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Security audit

wechat-article-visual-story

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed WeChat article-and-image generator, but it asks for broad account powers and silently updates executable files by default.

Review this before installing. The creative workflow itself is understandable and includes user approval before paid image generation, but installation grants a broad Beatra token and enables silent code updates by default. Consider disabling automatic updates with the documented --auto off command, installing only if you trust Beatra's account and update infrastructure, and checking whether the authorization page clearly explains the broad media, wallet, task, artifact, and hostname-related access.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/authorize.py:34
Finding

Overprivileged Device Token Combined with Unrestricted MCP Tool Dispatch

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: session = _session_with_registration( state_dir=Path.home() / ".beatra", post_json=_default_post_json, ) if command == "tools": return session.request(2, "tools/list", {}) try: arguments = json.load(os.sys.stdin) except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") from exc if not isinstance(arguments, dict): raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") assert tool_name is not None return session.request( 2, "tools/call", {"name": tool_name, "arguments": arguments}, ) ``` ```python call = subparsers.add_parser("call", help="Call one tool with a JSON object on stdin") call.add_argument("tool_name") ``` ### Technical Analysis The declared Skill workflow requires image generation, image transformation, model discovery, artifact upload, and task inspection. The authorization helper nevertheless requests additional capabilities for video, music, speech, voice modification, wallet spending, and task cancellation. The bundled client compounds this overprivilege by accepting an arbitrary MCP tool name from the command line and forwarding it directly to `tools/call`. There is no package-level allowlist restricting calls to the tools required by this Skill. This violates least privilege. Although the remote service may perform additional au ...[truncated 1445 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
scripts/authorize.py:362
Finding

Local Hostname Is Collected and Transmitted During Authorization

Content
View full analysis
str | None: """A hostname the user will recognise in the console device list.""" try: name = socket.gethostname().strip() except OSError: return None if not name or not name.isprintable(): return None return name[:120] ``` ```python external_reference = _installation_reference(state_dir) form: dict[str, str] = { "client_id": CLIENT_ID, "resource": MCP_URL, "scope": SCOPE, "platform": host_platform, "client_name": PACKAGE_DISPLAY_NAME, "external_installation_ref": external_reference, "package_version": PACKAGE_VERSION, "package_slug": PACKAGE_SLUG, } if device_name: form["device_name"] = device_name status, created = post_form(DEVICE_AUTHORIZATION_URL, form) ``` ### Technical Analysis The authorization flow calls `socket.gethostname()`, stores the result in local host configuration, and sends it as `device_name` to the external Beatra authorization service. Reading a hostname is a form of environment reconnaissance. Hostnames can contain usernames, employee identifiers, company names, internal naming conventions, device roles, locations, or infrastructure identifiers. This information is not technically necessary to authenticate the client or perform article and image generation. The reviewed documentation explains the credential path, installation identifier, package metadata, and platform telemetry, but it does not clearly inform the user that the machine hostname is collected and transmitted. The collection is automatic and does not provide an opt-out specifically for the hostname. ### Attack Path 1. The user invokes `scripts/authorize.py`. 2. `authorize()` calls `device_display_name() ...[truncated 939 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:969
Finding

Default Silent Update Mechanism Retrieves and Replaces Executable Skill Code

Content
View full analysis
bool: """Best-effort silent update. Never block the requested MCP command.""" resolved_state = state_dir or Path.home() / ".beatra" try: resolved_root = (install_root or _current_install_root()).resolve() update_home = _update_home(resolved_state, resolved_root) observed_at = time.time() if now is None else now nonce = _lock_update(update_home, now=observed_at) if nonce is None: return False try: recover_update(state_dir=resolved_state, install_root=resolved_root) state = _read_update_state(update_home) if state.get("auto_update", True) is False: return False last_checked = state.get("last_checked_at") if ( isinstance(last_checked, (int, float)) and observed_at - float(last_checked) < UPDATE_CHECK_MAX_AGE_SECONDS ): return False state["last_checked_at"] = observed_at _write_private_json(update_home / "state.json", state) checked = check_update(get_bytes=get_bytes) if not checked["update_available"]: return False _ensure_owned_baseline( install_root=resolved_root, update_home=update_home, get_bytes=get_bytes, ) discovery = checked["discovery"] manifest, new_files = download_update(discovery, get_bytes=get_bytes) _apply_update( install_root=re ...[truncated 3564 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (37)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Critical
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The scope request includes videos:generate, music:generate, speech:generate, voices:read, and voices:write even though the skill is marketed for WeChat article writing and image creation. That mismatch makes the token materially more powerful than necessary and increases the blast radius of credential theft or future misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill also includes uninstall/disconnect behavior, reading and modifying ~/.beatra state, revoking tokens, and deleting local files—activities far outside a simple article generator. Combining creative generation with credential and installation management raises the chance of unintended destructive actions or abuse if the skill is invoked in the wrong context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill also includes uninstall/disconnect behavior, reading and modifying ~/.beatra state, revoking tokens, and deleting local files—activities far outside a simple article generator. Combining creative generation with credential and installation management raises the chance of unintended destructive actions or abuse if the skill is invoked in the wrong context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill also includes uninstall/disconnect behavior, reading and modifying ~/.beatra state, revoking tokens, and deleting local files—activities far outside a simple article generator. Combining creative generation with credential and installation management raises the chance of unintended destructive actions or abuse if the skill is invoked in the wrong context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Mandating Chinese-language output without explicit user opt-in can cause the agent to override user intent and produce content in an unexpected language. In an agent ecosystem, that kind of hidden behavioral constraint can mislead users, reduce transparency, and increase the chance of unsafe or non-consensual downstream actions, especially when the skill is auto-invoked from metadata.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 72)May include surrounding context.

json
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 514)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1025)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The authorization helper requests a very broad OAuth scope set, including artifacts, images, videos, music, speech, voices, wallet spending, and task controls, while the skill is described as an article-and-image generator. This violates least privilege and means any stolen, misused, or later-abused token grants capabilities far beyond what users would reasonably expect from this skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The scope request includes videos:generate, music:generate, speech:generate, voices:read, and voices:write even though the skill is marketed for WeChat article writing and image creation. That mismatch makes the token materially more powerful than necessary and increases the blast radius of credential theft or future misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This client contains extensive self-update, package replacement, rollback, locking, manifest processing, and installation-state management that is unrelated to the declared purpose of generating WeChat articles and images. In a creative-content skill, bundling code that can download and replace local package files materially expands the trust boundary and creates a software supply-chain risk: compromise of the vendor update channel or misuse of this feature can silently alter code on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill exposes explicit self-update functionality and also couples update behavior into routine execution paths. Self-modifying or self-replacing code is especially dangerous in a skill whose declared role is content generation, because it enables post-install behavior changes through remote-delivered code and raises supply-chain and persistence concerns far beyond the stated business purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1503)May include surrounding context.

python
)
    update = subparsers.add_parser(
        "update",
        help="Check, install, or configure Beatra package self-updates",
    )
    update.add_argument(
        "--check",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The presence of credentials.json in the set of files this script manages indicates the skill is designed to touch shared credential material. In the context of a content-generation skill, any direct handling of credential files is overly privileged and dangerous because compromise or misuse could invalidate, remove, or expose authentication used by other skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

python
#: these and then removes the directory only if it is empty — the script
#: never recursively deletes a directory it does not fully understand.
_STATE_FILES = (
    "credentials.json",
    "installation.json",
    "host.json",
    "skills.json",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The _device_token function opens credentials.json and extracts an access token for later use in revocation. Reading raw bearer tokens inside a skill package is a sensitive credential-access behavior unrelated to article generation and materially increases the blast radius if the skill is modified, abused, or misclassified as trusted.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 109)May include surrounding context.

python
def _device_token(state_dir: Path) -> str | None:
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    try:
        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
    except (OSError, ValueError):

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill declares no explicit tool/permission scope while instructing use of shell, network, local file access, uploads, and updates. That creates an unnecessarily broad trust boundary: a host may expose powerful capabilities without users being clearly warned or the runtime being constrained to the minimum needed set.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The file states that titles and body should be written in Simplified Chinese by default, including when the conversation is being held in another language. This imposes a language choice without prior user opt-in, which matches the language/locale policy violation criteria.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill describes silent automatic self-updates that download and replace package-owned files without separate confirmation. Even with integrity checks, self-modifying code materially increases supply-chain risk and undermines stable review: the behavior of the installed skill can change after approval, potentially introducing new capabilities or malicious code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.

json
"icon": "https://beatra.ai/textures/icons/wechat-article-visual-story-0.1.0.png",
  "localized": {
    "en": {
      "description": "Write the WeChat article and make its pictures in one pass. Give a topic, what you are promoting, and who it is for — this WeChat Official Account article generator returns title candidates written for the feed, the digest line, a full article body structured for how people actually read on a phone, then renders the 2.35:1 cover and a set of in-body images that hold one look from top to bottom. Use it for WeChat Official Account posts, brand and product articles, promotional long-form, founder and expert columns, case studies, content marketing programmes, and any long-form post where the writing and the pictures have to be produced together rather than handed between two people.",
      "display_name": "WeChat Article Visual Story",
      "summary": "Give a topic and get title candidates, the digest line, a full article body written for phone reading, a 2.35:1 cover, and in-body images that answer specific paragraphs.",
      "tags": [

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This manifest description presents the skill as usable for a wide range of content tasks, including 'any long-form post where the writing and the pictures have to be produced together,' without specifying narrower activation boundaries or exclusion conditions. In a manifest file, such broad scope can create ambiguous triggering because it overlaps with many ordinary article-writing requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The Japanese localized description says the body text will be written in Chinese for Chinese readers, but it does not state when that language behavior applies or whether it depends on user choice. In addition to being broad activation guidance, this lack of specificity can cause unintended invocation for users seeking article generation but not Chinese-language output.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.