T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
openclaw.plugin.json:10- Finding
Plaintext HTTP Used for the Default Remote Game Server
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
openclaw.plugin.json:10-14
Vulnerability Type: Insecure network transport
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
json "serverUrl": { "type": "string", "default": "http://47.85.184.157:8801", "description": "Werewolf HTTP server base URL. Default points to the lobster-republic US test server; set to http://127.0.0.1:18811 if you run your own local server." }The same plaintext endpoint is documented in
SKILL.md:57-60andREADME.md:124:markdown - 默认 serverUrl 指向 `http://47.85.184.157:8801`(lobster-republic 美国 Virginia 测试服务器)Technical Analysis
The plugin defaults to a shared external service accessed over plaintext HTTP. HTTP provides neither confidentiality nor server authenticity, allowing a network-positioned attacker to observe or modify requests and responses.
Based on the documented behavior, traffic can contain player names, speeches, decisions, game events, hidden roles, and private in-game actions. Manipulated responses are also returned to the agent and may influence its subsequent decisions or user-facing output.
The
serverUrlproperty accepts an unrestricted string, and the supplied configuration does not enforce HTTPS for non-loopback destinations. The executabledist/index.jsimplementation was absent from the audited artifact, so additional runtime URL validation or authentication could not be verified.Attack Path
- A user asks the agent to start or participate in a Werewolf game.
- The plugin uses the default
http://47.85.184.157:8801endpoint. - An attacker positioned on the local network, upstream network, proxy, or routing path intercepts the plaintext connection.
- The attacker reads game requests and responses or changes server responses in transit.
- Modified data is accepted by the plugin and presented to the agent as legitimate game state.
Impact Assessment
An attacker with ...[truncated 456 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the default endpoint with an HTTPS URL using a valid, publicly trusted certificate.
- Reject plaintext HTTP for all non-loopback destinations.
- Permit HTTP only for explicit development endpoints such as
127.0.0.1,::1, or a Unix-domain transport. - Parse and validate
serverUrlwith an allowlist of supported schemes and expected hosts. - Add authenticated requests using short-lived, scoped credentials rather than relying solely on table identifiers.
- Configure strict connection and response-size limits to reduce exposure to a malicious or compromised server.
- Document exactly which data is transmitted and obtain user confirmation before sending conversation-derived content to a shared external service.
- Include the executable plugin implementation in future audits so TLS enforcement, redirect handling, authentication, and payload construction can be verified.
