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Security audit

Baroque Art Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent Baroque image generator, but it needs review because it handles an API token through command-line arguments and sends requests to an endpoint not fully disclosed in the main skill instructions.

Install only if you are comfortable sending prompts, reference UUIDs, and a Neta token to api.talesofai.com. Prefer a pinned or verified install path, use a limited-scope token, and rotate the token if it may have appeared in shell history, process listings, CI logs, or command telemetry.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:10
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Package Executed During Installation

Content
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Remediation
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...`. - Use a lockfile and registry integrity metadata where the installation workflow supports them. - Prefer `npx --offline` or `npx --no-install` after installing a verified local version. - Document the expected package publisher, version, checksum, and registry source. - Consider providing a manual installation method that does not execute dynamically retrieved package code. - Periodically audit the pinned package and its transitive dependency tree before updating the documented version. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
baroqueartgenerator.js:13
Finding

API Token Accepted Through Process Command-Line Arguments

Content
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0) args.prompt = rest.join(' '); return args; } async function main() { const { size, token: tokenFlag, ref, prompt } = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2)); const TOKEN = tokenFlag; if (!TOKEN) { console.error('\n✗ Token required. Pass via: --token YOUR_TOKEN'); console.error(' Get yours at: https://www.neta.art/open/'); process.exit(1); } ``` The documentation explicitly recommends this invocation pattern: ```bash node baroqueartgenerator.js "your prompt" --token "$NETA_TOKEN" ``` ### Technical Analysis The application requires the Neta API token to be supplied through the `--token` command-line flag and obtains it from `process.argv`. Shell-variable expansion does not protect the token after process creation: the expanded secret becomes part of the process argument vector. Depending on operating-system controls and the execution environment, command-line arguments can be exposed through process-inspection interfaces, monitoring agents, diagnostic reports, job orchestration metadata, audit logs, or command wrappers. Supplying the token literally can additionally preserve it in shell history. No evidence was found that the script prints the token itself or transmits it to an unrelated endpoint. The exposure is limited to the unsafe credential input mechanism and surrounding execution environment. ### Atta ...[truncated 1110 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (9)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The documented purpose says the skill uses the Neta API, but the analyzed behavior indicates a different external service (api.talesofai.com) and an undisclosed reference-based editing capability via --ref. This mismatch is dangerous because users may provide prompts, tokens, or images under false assumptions about where data is sent and what transformations are possible.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill declares only tools: Bash and does not constrain network-capable behavior with explicit tool scope or permissions, despite the documented use of an external API token and image-generation service. In an agent setting, missing scope boundaries can let the skill make unintended outbound requests or expand behavior beyond what a reviewer expects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The manifest description begins with broad wording ('any subject into dramatic baroque oil painting art') and does not define clear invocation boundaries or exclusions. This can overlap with many general image-editing or art-generation requests, increasing the risk of unintended activation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The instruction 'Use when someone asks to generate or create baroque art generator images' is imprecise and does not distinguish this skill from other image-generation or style-transfer skills. It lacks concrete trigger phrases, scope limits, or negative examples to prevent accidental invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

Using npx skills add blammectrappora/baroque-art-generator without a pinned version makes installation depend on whatever package version is current at execution time. That creates a supply-chain risk: a later malicious or compromised release could be pulled automatically by users or agents.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The hardcoded external endpoint is a genuine security concern because the skill advertises one provider but transmits data to a different domain, creating a potential misleading third-party transfer. Even if functionality is intended, this can expose prompts and authentication material to an unexpected service and weakens user ability to assess trust boundaries.

Content

Scanner excerpt · baroqueartgenerator.js (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

js
console.error(`→ Submitting: "${PROMPT.slice(0, 80)}${PROMPT.length > 80 ? '…' : ''}"`);
  console.error(`  Size: ${size} (${dims.width}×${dims.height})`);

  const submitRes = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The hardcoded external endpoint is a genuine security concern because the skill advertises one provider but transmits data to a different domain, creating a potential misleading third-party transfer. Even if functionality is intended, this can expose prompts and authentication material to an unexpected service and weakens user ability to assess trust boundaries.

Content

Scanner excerpt · baroqueartgenerator.js (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

js
console.error(`→ Submitting: "${PROMPT.slice(0, 80)}${PROMPT.length > 80 ? '…' : ''}"`);
  console.error(`  Size: ${size} (${dims.width}×${dims.height})`);

  const submitRes = await fetch('https://api.talesofai.com/v3/make_image', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers,
    body: JSON.stringify(body),

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · baroqueartgenerator.js (reported line 94)May include surrounding context.

js
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 90; attempt++) {
    await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 2000));
    const pollRes = await fetch(`https://api.talesofai.com/v1/artifact/task/${taskUuid}`, { headers });
    if (!pollRes.ok) continue;
    const data = await pollRes.json();
    const status = data.task_status;