T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:20- Finding
Unpinned Global Installation of the ClawHub CLI
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 20-23
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package installation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash npm install -g clawhub pnpm add -g clawhubTechnical Analysis
The documented installation commands retrieve the latest available
clawhubpackage without specifying an exact version or validating package integrity. Global npm and pnpm installations can also execute package lifecycle scripts, such aspreinstall,install, andpostinstall, under the privileges of the user running the package manager.Because the effective package contents can change after this Skill has been reviewed, compromise of the package, publisher account, registry, or dependency chain could cause users to install code that was not included in the audit. The use of global installation increases the potential reach by placing the package in the user's global tool environment.
No evidence establishes that the current
clawhubpackage is malicious. The vulnerability is the unsafe, unpinned supply-chain installation procedure.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry entry, or a transitive dependency used by a future
clawhubrelease. - The attacker publishes a malicious release under the expected package name.
- A user follows the documented unpinned global installation command.
- npm or pnpm downloads the attacker-controlled release.
- Malicious lifecycle scripts or subsequently invoked CLI code execute with the privileges of the installing user.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user performing the installation. Depending on those privileges and the local environment, affected resources may include user files, environment variables, credentials accessible to the user, global package configuration, and the Agent's local tools. Admin ...[truncated 171 chars]
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry entry, or a transitive dependency used by a future
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the CLI to a reviewed exact version, for example
clawhub@X.Y.Z, rather than implicitly installing the latest release. - Document the expected registry and reject unexpected registry overrides.
- Publish and verify package integrity information or signed release provenance where supported.
- Review the package, its lifecycle scripts, and its dependency lock data before recommending a new version.
- Avoid running global package installation with administrative privileges.
- Prefer a controlled environment, isolated prefix, or disposable container when evaluating new releases.
- Establish an explicit upgrade process that reviews release diffs before changing the pinned version.
- Pin the CLI to a reviewed exact version, for example
