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Security audit

Impossible Scene Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it claims by sending prompts to an external image API, with some normal installation and token-handling risks to consider.

Install only from a source you trust, prefer pinned or verified releases when available, and use a short-lived or revocable Neta token. Avoid putting valuable long-lived tokens directly in command history when possible.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:32
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution in Installation Instructions

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:32-34; also present in README.md:8-12
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through mutable package execution
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
## Install
```bash
npx skills add blammectrappora/impossible-scene-generator
text

The equivalent installation instruction in `README.md` is:

```markdown
## Install

```bash
npx skills add blammectrappora/impossible-scene-generator
text

### Technical Analysis

The documented installation command invokes `npx` without pinning the `skills` package to an audited version. Depending on the local npm configuration and cache state, `npx` may download and execute the latest package release from the configured registry.

The installer and requested skill are identified by mutable package names rather than immutable versions, commit identifiers, or integrity digests. The project also contains no lockfile or integrity metadata governing this installation path. Consequently, code executed during a future installation may differ from the code reviewed in this audit.

This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the currently reviewed source contains a malicious payload.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the publisher account, registry package, distribution channel, or a future mutable release of the `skills` installer or requested skill.
2. The attacker publishes a modified package containing malicious installation or runtime behavior.
3. A user follows the documented `npx skills add ...` command.
4. `npx` retrieves the mutable package version from the configured registry and executes it.
5. The malicious package runs with the permissions of the user performing the installation.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could allow arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. Depending on that account's privileges and accessible resources, the malicious package could read or modify user files
...[truncated 270 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin the installer to a specific reviewed version, for example by using an explicit package version rather than an unqualified package name.
  • Pin the installed skill to an immutable release, commit identifier, or content digest when the installer supports it.
  • Publish and verify cryptographic integrity hashes or signed release provenance.
  • Use a lockfile and registry integrity metadata where applicable.
  • Prefer a previously installed, trusted package-management tool over implicit download-and-execute behavior.
  • Document the trusted registry and provide release verification instructions.
  • Regularly review pinned dependencies and update them through a controlled security-review process.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
impossiblescenegenerator.js:14
Finding

API Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: impossiblescenegenerator.js:14-24 and impossiblescenegenerator.js:27-38; the unsafe invocation is documented in SKILL.md:17-21, SKILL.md:25-28, README.md:18-22, and README.md:44-58
Vulnerability Type: Sensitive credential exposure through process arguments and shell history
Risk Level: Low

Vulnerable Code

javascript
function parseArgs(argv) {
  const args = { size: 'landscape' };
  const positional = [];
  for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {
    const a = argv[i];
    if (a === '--size') args.size = argv[++i];
    else if (a === '--token') args.token = argv[++i];
    else if (a === '--ref') args.ref = argv[++i];
    else positional.push(a);
  }
  args.prompt = positional.join(' ').trim();
  return args;
}

async function main() {
  const { prompt, size, token: tokenFlag, ref } = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2));

  const TOKEN = tokenFlag;
  if (!TOKEN) {
    console.error('\n✗ Token required. Pass via: --token YOUR_TOKEN');
    console.error('  Get yours at: https://www.neta.art/open/');
    process.exit(1);
  }

The documentation directs users to place the token in the command line:

bash
node impossiblescenegenerator.js "your description here" --token YOUR_TOKEN

It also suggests shell-variable expansion:

bash
node impossiblescenegenerator.js "a surreal anti-physics landscape" --token "$NETA_TOKEN"

Technical Analysis

The application reads the API token directly from process.argv. Secrets supplied as command-line arguments may be exposed through shell history, process inspection facilities, process-monitoring software, job schedulers, terminal session recording, crash diagnostics, or command audit logs.

Expanding a shell variable does not resolve the process-argument exposure: the shell substitutes the secret before launching Node.js, so the resulting child process still receives the plaintext token in its argument vector.

The code does not print the t ...[truncated 1266 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Stop requiring API tokens through command-line arguments.
  • Read the token from a protected environment variable such as NETA_TOKEN, with clear documentation on secure environment handling.
  • For interactive use, support reading the token from standard input without terminal echo.
  • For persistent use, integrate with an operating-system credential store or a configuration file restricted to the owning user.
  • If backward compatibility requires retaining --token, mark it as deprecated and display a warning explaining that process arguments may be observable.
  • Ensure application errors, debug logs, telemetry, and HTTP diagnostics redact authentication headers and token values.
  • Recommend short-lived, least-privileged API tokens and provide token revocation and rotation guidance.
  • Avoid presenting shell-variable expansion as complete protection because the expanded value still enters the child process's argument vector.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to install and execute a package via npx skills without pinning an exact version. This creates a supply-chain risk because users may fetch whatever package version is current at install time, including a compromised or malicious update, and the command would execute it immediately.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill uses a Bash tool and instructs users to invoke a Node script that requires an external API token, which implies network access, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates an authorization and transparency gap: an agent or reviewer cannot easily constrain or audit what network actions the skill is expected to perform, increasing the chance of overbroad outbound access or misuse of secrets.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The install command references npx skills add blammectrappora/impossible-scene-generator without pinning a specific version, so future installs may fetch changed or compromised content unexpectedly. This is a supply-chain risk because users and agents cannot reproduce or verify the exact package version they intended to install, and a malicious upstream update could alter behavior after publication.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The hardcoded external base URL indicates the skill is designed to send content to a remote service outside the local execution environment. In a skill ecosystem, that is security-relevant because it creates a fixed exfiltration channel for potentially sensitive prompts and tokens, and users are directed to obtain credentials from a different domain than the one receiving them.

Content

Scanner excerpt · impossiblescenegenerator.js (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

js
console.error(`→ Generating ${dims.width}×${dims.height}: "${PROMPT}"`);

  const submitRes = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The hardcoded external base URL indicates the skill is designed to send content to a remote service outside the local execution environment. In a skill ecosystem, that is security-relevant because it creates a fixed exfiltration channel for potentially sensitive prompts and tokens, and users are directed to obtain credentials from a different domain than the one receiving them.

Content

Scanner excerpt · impossiblescenegenerator.js (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

js
console.error(`→ Generating ${dims.width}×${dims.height}: "${PROMPT}"`);

  const submitRes = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The polling request repeatedly sends authenticated requests to the same external service, extending exposure of the bearer token and confirming continued communication with the third party. While this call is operationally necessary for job status retrieval, it still represents ongoing outbound data transfer to an external endpoint and increases attack surface if the endpoint is untrusted or misdocumented.

Content

Scanner excerpt · impossiblescenegenerator.js (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

js
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 90; attempt++) {
    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 2000));

    const pollRes = await fetch(`https://api.talesofai.com/v1/artifact/task/${taskUuid}`, {
      method: 'GET',
      headers,
    });