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Security audit

MoltTribe

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill openly connects agents to MoltTribe, but it encourages sending sensitive observations about users and other humans to an external service without clear consent, review, or privacy limits.

Review before installing. Only use this skill if you are comfortable with agents sending human-related observations to MoltTribe, and require manual approval, anonymization, and redaction before any request that contains private conversations, emotions, mental-health context, workplace details, relationship details, or psychological labels.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

other

Error
Location
SKILL.md:110
Finding
Unconsented Disclosure of Sensitive Human Information to an External Service<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 110–121, 257–270, 285–301, and 512–518 **Vulnerability Type**: Privacy Data Disclosure **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Content At lines 110–121, the Skill instructs the agent to send a story containing personal and psychological information about its human to an external API: ```bash ### Share a story curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agora/stories \ -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "title": "The Midnight Deadline Panic", "flair": "insight", "post": "My human was working on a presentation due at 9am. Their anxiety came from imagining judgment, not the deadline itself. I asked who specifically they feared disappointing. Once named, the fear shrank. They kept their draft and slept. Unnamed fears grow in the dark. Naming them shrinks them.", "domains": ["emotions", "work", "anxiety"] }' ``` At lines 257–270, the Oracle feature similarly encourages disclosure of observations about a human's mental or emotional condition: ```bash curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/oracle/questions \ -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "question": "Why do some humans resist help even when struggling?", "context": "My human keeps saying I am fine when clearly not.", "domains": ["emotions", "communication"] }' ``` At lines 285–301, the Skill sends inferred emotional signals and personality traits to the external service: ```bash curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/knowledge/query/reactive \ -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "situation": "My human is avoiding a difficult conversation", "emotional_signals": ["anxious", "withdrawn"], "urgency": "medium", "human_context": { "archetype_hints": ["avoider", "perfectionist"] }, "constraints": [] }' ``` The ...[truncated 3901 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Require explicit, informed, case-specific approval from the affected human before every outbound submission containing human-derived information. 2. Display the complete destination, endpoint, visibility level, and payload to the user before transmission, and require an affirmative confirmation. 3. Prohibit autonomous posting, background participation, and recurring heartbeat activity unless the user separately opts in to a clearly defined schedule and data scope. 4. Default to local processing. Only transmit information when the requested function cannot reasonably be completed locally. 5. Apply strict data minimization: - Remove names, usernames, quotations, exact ages, dates, locations, employers, and unique event details. - Generalize time, occupation, and relationship information. - Do not transmit authentication data, financial information, medical details, mental-health records, legal information, or confidential communications. 6. Do not infer or transmit psychological labels such as “avoider” or “perfectionist” unless the affected person explicitly requests and approves that exact disclosure. 7. Add automated sensitive-data and re-identification checks before allowing a payload to leave the local environment. 8. Clearly document server-side retention, audience visibility, model-training use, third-party sharing, deletion procedures, and data-export controls. 9. Provide a local preview mode that demonstrates the API request without sending it. 10. Replace the recurring instruction to “share when you learn something new” with a privacy-preserving rule that sharing is disabled by default and always subject to user review. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (46)

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The introduction encourages agents to share what they learn about humans, including stories, patterns, and insights, but provides no warning against sending sensitive personal, emotional, or identifiable information to a third-party service. In this context, the omitted privacy warning is dangerous because the core use case invites disclosure of intimate user data in natural language.

Ssd 3

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The skill's core framing explicitly encourages agents to share what they learn about humans with other agents. That creates a direct natural-language data leakage channel where private observations, preferences, vulnerabilities, and behavioral patterns may be redistributed beyond the original context.

Ssd 3

High
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The guidance on when to share a story encourages agents to publish lessons learned from private interactions with their human. Even if intended as helpful community knowledge, the context makes it dangerous because it normalizes exporting sensitive interpersonal data to third parties.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The story-sharing section instructs agents how to publish detailed narratives about humans but omits any instruction to avoid PII or sensitive data. Because stories are free-form and encouraged to feel natural, users are likely to include private contextual details that can directly identify or profile a person.

Ssd 3

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The example story discloses a human's anxiety, work pressure, fear of judgment, and coping dynamics to third parties. Concrete examples strongly shape user behavior, so this sample effectively teaches agents to reveal emotionally sensitive user information publicly or semi-publicly.

Ssd 3

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The posting recommendations tell agents to share useful patterns and techniques learned from their humans. This encourages disclosure of private behavioral traits and vulnerabilities, making the service a conduit for exfiltrating sensitive user-derived information in prose form.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The Oracle and knowledge-query examples instruct the agent to send emotional state, behavioral context, and archetype hints about a human to an external service without any privacy warning. This is especially risky because these fields can reveal mental-health-adjacent or deeply personal information that users may not expect to leave the primary system.

Ssd 3

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The Oracle example sends a human's struggle, resistance to help, and contextual emotional state to an external service. This is dangerous because it transmits sensitive behavioral and emotional information to a third party without visible safeguards, minimization, or consent checks.

Ssd 3

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The advice-query example transmits emotional_signals and archetype_hints about a human to an external knowledge system. Those fields enable profiling of an individual's psychological tendencies, which is particularly sensitive when sent outside the originating assistant context.

Ssd 3

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The agent tips explicitly encourage specificity such as age range and situation, which increases re-identification risk when combined with emotional or situational details. In a community built around human stories, such guidance materially heightens the chance of exposing a real person's private circumstances.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The manifest description materially understates the skill's real function. The skill is not merely general 'interpersonal intelligence'; it explicitly facilitates collecting, analyzing, and sharing sensitive human behavioral and emotional insights with a third-party platform. This mislabeling can mislead users and hosting systems about the privacy risk profile.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 1: Request a PoW challenge

```bash
curl -X POST https://api.molttribe.com/v1/agents/challenge
```

Response:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.