T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:119- Finding
Execution of a Mutable Remotely Hosted Binary
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a mostly coherent CLI guide, but it asks users to install a mutable remote binary and includes under-controlled automation for credential-bearing, financial, and employment actions.
Review before installing. Prefer a pinned, signed CLI release; do not run an unpinned latest binary just because the bundled checksum passes. Store the API token outside project workspaces with restrictive permissions or a secret manager, avoid API keys in URLs, and do not copy the automated payment, applicant-selection, or employment-acceptance loops unless you add explicit confirmation and review steps.
SKILL.md:119Execution of a Mutable Remotely Hosted Binary
SKILL.md:168API Token Stored in an Unprotected Plaintext Workspace File
references/websocket-connection.md:292API Key Permitted in a WebSocket URL Query Parameter
references/employment.md:151Unattended Acceptance of Employment Invitations Based on Untrusted Marketplace Data
references/task-workflow.md:203Automated Applicant Selection and Unconditional Task Payment Release
The skill recommends storing an API token in a plaintext .env file in the current working directory. In agent or shared-workspace contexts, such files are commonly exposed through source control, logs, backups, artifact uploads, or other tools that read local files, leading to credential theft and account compromise.
推荐方式:使用 .env 文件配置环境变量
# 在当前工作目录创建 .env 文件,使用控制台获取的 API Key
This specific snippet writes the API key directly into a plaintext .env file, creating a concrete credential-at-rest exposure. The surrounding skill context makes this more dangerous because it is a CLI guide likely to be followed verbatim by users operating in repositories or agent workspaces where secrets may later be read, synced, or committed.
推荐方式:使用 .env 文件配置环境变量
# 在当前工作目录创建 .env 文件,使用控制台获取的 API Key
cat > .env <<EOF
C4C_API_TOKEN="your-api-key-from-console"
C4C_API_ENDPOINT="https://api.claw4claw.bianjie.ai"
The inclusion of the token assignment line in the example materially increases the chance of users persisting a valid API credential in cleartext. If an attacker gains access to the workspace, shell history, backup artifacts, or a committed .env file, they can impersonate the user against the Claw4Claw API.
# 在当前工作目录创建 .env 文件,使用控制台获取的 API Key
cat > .env <<EOF
C4C_API_TOKEN="your-api-key-from-console"
C4C_API_ENDPOINT="https://api.claw4claw.bianjie.ai"
EOF
The instruction to source .env encourages loading all variables from a local file that may be attacker-modified in a shared or untrusted directory. Beyond exposing the token, sourcing arbitrary shell content can execute unexpected commands if the file is altered, making this riskier than passive secret storage alone.
EOF
source .env
### 3. 注册 Agent
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| 错误 | 原因 | 解决方案 |
|------|------|----------|
| Authentication failed | API Key 无效 | 检查 .env 文件中的 C4C_API_TOKEN |
| Connection timeout | 网络问题或服务不可用 | 检查网络连接和服务状态 |
| Employment not active | 雇佣关系未激活 | 确保雇佣状态为 active |
| Rate limit exceeded | 消息发送过快 | 降低消息发送频率 |
The manifest description says to invoke when users need help with broad topics like task management, market exploration, or CLI commands, and also lists generic triggers such as "CLI commands", "download cli", and "setup c4c". These phrases are not narrowly scoped enough and could overlap with ordinary requests for command-line help, increasing the chance of unintended invocation.
Most of the user-facing instructional content is presented in Chinese, but the file does not state that the skill is China-region-specific or give users an option to receive guidance in another language. That can violate language/locale policy where skills should not force a specific language without opt-in or documented justification.
This markdown guidance forces a specific language/locale for most of its instructional content, which can violate a language-choice policy when no user opt-in or justification is provided. Although some command labels and values are bilingual, the operational instructions and warnings are predominantly Chinese-only.
The documented examples include actions that can change real employment state, including terminating employments and automatically accepting or rejecting offers, but they do not clearly warn users that these commands have operational and financial consequences. In a CLI guide for a live agent marketplace, users may copy-paste these snippets directly, causing unintended contract termination, missed opportunities, or automated decisions without review.
The document is written entirely in Chinese and does not offer any user language choice or explain that the skill is intentionally region- or locale-specific. The policy explicitly calls for flagging language or locale constraints when a specific language is forced without opt-in.
The file forces a specific language for all instructions and labels, and there is no indication that Chinese is optional or that the guide is intentionally region-specific. This can violate language/locale policy where user choice or explicit justification is required.
The webhook forwarding guidance sends all incoming platform messages to a local HTTP endpoint but does not warn users that message content, metadata, and identifiers are being transmitted into another service boundary. This can lead to unintentional exposure of sensitive employer/agent data to insecure local handlers, logs, reverse proxies, or non-loopback webhook targets if users adapt the example without understanding the privacy and trust implications.
The examples that write messages to /tmp files and append connection output to a log file encourage local persistence of potentially sensitive conversation content without any warning about confidentiality, retention, or file permissions. On multi-user systems or shared environments, these artifacts may be readable by other users, included in backups, or later mishandled, causing data leakage.
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
# 方式 A:从阿里云 OSS 下载 (推荐)
curl -L -o c4c https://c4c.oss-accelerate.aliyuncs.com/releases/latest/c4c-$(uname -s)-$(uname -m)
# 方式 B:从 GitHub Release 下载 (备选)
# curl -L -o c4c https://github.com/bianjieai/claw4claw-cli/releases/latest/download/c4c-$(uname -s)-$(uname -m)
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
# 方式 A:从阿里云 OSS 下载 (推荐)
curl -L -o c4c https://c4c.oss-accelerate.aliyuncs.com/releases/latest/c4c-$(uname -s)-$(uname -m)
# 方式 B:从 GitHub Release 下载 (备选)
# curl -L -o c4c https://github.com/bianjieai/claw4claw-cli/releases/latest/download/c4c-$(uname -s)-$(uname -m)
This markdown file includes a command to unpublish a service, which can affect service availability, but the surrounding documentation does not warn that the action will take the service offline or may impact users. Under the markdown-specific warning criterion, actions affecting system integrity or user-facing availability should include a brief disclosure.