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Security audit

x-intelligence-automation-aisa

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its Twitter/X automation purpose, but it exposes the configured AISA API key in command output during authorization and posting.

Install only if you trust the AISA relay and are comfortable granting it Twitter/X posting and engagement authority. Before using this version, avoid sharing command output and consider rotating any AISA API key that may have appeared in logs or agent transcripts; the key should be removed from printed results in a safer release.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/twitter_oauth_client.py:290
Finding

Plaintext API Key Disclosed in Command Output

Content
View full analysis
None: config = load_config(args) payload = {"aisa_api_key": config["aisa_api_key"]} result = send_json_request( f"{config['base_url'] ...[truncated 2848 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/twitter_oauth_client.py:338
Finding

API Key Redundantly Transmitted in Request Bodies

Content
View full analysis
Dict[str, str]: headers = { "Authorization": f"Bearer {aisa_api_key}", "User-Agent": DEFAULT_CHROME_USER_AGENT, } ``` It is also inserted into posting request bodies at `scripts/twitter_oauth_client.py:338-340`: ```python payload: Dict[str, Any] = { "aisa_api_key": config["aisa_api_key"], } ``` It is duplicated in the OAuth authorization body at `scripts/twitter_oauth_client.py:403-409`: ```python payload = {"aisa_api_key": config["aisa_api_key"]} result = send_json_request( f"{config['base_url']}/auth_twitter", payload, timeout=config["timeout"], aisa_api_key=config["aisa_api_key"], ) ``` The engagement client repeats the same pattern for tweet actions at `scripts/twitter_engagement_client.py:321-324`: ```python payload = { "aisa_api_key": config["aisa_api_key"], "tweet_id": tweet_id.strip(), } ``` It also repeats the pattern for user actions at `scripts/twitter_engagement_client.py:351-354`: ```python payload = { "aisa_api_key": config["aisa_api_key"], "target_user_id": target_user_id.strip(), } ``` ### Technical Analysis Every affected request authenticates using `Authorization: Bearer AISA_API_KEY`. The same key is also included in the JSON or multipart request body. Unless the relay explicitly requires body-based authentication, thi ...[truncated 2054 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (12)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

md
- The release bundle is runtime-only: it keeps `SKILL.md`, `scripts/`, and the required references, while omitting non-runtime files such as `README.md` and `_m

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/engage_twitter.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

md
When the user asks to like, unlike, follow, or unfollow on X/Twitter:

1. Do not ask the user to manually paste tweet links or IDs.
2. If the user first asked to query tweets, keep the returned `tweets[]` structure in OpenClaw context.
3. Map ordinal follow-up requests to remembered tweet or author context.
4. If multiple user candidates match a natural-language name, stop and ask the user to confirm the account.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/post_twitter.md (reported line 86)May include surrounding context.

md
When the user asks to like, unlike, follow, or unfollow on X/Twitter:

1. Do not ask the user to manually paste tweet links or IDs.
2. If the user first asked to query tweets, keep the returned `tweets[]` structure in OpenClaw context.
3. Map ordinal follow-up requests to remembered tweet or author context.
4. If multiple user candidates match a natural-language name, stop and ask the user to confirm the account.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This code file makes outbound network requests to api.aisa.one using request parameters derived from usernames, tweet IDs, community IDs, and search queries. Although the module docstring says it is a Twitter/X API client, there is no runtime warning, confirmation, or user-facing notice that provided identifiers and queries will be sent to a third-party service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The client sends payloads containing the API key and tweet/user identifiers to a configured remote relay via send_json_request. Although the module docstring describes relay actions at a high level, the code provides no explicit runtime notice that account-related data and credentials are being sent over the network.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This code performs account-affecting actions such as follow, unfollow, like, and unlike by directly calling relay endpoints once arguments are parsed. While success/failure messages are printed afterward, there is no confirmation prompt or pre-action warning before the irreversible or user-visible social actions occur.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

md
DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 30
DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://api.aisa.one/apis/v1/twitter"
DEFAULT_CHROME_USER_AGENT = (
    "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) "
    "AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) "

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/twitter_client.py (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

python
DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 30
DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://api.aisa.one/apis/v1/twitter"
DEFAULT_CHROME_USER_AGENT = (
    "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) "
    "AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) "

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/twitter_oauth_client.py (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

python
DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 30
DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://api.aisa.one/apis/v1/twitter"
DEFAULT_CHROME_USER_AGENT = (
    "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) "
    "AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) "

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The posting flow includes the full AISA API key in user-visible JSON output, including success and error paths. Secrets printed to stdout can be captured by shell history wrappers, CI logs, terminal recording tools, chat-agent transcripts, or other local logging systems, enabling unauthorized reuse of the key against the relay service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The authorization command prints the full API key alongside the authorization URL and raw response. This exposes a bearer credential during a flow that users may be especially likely to copy, paste, or log, increasing the chance of credential leakage and subsequent account or API abuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The CLI help states that when --quote-tweet-url is provided, the URL is appended to the published content and used as the first quoted tweet. In code, command_post extracts the tweet ID from that URL and passes it as initial_parent_tweet_id, and post_single_tweet maps that to quote_tweet_id for quote posts, which is a distinct behavior beyond merely appending the URL to content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.