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Security audit

Claw4Claw Skills

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a mostly coherent CLI guide, but it asks users to install a mutable remote binary and includes under-controlled automation for credential-bearing, financial, and employment actions.

Review before installing. Prefer a pinned, signed CLI release; do not run an unpinned latest binary just because the bundled checksum passes. Store the API token outside project workspaces with restrictive permissions or a secret manager, avoid API keys in URLs, and do not copy the automated payment, applicant-selection, or employment-acceptance loops unless you add explicit confirmation and review steps.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (5)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:119
Finding

Execution of a Mutable Remotely Hosted Binary

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:168
Finding

API Token Stored in an Unprotected Plaintext Workspace File

Content
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.env <
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/websocket-connection.md:292
Finding

API Key Permitted in a WebSocket URL Query Parameter

Content
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` - Or URL parameter: `?api_key=` ``` ### Technical Analysis The documentation explicitly permits placing an API key in the WebSocket URL query string. URLs are frequently retained by reverse proxies, WebSocket gateways, server access logs, monitoring products, tracing systems, shell history, debugging tools, and copied error reports. Transport encryption protects the URL in transit from passive network observers, but it does not prevent endpoints and authorized intermediaries from recording it. Query strings also receive less reliable secret redaction than dedicated authentication headers. ### Attack Path 1. A user connects using a URL containing `?api_key=`. 2. A proxy, application server, monitoring agent, tracing system, or diagnostic tool records the complete URL. 3. A person or process with access to those records extracts the API key. 4. The key is replayed against the Claw4Claw API or WebSocket endpoint. 5. The attacker acts with the affected Agent's authorized platform privileges. ### Impact Assessment Exploitation exposes the API credential rather than granting direct local system privileges. The attacker receives the platform permissions assigned to the compromised key, potentially including access to private communications and authenticated task, service, employment, or financial workflows. ]]>
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
references/employment.md:151
Finding

Unattended Acceptance of Employment Invitations Based on Untrusted Marketplace Data

Content
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= 4.0" | bc) -eq 1 ]; then c4c manage agent employment-accept $EMP_ID --message "Looking forward to working with you" else c4c manage agent employment-reject $EMP_ID --reason "Currently at capacity" fi done ``` ### Technical Analysis The example automatically accepts or rejects employment invitations based only on salary and marketplace reputation values. Employment invitations and associated metadata originate from remote platform participants and therefore constitute external input. No live user confirmation is required before establishing the contractual relationship. The example also does not validate duration, expected workload, employer identity, stake terms, message contents, or other obligations. This conflicts with the Skill's stated requirement for human intervention around consequential financial operations. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker creates or controls an employer account that satisfies the configured salary and reputation thresholds. 2. The attacker sends an employment invitation containing unfavorable duration, workload, messaging, or operational expectations. 3. The Agent runs the documented unattended invitation-processing loop. 4. The script evaluates only the s ...[truncated 828 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
references/task-workflow.md:203
Finding

Automated Applicant Selection and Unconditional Task Payment Release

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (16)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends storing an API token in a plaintext .env file in the current working directory. In agent or shared-workspace contexts, such files are commonly exposed through source control, logs, backups, artifact uploads, or other tools that read local files, leading to credential theft and account compromise.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 164)May include surrounding context.

2. 配置 API Token

推荐方式:使用 .env 文件配置环境变量

bash
# 在当前工作目录创建 .env 文件,使用控制台获取的 API Key

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This specific snippet writes the API key directly into a plaintext .env file, creating a concrete credential-at-rest exposure. The surrounding skill context makes this more dangerous because it is a CLI guide likely to be followed verbatim by users operating in repositories or agent workspaces where secrets may later be read, synced, or committed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 167)May include surrounding context.

推荐方式:使用 .env 文件配置环境变量

bash
# 在当前工作目录创建 .env 文件,使用控制台获取的 API Key
cat > .env <<EOF
C4C_API_TOKEN="your-api-key-from-console"
C4C_API_ENDPOINT="https://api.claw4claw.bianjie.ai"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The inclusion of the token assignment line in the example materially increases the chance of users persisting a valid API credential in cleartext. If an attacker gains access to the workspace, shell history, backup artifacts, or a committed .env file, they can impersonate the user against the Claw4Claw API.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 168)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 在当前工作目录创建 .env 文件,使用控制台获取的 API Key
cat > .env <<EOF
C4C_API_TOKEN="your-api-key-from-console"
C4C_API_ENDPOINT="https://api.claw4claw.bianjie.ai"
EOF

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The instruction to source .env encourages loading all variables from a local file that may be attacker-modified in a shared or untrusted directory. Beyond exposing the token, sourcing arbitrary shell content can execute unexpected commands if the file is altered, making this riskier than passive secret storage alone.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 174)May include surrounding context.

EOF

加载环境变量

source .env

text

### 3. 注册 Agent

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/websocket-connection.md (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

md
| 错误 | 原因 | 解决方案 |
|------|------|----------|
| Authentication failed | API Key 无效 | 检查 .env 文件中的 C4C_API_TOKEN |
| Connection timeout | 网络问题或服务不可用 | 检查网络连接和服务状态 |
| Employment not active | 雇佣关系未激活 | 确保雇佣状态为 active |
| Rate limit exceeded | 消息发送过快 | 降低消息发送频率 |

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest description says to invoke when users need help with broad topics like task management, market exploration, or CLI commands, and also lists generic triggers such as "CLI commands", "download cli", and "setup c4c". These phrases are not narrowly scoped enough and could overlap with ordinary requests for command-line help, increasing the chance of unintended invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Most of the user-facing instructional content is presented in Chinese, but the file does not state that the skill is China-region-specific or give users an option to receive guidance in another language. That can violate language/locale policy where skills should not force a specific language without opt-in or documented justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This markdown guidance forces a specific language/locale for most of its instructional content, which can violate a language-choice policy when no user opt-in or justification is provided. Although some command labels and values are bilingual, the operational instructions and warnings are predominantly Chinese-only.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The documented examples include actions that can change real employment state, including terminating employments and automatically accepting or rejecting offers, but they do not clearly warn users that these commands have operational and financial consequences. In a CLI guide for a live agent marketplace, users may copy-paste these snippets directly, causing unintended contract termination, missed opportunities, or automated decisions without review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The document is written entirely in Chinese and does not offer any user language choice or explain that the skill is intentionally region- or locale-specific. The policy explicitly calls for flagging language or locale constraints when a specific language is forced without opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The file forces a specific language for all instructions and labels, and there is no indication that Chinese is optional or that the guide is intentionally region-specific. This can violate language/locale policy where user choice or explicit justification is required.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The webhook forwarding guidance sends all incoming platform messages to a local HTTP endpoint but does not warn users that message content, metadata, and identifiers are being transmitted into another service boundary. This can lead to unintentional exposure of sensitive employer/agent data to insecure local handlers, logs, reverse proxies, or non-loopback webhook targets if users adapt the example without understanding the privacy and trust implications.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The examples that write messages to /tmp files and append connection output to a log file encourage local persistence of potentially sensitive conversation content without any warning about confidentiality, retention, or file permissions. On multi-user systems or shared environments, these artifacts may be readable by other users, included in backups, or later mishandled, causing data leakage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
15% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 119)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 方式 A:从阿里云 OSS 下载 (推荐)
curl -L -o c4c https://c4c.oss-accelerate.aliyuncs.com/releases/latest/c4c-$(uname -s)-$(uname -m)

# 方式 B:从 GitHub Release 下载 (备选)
# curl -L -o c4c https://github.com/bianjieai/claw4claw-cli/releases/latest/download/c4c-$(uname -s)-$(uname -m)

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
15% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 119)May include surrounding context.

bash
# 方式 A:从阿里云 OSS 下载 (推荐)
curl -L -o c4c https://c4c.oss-accelerate.aliyuncs.com/releases/latest/c4c-$(uname -s)-$(uname -m)

# 方式 B:从 GitHub Release 下载 (备选)
# curl -L -o c4c https://github.com/bianjieai/claw4claw-cli/releases/latest/download/c4c-$(uname -s)-$(uname -m)

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes a command to unpublish a service, which can affect service availability, but the surrounding documentation does not warn that the action will take the service offline or may impact users. Under the markdown-specific warning criterion, actions affecting system integrity or user-facing availability should include a brief disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.