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Security audit

zhz-transcript-summarize

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s transcription and summarization workflow matches its stated purpose, with clearly disclosed transcript sharing and local storage.

Use recordings whose transcript you are comfortable sharing with your current model provider. Delete cached transcripts when no longer needed, install dependencies from trusted sources, and review links in HTML summaries before following them. The inspected files do not substantiate the pre-scan malicious signal.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: file_read, file_write, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.py (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

python
kw = {}
    if CREATE_NO_WINDOW:
        kw["creationflags"] = CREATE_NO_WINDOW
    return subprocess.run(cmd, check=False, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, **kw)


def extract_audio(src, dst_wav, ffmpeg="ffmpeg"):

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.