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Security audit

Pinup Art Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward image-generation wrapper for a disclosed external API, but users should handle the API token carefully and prefer verified installs.

Before installing, verify the publisher and prefer a pinned or checksum-verified artifact if available. Do not paste a real Neta API token directly into shared terminals, scripts, CI logs, or shell history; rotate the token if it may already have been exposed. Prompts and optional reference UUIDs are sent to the external image API to generate the image.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:29
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Skill Installation

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
pinupartgenerator.js:12
Finding

API Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments

Content
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). Pass it via the `--token` flag. ```bash node
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to run npx skills add blammectrappora/pinup-art-generator without any version pinning or integrity constraint. This can cause users to fetch and execute whatever package version is current at install time, increasing supply-chain risk if the package is later compromised, replaced, or unexpectedly changed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill declares only tools: Bash and does not explicitly scope or disclose its network behavior, yet its documented usage depends on calling an external Neta API with a token. This creates a transparency and least-privilege problem: an agent or user may authorize shell execution without realizing the skill will transmit prompts and credentials to a third-party service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The phrase "Use when someone asks to generate or create pin up art generator images" is loosely defined and does not clearly distinguish this skill from other image-generation requests. It provides no explicit trigger phrases, scope limits, or negative examples, which could cause unintended invocation for general art-generation requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The install instruction uses npx skills add blammectrappora/pinup-art-generator without a pinned version, which allows whatever package/version is current at execution time to be fetched and run. This is a supply-chain risk because a compromised publisher account, malicious update, or dependency swap could cause users to install unexpected code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The script accepts the API token via a command-line flag, which can expose the credential through shell history, process listings, audit logs, or job runners. This is a real credential-handling weakness because the same token is then used to authenticate outbound API calls to a third-party service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · pinupartgenerator.js (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

js
console.error(`→ Submitting job (${dims.width}×${dims.height})...`);

  const submitRes = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · pinupartgenerator.js (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

js
console.error(`→ Submitting job (${dims.width}×${dims.height})...`);

  const submitRes = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · pinupartgenerator.js (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

js
console.error(`→ Submitting job (${dims.width}×${dims.height})...`);

  const submitRes = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.