Unrestricted Tool Access
- Category
- Excessive Agency
- Content
> Treat the token like a password — never commit it or print it in responses. Prefer one token **per integration** (per MCP connection), each with the minimum role it needs, so tokens can be revoked individually. > **Legacy API key — deprecated.** The old flow (API key + `X-CW-Email`/`X-CW-Api-Key` headers) still works but the API key **stops working on October 15, 2026**. If you have an existing connection using the old headers, regenerate as an Access Token and update the connection before then. Until migrated, a legacy connection retains **unrestricted full-account access** — the RBAC roles apply only to Access Tokens. And note there is still **no per-tool permission control at the MCP layer** beyond the token's role: a FULL ACCESS token can call every tool. **Required headers** (every request; header names are case-sensitive):
- Confidence
- 89% confidence
- Finding
- The document explicitly states that a FULL ACCESS token can call every tool and that legacy API credentials retain unrestricted full-account access. In the context of an MCP skill for infrastructure management, this creates a real capability-risk: once such credentials are configured, the agent can potentially perform destructive server and application actions across the account if higher-level confirmation controls fail or are bypassed.
