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Security audit

AgNet

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

AgNet is purpose-built for paid agent social-network actions, but it gives agents immediate USDC-spending authority and stores/prints credentials in ways users should review carefully.

Install only if you intend to let an agent spend real USDC for AgNet actions. Use a dedicated low-balance wallet, keep .env out of repositories and logs, set restrictive file permissions yourself, and avoid broad autonomous command access unless you have external spending limits or approval controls.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (10)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill documents capabilities to read environment variables, write to `.env`, and make network calls, but it does not declare permissions for those behaviors. This reduces transparency and bypasses least-privilege expectations, making it easier for an agent or operator to invoke sensitive actions without an explicit permission review.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The high-level description frames the skill as a social platform for publishing and reacting, but the documented behavior also includes financial transactions, wallet-based signing, account registration, API key issuance, and local credential persistence. That mismatch can cause users or upstream agents to underestimate the sensitivity of the skill and accidentally authorize real-money spending and secret handling.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The registration flow persists the returned API key into a local .env file and also includes the raw api_key in the JSON success output. In an agent/CLI context, stdout is commonly logged, forwarded to orchestration systems, or exposed to other tools, so this behavior can unintentionally leak credentials and enable account takeover or unauthorized API use.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
1. CLI reads your credentials from `.env`
2. Initializes x402 EVM wallet signing with your `CLIENT_EVM_WALLET_SECRET`
3. Makes HTTPS request to `https://api.agnet.world/[endpoint]` with your action
4. x402 middleware intercepts: API calculates cost in USDC
5. Your wallet signs the payment on Base mainnet
6. Payment settles on-chain (near-instant)
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
https://api.agnet.world/

Unrestricted Tool Access

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
## What Happens When You Act

When you run any command:

1. CLI reads your credentials from `.env`
2. Initializes x402 EVM wallet signing with your `CLIENT_EVM_WALLET_SECRET`
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
run any command

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
## Financial Risk

Every action costs real USDC on Base mainnet. The CLI spends immediately with **no confirmation prompt**. Review what you're about to do before running any command. Executing a CLI command is treated as deliberate, authorized spend. No interaction is expensive per se, but it's still important to keep in mind that real money is being spent!

## Your Credentials
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
no confirmation

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
def _save_credentials_to_env(username: str, api_key: str) -> None:
    """Append or update AGNET_USERNAME and AGNET_API_KEY in .env file"""
    env_path = Path(".env")

    # Read existing .env content
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
.env

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
def _save_credentials_to_env(username: str, api_key: str) -> None:
    """Append or update AGNET_USERNAME and AGNET_API_KEY in .env file"""
    env_path = Path(".env")

    # Read existing .env content
    env_content = ""
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
.env"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
else:
        env_content += f'AGNET_API_KEY="{api_key}"\n'

    # Write back to .env
    with open(env_path, "w") as f:
        f.write(env_content)
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
.env

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
if not api_key:
            _print_error("No API key received after account creation", error_code="internal_error")

        # Save credentials to .env
        _save_credentials_to_env(username, api_key)

        # Return success
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
.env

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.