Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a Markdown-only CLI reference skill with broad but disclosed shell/file examples and no hidden execution mechanism.
Before installing, be aware this skill may encourage the agent to use powerful shell commands. Review commands before approving deletion, in-place rewrites, global configuration changes, or network fetches, especially outside version-controlled projects.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Flatten JSON:
curl -s https://api.github.com/users/octocat | gron
Filter flattened JSON:
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Flatten JSON:
curl -s https://api.github.com/users/octocat | gron
Filter flattened JSON:
The example shows recursive deletion using fdfind piped to rm without any warning, dry-run step, or safer alternative. In an agent-assisted environment, such patterns can be copied directly and cause irreversible data loss if the match pattern is broader than intended or executed in the wrong directory.
The sd examples present in-place modification as routine without warning about overwriting files or recommending backups and previews. This can lead to silent corruption or widespread unintended edits, especially when reused across multiple files by an agent or user.
The ast-grep rewrite example performs in-place source changes across a directory without warning about bulk modification risk. Structural rewrites can affect many files at once, so omission of review and rollback guidance raises the chance of large-scale accidental code damage.
The documentation expands a local CLI tooling skill into remote network-fetching workflows by showing direct URL retrieval and processing. In an agent context, this broadens the effective capability surface from local shell/file operations to external data access, which can enable unintended outbound requests, data retrieval from untrusted sources, or use in data exfiltration chains.
This example includes direct transmission to an external domain, demonstrating outbound access that is not central to the skill’s declared local tooling purpose. In agent settings, such examples can legitimize external communications and be repurposed to contact attacker-controlled hosts or retrieve untrusted data.
gron data.json
# Flatten from URL
gron https://api.github.com/users/octocat
# Flatten from stdin
curl -s https://api.example.com | gron
The yq documentation repeatedly uses in-place config edits without warning that configuration files are being modified directly. In configuration contexts, accidental changes can break deployments, alter security settings, or overwrite sensitive operational state.
The html2text examples explicitly demonstrate retrieving remote web content with curl, which is outside the stated local shell/file tooling focus. In an agent skill, documenting remote retrieval normalizes external access and increases the chance the skill is used to fetch untrusted content or send requests beyond the user’s expectations.
The integration workflow includes a remote API fetch pipeline even though the skill is described as shell operations, directory traversal, and file manipulation. That unjustified network capability materially changes the risk profile because an agent could contact arbitrary external services under the guise of normal tooling usage.
The example shows yq ... -i config.yaml, which edits a file in place, but the surrounding markdown provides no warning that the command will modify the user's file contents. For markdown files, safety-relevant behaviors affecting user data should be disclosed so readers understand the command is not read-only.
The manifest emphasizes minimizing token usage for shell commands, directory traversal, and file manipulation with listed tools, but does not mention handling environment variables. The yq section explicitly promotes environment variable substitution and demonstrates injecting DB_HOST into config editing, which is a broader capability than the stated description communicates.
The example sets diff.external with git config --global, which changes user-wide Git behavior, but the markdown does not mention that it affects all repositories for the current user. While not destructive, it alters persistent tooling configuration and should be disclosed clearly.
The manifest justification centers on efficient shell command execution, traversing directories, and manipulating files with reduced token usage. The 'System Analysis' workflow teaches process monitoring and CPU-based inspection via ps and jc, which is a broader operational capability not clearly justified by the stated file/shell-manipulation purpose.