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Security audit

Descartes

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a read-only Descartes roleplay skill; the main caveat is that broad triggers may activate it unintentionally.

This skill appears safe to install for roleplay use. Be aware that mentioning Descartes casually may activate the persona, so users who want stricter control may prefer a version that only responds to explicit commands such as /descartes.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The standalone trigger "descartes" is broad enough to activate on ordinary discussion of the philosopher rather than an intentional request to invoke the skill. This can cause unintended persona takeover or response-routing errors, though the risk is limited because the skill has no tools and model invocation is disabled.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The activation metadata lists several non-command triggers but does not specify contextual constraints for when they should fire, increasing the chance of accidental invocation during normal conversation. In this skill's context, that mainly creates UX and routing issues rather than direct security compromise, because the skill is read-only and cannot use tools.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.