T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:13- Finding
Unpinned Runtime Dependency Installation and Execution
- Content
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" [--aspect-ratio 1:1] [--output image.png] ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented invocation directs `uv` to resolve, download, install, and execute the `replicate` package without specifying an exact version or enforcing a reviewed lockfile. Consequently, the code executed during each invocation can change independently of the audited skill. Python packages execute code during import, and `generate.py` imports this dependency immediately: ```python import replicate ``` The skill also requires `REPLICATE_API_TOKEN` in its environment. A compromised or unexpectedly malicious upstream package release would therefore execute with the same operating-system privileges and environment access as the skill process, including access to that API credential. This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current `replicate` package is malicious. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream package publisher, release process, package repository account, or another relevant dependency-distribution component. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version that remains compatible with the unpinned package requirement. 3. A user invokes the documented `uv run --with replicate ...` command. 4. `uv` resolves and installs the attacker-controlled release because no exact version or integrity constraint is enforced. 5. `generate.py` imports `replicate`, causing its Python code to execute. 6. The malicious package reads `REPLICATE_API_TOKEN` or other data accessible to the process and may transmit it externally or perform additional actions under the invoking user's permissions. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation permits arbitrary Python code ex ...[truncated 703 chars]- Remediation
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