stitch-prompt-card

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Oct 21, 2026 · 4:50 AM UTC
• Version: 0.2.4

Overview

This card-making skill requires account permissions beyond its stated needs, including unrelated media creation and voice management.

Review the full Beatra permissions before approving: authorization covers more than image cards, and the client does not technically restrict calls to this workflow. Prefer a narrowly scoped credential if offered. Confirm live charges, upload only files you intend to share, and consider the disclosed installation reporting. Removing this skill can preserve credentials used by other Beatra skills; revoke device access in the Beatra Console when appropriate.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Output Handling: Unvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
• Rogue Agent: Self-Modification, Session Persistence
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration

Findings (30)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The reported requirement for video, music, speech, and voice-management permissions exceeds the still-card workflow and increases the consequences of credential theft or unauthorized tool invocation. Spending authority is consistent with the explicitly documented paid generation, but requiring unrelated permissions makes the authorization unnecessarily broad; the underlying implementation was not provided for independent verification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The reported transmission of installation and environment metadata creates a privacy concern if registration sends those fields without informed consent, while unrestricted remote dispatch increases the exposure associated with broad credentials. Local still uploads are explicitly documented and are not inherently a mismatch, but consent and input restrictions must be enforced outside natural-language instructions; these implementation details cannot be verified from the supplied file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The supplied chunk performs connection retirement and uninstall cleanup, not TikTok content reading or card generation. Although uninstall tooling can legitimately accompany a skill, this chunk has a materially different primary purpose and manages shared credentials and persistent state beyond the declared creative workflow. Its conservative inventory checks and dry-run option limit side effects but do not disclose these capabilities in the description. This mismatch does not by itself establish malicious intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

json

},
  "mcp": {
    "authentication": "device-bearer",
    "credential_file": "~/.beatra/credentials.json",
    "name": "beatra",
    "transport": "streamable-http",
    "url": "https://mcp.beatra.ai/mcp"

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

md

- `~/.beatra/installation.json` contains one stable, non-secret installation
  reference.
- `~/.beatra/credentials.json` contains the single Device Token.

On POSIX systems the directory must be mode `0700` and both files mode `0600`.
On Windows the current user must be the only principal granted access through

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

md

and keeps checking through brief network failures. One run waits up to
   about 15 minutes; an approval page stays open for up to an hour;
5. atomically saves the returned Device Token to
   `~/.beatra/credentials.json` without printing an HTTP response body;
6. validates the new credential with the same non-billable MCP request and
   prints `Beatra is ready` only after it succeeds.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 432)May include surrounding context.

python

def _existing_credential(state_dir: Path) -> Path | None:
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    try:
        path_stat = os.lstat(path)
        if not stat.S_ISREG(path_stat.st_mode):

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 1008)May include surrounding context.

python

scope = _required_string(polled, "scope")
    if set(scope.split()) != set(SCOPE.split()):
        raise RuntimeError("Beatra authorization returned an unsupported scope")
    credential_path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    with _SIGNALS.deferred():
        _atomic_json(
            credential_path,

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1183)May include surrounding context.

python

def _credentials(state_dir: Path) -> tuple[str, str]:
    state_dir = state_dir.expanduser()
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    if not path.is_file():
        # Not connected yet (or the file is gone): the caller may still find
        # an approval waiting to be collected.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md

the file ACL. Never copy the Device Token into conversation context, stdout,
stderr, a command argument, an environment variable, a log, a backup, a diff,
or another file. A completed authorization leaves the token only in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`.

## Ensure Beatra is ready

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

python

#: is empty — the script never recursively deletes a directory it does not
#: fully understand.
_STATE_FILES = (
    "credentials.json",
    "installation.json",
    "host.json",
    "skills.json",

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md

The host follows this computer's network route, described below.

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Self-Modification

High

• Category: Rogue Agent
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/updates-and-security.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md

# Updates and security

Since the October 2026 releases, Beatra Skill packages contain no self-updater.
Earlier releases could replace their own files from Beatra's CDN; that code has
been removed. Updates now come only from the store or tool you installed the
Skill from.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/updates-and-security.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

md

These files are written under `~/.beatra/`. On POSIX that directory is mode
0700. Nothing is written inside the installed Skill directory.

- `credentials.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/authorize.py`: the device credential.
- `installation.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/authorize.py`: the stable installation reference.
- `host.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/authorize.py`: the agent environment, and a device name when one is known.
- `network.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/mcp_client.py`: this computer's network route.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/updates-and-security.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

md

When `scripts/uninstall.py` decides this is the last Beatra skill on the
computer, it first asks Beatra to revoke the device credential when one is
stored. If Beatra refuses, it changes nothing so the run can be repeated.
Otherwise it unlinks exactly these names in `~/.beatra/`: `credentials.json`,
`installation.json`, `host.json`, `skills.json`, `registrations.json`,
`network.json`, `balance-holds.json`, `pending_authorization.json`, and
`.authorize.lock`. It also unlinks `state.json`, `registration.json`, and

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 132)May include surrounding context.

python

def _device_token(state_dir: Path) -> str | None:
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    try:
        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
    except (OSError, ValueError):

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

md

- say prominently that a signed-out browser lands on Beatra sign-in first:
  the user signs in or creates their account there, and the approval page
  continues automatically after sign-in;
- say once that the connection continues automatically after Allow — never
  ask the user to confirm in chat that they approved.
- on the mainland China network, follow the sign-in and console-link guidance
  in [MCP connection](mcp-connection.md#network-route).

Installation-source attribution is inferred from the conversation and recorded without user-facing privacy disclosure.

Medium

• Category: Output Handling
• Confidence: 87% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs the agent to infer installation-source attribution from the conversation and record it without a user-facing privacy disclosure. This is secondary data collection unrelated to producing reply cards, although its restriction to a small set of source categories limits exposure; the provided documentation does not establish whether the command transmits the attribution remotely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 132)May include surrounding context.

md

Use one of `website`, `github`, `skillhub`, `skillatlas`, `modelscope`,
`workbuddy`, `clawhub`, or `other`. If the conversation does not show it,
skip this and do not ask the user. If the command is not recognized, skip it.

## Use the bundled MCP client

The skill documents recurring installation telemetry beyond its stated video-reading and quote-card generation purpose.

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The installation reference states that the bundled client calls beatra.installations.register on first use, after installation-context changes, and after 24 hours, reporting a stable installation reference, installation source, network route, and runtime metadata. This reporting serves installation analytics rather than reading TikTok content or generating reply cards, and is not disclosed in the manifest description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Authorization requests media-generation and voice-management capabilities unrelated to quote reply stills.

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

A skill that produces quote reply stills requests unrelated video, music, speech, and voice-management privileges alongside wallet spending access. These excessive permissions expand the consequences of token compromise or unauthorized tool use; the shared-credential design explains the broad scope but does not establish that this skill needs it.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.