T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:32- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution in Installation Instructions
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:32-34; also present inREADME.md:8-12
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through mutable package execution
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown ## Install ```bash npx skills add blammectrappora/impossible-scene-generatortext The equivalent installation instruction in `README.md` is: ```markdown ## Install ```bash npx skills add blammectrappora/impossible-scene-generatortext ### Technical Analysis The documented installation command invokes `npx` without pinning the `skills` package to an audited version. Depending on the local npm configuration and cache state, `npx` may download and execute the latest package release from the configured registry. The installer and requested skill are identified by mutable package names rather than immutable versions, commit identifiers, or integrity digests. The project also contains no lockfile or integrity metadata governing this installation path. Consequently, code executed during a future installation may differ from the code reviewed in this audit. This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the currently reviewed source contains a malicious payload. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the publisher account, registry package, distribution channel, or a future mutable release of the `skills` installer or requested skill. 2. The attacker publishes a modified package containing malicious installation or runtime behavior. 3. A user follows the documented `npx skills add ...` command. 4. `npx` retrieves the mutable package version from the configured registry and executes it. 5. The malicious package runs with the permissions of the user performing the installation. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could allow arbitrary code execution under the installing user's account. Depending on that account's privileges and accessible resources, the malicious package could read or modify user files ...[truncated 270 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the installer to a specific reviewed version, for example by using an explicit package version rather than an unqualified package name.
- Pin the installed skill to an immutable release, commit identifier, or content digest when the installer supports it.
- Publish and verify cryptographic integrity hashes or signed release provenance.
- Use a lockfile and registry integrity metadata where applicable.
- Prefer a previously installed, trusted package-management tool over implicit download-and-execute behavior.
- Document the trusted registry and provide release verification instructions.
- Regularly review pinned dependencies and update them through a controlled security-review process.
