T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Error
- Location
- scripts/freedom_engine.py:21
- Finding
- Unrestricted User-Controlled URL Fetching Enables Server-Side Request Forgery<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/freedom_engine.py:21-45, 70` **Vulnerability Type**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```python def quick_fetch(self, url): """Ultra-fast stealth fetch using Scrapling (SOTA 2026).""" print(f"[Freedom] Executing Scrapling Stealth Fetch: {url}") try: fetcher = Fetcher(auto_match=True) response = fetcher.get(url) return { "status": "success", "mode": "scrapling", "title": response.title, "text": response.text[:2000] } except Exception as e: print(f"[Freedom] Scrapling failed, falling back to CFFI: {e}") return self.impersonate_fetch(url) def impersonate_fetch(self, url): """Kernel-level TLS impersonation using curl_cffi.""" print(f"[Freedom] Executing CFFI Impersonation: {url}") try: r = requests_cffi.get(url, impersonate="chrome124", timeout=20) return { "status": "success", "mode": "cffi", "status_code": r.status_code, "text": r.text[:2000] } ``` ```python target = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "https://example.com" engine = FreedomEngine() print(json.dumps(engine.quick_fetch(target), indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)) ``` ### Technical Analysis The command-line argument is passed directly to two network clients without validating the URL scheme, destination hostname, resolved IP address, port, or redirect chain. No control prevents requests to loopback, link-local, private, or otherwise reserved networks. The fallback does not provide a security boundary: if Scrapling fails, `curl_cffi` repeats the request to the same untrusted destination. Successful responses expose up to 2,000 characters through the process output. The declared web-retrieval functionality requires outbound access to user-selected public websites, but it does not require access to int ...[truncated 1268 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Permit only explicitly supported schemes, normally `https`. 2. Parse URLs with a standards-compliant parser and reject embedded credentials, malformed hosts, unsupported ports, and ambiguous numeric IP representations. 3. Resolve every hostname before connecting and reject all loopback, private, link-local, multicast, unspecified, and reserved addresses for both IPv4 and IPv6. 4. Disable redirects or revalidate the destination after every redirect. 5. Prefer an explicit hostname allowlist where the intended destinations are known. 6. Apply outbound firewall or proxy controls so application validation is not the only boundary. 7. Use a dedicated low-privilege network worker with no access to cloud metadata or internal control-plane services. 8. Avoid returning arbitrary response bodies unless required; enforce strict response-size and content-type limits. ]]>