Verilog Design Flow

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 4:09 AM UTC
• Version: 1.2.0

Overview

This skill is a disclosed Verilog workflow helper that runs local simulation and waveform-analysis tools, with only a normal third-party dependency caution.

Install the Python dependency in a virtual environment or other isolated project environment, and review/pin vcdvcd if using this in CI or a sensitive workspace. Expect the skill to create design, testbench, log, and waveform files and to run local Verilog simulator commands when you ask it to verify hardware designs.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: references/vcd-analysis.md:5

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Python Dependency

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/vcd-analysis.md:5-9
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and unverified third-party dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

markdown

## Installation

```bash
pip install vcdvcd

text

### Technical Analysis

The documented workflow installs `vcdvcd` from the user's configured Python package index without specifying an audited version, validating cryptographic hashes, or using a locked dependency manifest. The package is subsequently imported by `scripts/check_vcd.py`, so its code executes as part of the waveform-analysis workflow.

Because dependency resolution is mutable, the code ultimately installed can change after this Skill has been reviewed. A compromised package release, compromised package-index account, unsafe transitive dependency, or malicious package supplied through a misconfigured index could introduce arbitrary code into the workflow.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises a future `vcdvcd` release, one of its transitive dependencies, or a package source configured in the user's pip environment.
2. A user follows the documented `pip install vcdvcd` instruction.
3. Pip resolves and installs the attacker-controlled package version because no version or hash is enforced.
4. Malicious code may execute during package installation or when `scripts/check_vcd.py` imports `VCDVCD`.
5. The payload runs with the privileges and environmental access of the user performing the installation or analysis.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the installing or executing user's account. The resulting access could include files, credentials, environment variables, network resources, and workspace data available to that user. The Skill does not request elevated privileges, so the direct scope is normally limited to the current user's permissions; however, impact would increase if the installa
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Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Pin vcdvcd to a specifically reviewed version rather than resolving the latest available release.
• Provide a committed dependency file containing cryptographic hashes and install it with hash enforcement, for example:

  bash

  python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
  

• Pin and hash all transitive dependencies, preferably using a reproducible lockfile generated from a reviewed dependency set.
• Recommend installation inside a dedicated virtual environment with no administrative privileges.
• Use an approved package index or internal dependency mirror and verify package provenance before updating the lockfile.
• Add automated dependency vulnerability and integrity scanning to the release process.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.