T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:5- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Homebrew Dependency
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 5
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from a mutable third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet:
yaml metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🧾","requires":{"bins":["summarize"]},"install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"steipete/tap/summarize","bins":["summarize"],"label":"Install summarize (brew)"}]}}Technical Analysis
The skill delegates installation of the required
summarizeexecutable to the third-party Homebrew tapsteipete/tap/summarize. The dependency declaration does not pin an immutable release, commit, or artifact digest, and it does not specify an independent integrity-verification mechanism.Consequently, the code ultimately installed may change after this skill package has been reviewed. If the tap, its maintainers, the referenced release infrastructure, or another relevant supply-chain component is compromised, an attacker could substitute malicious installation logic or binaries. This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the currently referenced package is malicious.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the third-party Homebrew tap, a maintainer account, or an upstream artifact source used by the formula.
- The attacker modifies the mutable formula or referenced artifact to distribute malicious code.
- A user installs the skill dependency through the declared Homebrew installation method.
- Homebrew resolves the altered formula or artifact without a project-defined immutable version or integrity constraint.
- The malicious installation logic or executable runs with the privileges of the installing user.
- The payload may access data and credentials available to that user, including files supplied for summarization and API keys present in the process environment.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide code execution with the installing user's ...[truncated 520 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to an immutable, reviewed release or commit rather than relying only on the mutable tap and formula name.
- Verify downloaded artifacts using a cryptographic digest, such as SHA-256, whose expected value is maintained in a trusted project-controlled location.
- Prefer an official and auditable distribution channel with signed releases and documented provenance.
- Record the exact resolved dependency version and source so installations are reproducible.
- Validate signatures and checksums before executing installation scripts or binaries, and fail closed when verification fails.
- Review dependency updates before changing the pinned version, including changes to Homebrew formula installation logic and upstream artifact locations.
- Perform installation and execution with least privilege, avoiding elevated accounts and limiting access to unrelated files and credentials.
