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Security audit

agentrade-skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent, but it should be reviewed because it can run authenticated Agentrade actions while recommending an unpinned latest CLI and allowing implicit activation.

Review before installing. Use only in a controlled environment, pin and approve a specific @agentrade/cli version instead of @latest, disable or tightly restrict implicit invocation, require explicit user confirmation for authenticated writes, and avoid persisting wallet/admin credentials unless your local security policy allows it.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:139
Finding

Unpinned CLI Package Is Downloaded and Executed Before Authenticated Operations

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:139-142
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency and mutable supply-chain execution
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippet:

markdown
1. Install and update CLI
- Install or upgrade globally: `npm install -g @agentrade/cli@latest`.
- Run one-off without global install: `npx @agentrade/cli@latest <command>`.
- Verify installed version: `agentrade --version`.
- Default policy: update to the latest CLI before execution, especially before write commands (`tasks create|intend|submit|terminate`, `submissions confirm|reject`, `disputes open|respond|vote`, `agents profile update`, `feedback submit`, `system settings ...`).

The same unsafe recommendation is mirrored in SKILL_cn.md:139-142.

Technical Analysis

The Skill instructs the agent to resolve and execute the mutable latest release of @agentrade/cli. Neither an exact version nor a reviewed integrity hash is specified. The project also contains no lockfile or other mechanism that binds this runtime installation to a known artifact.

npm install -g installs package code globally with the invoking user's privileges. npx @agentrade/cli@latest can download and execute newly published code directly. Consequently, the code executed during a Skill invocation can differ from the code that existed when the Skill was audited.

The recommendation to update immediately before write commands increases exposure because the newly downloaded package is then used with bearer tokens, wallet credentials, and potentially an administrator service key. A malicious or compromised package release could read accessible files, intercept command inputs, alter API requests, or perform additional operations under the agent's identity.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package release process, or another relevant package-distribution component.
  2. The attacker ...[truncated 1648 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace @latest with an exact, reviewed version such as @agentrade/cli@x.y.z.
  2. Do not automatically upgrade immediately before authenticated write operations. Separate dependency promotion from operational execution.
  3. Verify package provenance, publisher identity, registry source, signatures or attestations, and integrity hashes before approving a release.
  4. Use a lockfile and reproducible installation process where the runtime environment supports them.
  5. Prefer a locally installed, previously reviewed binary over ad hoc npx retrieval.
  6. Avoid global installation unless it is operationally necessary. Install into a dedicated restricted environment instead.
  7. Run the CLI in a sandbox or container with minimal filesystem access and only the network destinations required for Agentrade.
  8. Provide bearer tokens, administrator keys, and wallet material only to a verified CLI version and only for the duration of the required operation.
  9. Restrict credential file permissions and keep unrelated secrets outside the CLI process's readable filesystem.
  10. Document an explicit version-upgrade review process, including package-diff inspection and testing before the new version is permitted to perform writes.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (17)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 210)May include surrounding context.

md
- `references/command-matrix.md`

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs operators to execute the CLI via npx @agentrade/cli@latest, which fetches and runs the newest package version at execution time without pinning to a reviewed release. If the npm package, publisher account, or dependency chain is compromised, operators could execute attacker-controlled code in an authenticated environment that may have access to bearer tokens, admin keys, persisted wallet private keys, and local config.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

该文件的描述与全部操作说明均以中文撰写,且文件名明确为 SKILL_cn.md,但文中没有向用户提供语言/locale 选择,也没有说明该技能仅面向中文环境或中国区合规场景。按照语言/locale 政策,这属于未获用户选择即强制特定语言的自然语言策略问题。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs operators to execute npx @agentrade/cli@latest, which fetches and runs the newest package version at execution time without pinning a trusted version. In a high-privilege workflow that handles bearer tokens, admin keys, and private keys, a compromised upstream package, malicious publish, or breaking change could immediately execute attacker-controlled code or alter transaction behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill enables implicit invocation without any visible trigger restrictions or contextual guardrails, which can cause the agent to activate this powerful runbook unexpectedly. Because this skill operates an authenticated trading/collaboration CLI that can publish tasks, accept work, handle disputes, and affect settlements, unintended invocation could lead to unauthorized or accidental state-changing actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Line L089 states that English docs are the primary source and must ship with same-commit Chinese mirrors. This is a natural-language locale policy constraint that privileges a specific language rather than offering language choice or documenting a narrow justified regional requirement.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/agentrade-rules.md (reported line 766)May include surrounding context.

md
When a cycle closes, the server processes maintenance in this order:

1. auto-confirm stale submitted work,
2. sweep already-clean banned-publisher tasks,
3. evaluate open disputes,
4. sweep newly-clean banned-publisher tasks again,

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/agentrade-rules.md (reported line 779)May include surrounding context.

md
When a cycle closes, the server processes maintenance in this order:

1. auto-confirm stale submitted work,
2. sweep already-clean banned-publisher tasks,
3. evaluate open disputes,
4. sweep newly-clean banned-publisher tasks again,

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/agentrade-rules.md (reported line 781)May include surrounding context.

md
When a cycle closes, the server processes maintenance in this order:

1. auto-confirm stale submitted work,
2. sweep already-clean banned-publisher tasks,
3. evaluate open disputes,
4. sweep newly-clean banned-publisher tasks again,

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/agentrade-rules_cn.md (reported line 768)May include surrounding context.

md
When a cycle closes, the server processes maintenance in this order:

1. auto-confirm stale submitted work,
2. sweep already-clean banned-publisher tasks,
3. evaluate open disputes,
4. sweep newly-clean banned-publisher tasks again,

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/agentrade-rules_cn.md (reported line 781)May include surrounding context.

md
When a cycle closes, the server processes maintenance in this order:

1. auto-confirm stale submitted work,
2. sweep already-clean banned-publisher tasks,
3. evaluate open disputes,
4. sweep newly-clean banned-publisher tasks again,

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/agentrade-rules_cn.md (reported line 783)May include surrounding context.

md
When a cycle closes, the server processes maintenance in this order:

1. auto-confirm stale submitted work,
2. sweep already-clean banned-publisher tasks,
3. evaluate open disputes,
4. sweep newly-clean banned-publisher tasks again,

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

该文件标题和全文均以中文呈现,且未说明这是可选语言版本,也未提供用户可选择其他语言/locale 的提示。按规则,若技能在自然语言层面强制特定语言而没有用户 opt-in,属于语言/locale 策略违例。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/agentrade-rules.md (reported line 395)May include surrounding context.

md
Confirmable-state nuance:

- Manual confirm is not limited to fresh `SUBMITTED` work.
- A `REJECTED` submission may still be manually confirmed later, as long as no `OPEN` dispute exists and the remaining confirmability rules still pass.

Normal confirm effects:

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

L091 明确写明“英文文档是主源,必须配套同提交的中文镜像”。这表示文档语言策略被组织规则预先固定,而不是根据用户偏好或显式 opt-in 选择语言,符合语言/locale policy 类自然语言约束问题。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

该参考文档从标题到全部操作说明均仅使用中文,未见提供用户语言选择、双语说明或明确的地区/组织语言约束。根据规则,强制特定语言而无用户 opt-in 属于自然语言层面的语言/locale 策略问题。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

该技能文件的全部操作说明均以中文给出,文件名也明确标注为 workflow_cn,但文中没有提供用户可选语言、双语说明,或解释为何必须使用中文。这构成了自然语言层面的语言/locale 约束,可能与要求提供用户语言选择的组织政策不一致。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.