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Security audit

Neon Art Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward neon image generator, with notable but disclosed risks around API token handling and install provenance.

Prefer the ClawHub install path or a pinned, reviewed source instead of a floating npx command. Use a limited Neta token, run the script only on trusted machines, and assume your prompt, optional reference UUID, and token are sent to api.talesofai.com for generation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:32
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Installer Executed Through npx

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
neonartgenerator.js:8
Finding

API Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments

Content
View full analysis
"your prompt" --token YOUR_TOKEN ``` ```bash node neonartgenerator.js "PROMPT" --token YOUR_TOKEN [--size SIZE] [--ref UUID] ``` ### Technical Analysis The only supported credential mechanism places the Neta API token in `process.argv`. Command-line arguments may be exposed through several local channels, depending on the operating system and execution environment: - Shell command history. - Process inspection utilities while the process is running. - Process-monitoring and endpoint telemetry. - Job-runner logs, debugging output, or command auditing. - Wrapper scripts that record complete command lines. Although the script does not deliberately print the token, passing it as an argument extends its exposure beyond the process itself. The script may run for up to approximately three minutes while polling for a result, increasing the period during which process metadata can reveal the token. The token is subsequently used as the `x-token` authentication header for requests to the documented image-generation API. No environment-variable, protected credential-file, standard-input, or interactive secret-entry alternative is provided. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the documentation and invokes the script with a valid t ...[truncated 1197 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (7)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to install and run a package via npx skills without pinning a specific version. This allows whatever version is current at execution time to be fetched and executed, which creates a supply-chain risk if the upstream package is compromised, replaced, or updated with malicious behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

Referencing npx skills again without a pinned version repeats the same supply-chain exposure: users may execute a different package version than the author reviewed. In security-sensitive environments, dynamic retrieval and execution of latest code materially increases the chance of compromise.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill declares only the Bash tool and omits any explicit permission or allowed-tools scoping, even though its documented behavior depends on network access to the Neta API. That mismatch can cause the agent runtime to grant broader-than-necessary capabilities or leave network use insufficiently constrained, increasing the risk of unintended outbound requests or abuse if the skill is modified or invoked unexpectedly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Using npx skills add blammectrappora/neon-art-generator without pinning a specific version introduces a supply-chain risk: future installs may pull a changed or compromised package. An attacker who gains control of the upstream package or a later release could distribute malicious code to users who follow the installation instructions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The hardcoded external domain indicates outbound communication to api.talesofai.com, which differs from the skill branding and token acquisition domain shown to the user. That mismatch makes the data flow more dangerous because it can mislead users into trusting one provider while actually sending content and authentication material to another service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · neonartgenerator.js (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

js
};
  }

  const res = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: HEADERS,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The hardcoded external domain indicates outbound communication to api.talesofai.com, which differs from the skill branding and token acquisition domain shown to the user. That mismatch makes the data flow more dangerous because it can mislead users into trusting one provider while actually sending content and authentication material to another service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · neonartgenerator.js (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

js
};
  }

  const res = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: HEADERS,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The polling request repeatedly transmits the same authentication header to the external service and confirms continued interaction with the third-party API. While polling itself is normal functionality, it extends the exposure of credentials and task metadata to an external domain and reinforces the undisclosed cross-service data sharing risk in this skill.

Content

Scanner excerpt · neonartgenerator.js (reported line 96)May include surrounding context.

js
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < maxAttempts; attempt++) {
    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 2000));

    const pollRes = await fetch(`https://api.talesofai.com/v1/artifact/task/${taskUuid}`, {
      headers: HEADERS,
    });