generation requests. A hardcoded remote endpoint creates a fixed exfiltration path for prompts, reference identifiers, and authentication material, and here the destination domain differs from the user-facing site mentioned in the help text, which makes the trust boundary less transparent.

Content

Scanner excerpt · stickerpack.js (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

js
async function main() {
  // Submit the image generation task
  const createRes = await fetch("https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image", {
    method: "POST",
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The polling request repeatedly transmits the authentication header to the same third-party API endpoint while checking task status. Although this is functionally necessary, it extends the external exposure window and continues sharing credentials and task identifiers with the remote service, reinforcing the same egress/trust-boundary concern.

Content

Scanner excerpt · stickerpack.js (reported line 112)May include surrounding context.

js
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 2000));

    const pollRes = await fetch(
      `https://api.talesofai.com/v1/artifact/task/${taskUuid}`,
      { headers }
    );