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Security audit

CloudPlus

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This CloudPlus skill is aligned with enterprise chat use, but it needs review because it can install a persistent global npm tool and perform sensitive chat actions without clear confirmation safeguards.

Review this skill before installing. It can act through a CloudPlus enterprise account, send messages and files, read chat history or collected content, and open links or apps. Only use it if you trust the cloudplus-mcp-server npm package and are comfortable with a global install; require explicit confirmation for sends, file transfers, link/app opens, and sensitive data retrieval.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:24
Finding

Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party npm Package

Content
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Remediation
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``` 2. Verify the expected package publisher, registry URL, provenance, and integrity hash before installation. 3. Prefer a project-local, locked dependency over a global installation. 4. Execute the CLI from an isolated environment with narrowly scoped filesystem and network permissions. 5. Disable npm lifecycle scripts unless they are required and have been audited. 6. Require explicit user approval before installing or modifying software. 7. Validate the resolved executable path before invocation so that an unrelated or attacker-controlled binary cannot satisfy the `which` check. 8. Periodically audit the pinned package and update it only after reviewing the new release. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:39
Finding

Shell Command Injection Through Unquoted Dynamic CLI Arguments

Content
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--message <内容> ``` ```bash mcp-cloudplus send-file --to <用户名或群名> --file <文件路径> ``` ```bash mcp-cloudplus search-user <关键词> ``` ```bash mcp-cloudplus search-group-chat <关键词> ``` ```bash mcp-cloudplus search-file <关键词> ``` ```bash mcp-cloudplus search-message <关键词> ``` ```bash mcp-cloudplus search-light-apps <关键词> ``` ```bash mcp-cloudplus get-chat-history --username <用户名或群名> --start [--end ] ``` ```bash mcp-cloudplus open-url ``` ```bash mcp-cloudplus open-app <应用名> ``` The placeholders in these excerpts are reproduced exactly from the source and represent usernames, group names, content, paths, keywords, dates, URLs, and application names. ### Technical Analysis The documented commands place dynamic, potentially user-controlled values directly into shell command templates. The skill does not require an argument-array API, shell escaping, strict input validation, or the `--` end-of-options marker. If an agent implements these templates by textual substitution and passes the resulting string to a shell, whitespace can change argument boundaries and shell metacharacters can introduce additional commands, substitutions, redirections, or pipelines. Values beginning with a hyphen may also be interpreted as unexpected CLI options. Message content, search terms, contact names, file paths, URLs, and application names are particularly likely to contain spaces or punctuation. Quoting alone is not a complete defense if values are inserted into a preconstructed shell string using an incorrect escaping scheme. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker supplies a crafted value for a dynami ...[truncated 1599 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger description is broad enough to match generic messaging, search, file, or app-opening requests that may not explicitly reference CloudPlus. That can cause the skill to activate in contexts where the user did not intend to interact with CloudPlus, increasing the chance of unintended message sending, file transfer, history access, or link/app opening in a real enterprise account.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill can send messages, send files, open URLs, open apps, and launch CloudPlus, all of which change application state or can trigger external actions, yet there is no warning or confirmation requirement. In an enterprise messaging context, unintended execution could cause data leakage, phishing exposure, or unauthorized communication from the user’s account.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill includes commands to retrieve chat history and collected content, both of which may expose highly sensitive enterprise communications or stored materials, but it provides no warning or consent guidance. In the context of a communications skill, this makes accidental over-collection or disclosure more likely, especially if the skill is auto-selected from broad user requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest says the skill is for sending messages/files, searching contacts/groups/files/messages, and opening apps or links in CloudPlus. The documented command set also includes get-collect-content, which is a separate data-retrieval capability not mentioned in the description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.