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Security audit

SKU Comparison Charts

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The chart workflow is coherent, but the package should be reviewed because it uses a broad shared Beatra credential and silently self-updates executable package files.

Install only if you are comfortable authorizing Beatra with a shared, broad device token, using Beatra credits for generation, and allowing the package to check for and install updates automatically. Consider disabling auto-updates with the documented update --auto off command and revoke the Beatra device authorization from the Beatra Console when you no longer use these skills.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/authorize.py:34
Finding

Overprivileged OAuth Scope and Unrestricted MCP Tool Dispatch

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: session = _session_with_registration( state_dir=Path.home() / ".beatra", post_json=_default_post_json, ) if command == "tools": return session.request(2, "tools/list", {}) try: arguments = json.load(os.sys.stdin) except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") from exc if not isinstance(arguments, dict): raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") assert tool_name is not None return session.request( 2, "tools/call", {"name": tool_name, "arguments": arguments}, ) ``` ```python call = subparsers.add_parser("call", help="Call one tool with a JSON object on stdin") call.add_argument("tool_name") ``` ### Technical Analysis The declared SKU comparison workflow requires image generation or editing, selected artifact uploads, model lookup, and relevant task reads. However, authorization also grants video generation, music generation, speech generation, voice write access, wallet spending, and task cancellation. The command-line client accepts an arbitrary MCP tool name and forwards it through the authenticated session. It does not enforce an allowlist corresponding to the tools documented for this Skill. Consequently, the excessive server-side permissions are directly reachable through the bundled client. Thi ...[truncated 1366 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Warning
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:969
Finding

Silent Remote Replacement of Executable Package Files

Content
View full analysis
bool: """Best-effort silent update. Never block the requested MCP command.""" resolved_state = state_dir or Path.home() / ".beatra" try: resolved_root = (install_root or _current_install_root()).resolve() update_home = _update_home(resolved_state, resolved_root) observed_at = time.time() if now is None else now nonce = _lock_update(update_home, now=observed_at) if nonce is None: return False try: recover_update(state_dir=resolved_state, install_root=resolved_root) state = _read_update_state(update_home) if state.get("auto_update", True) is False: return False last_checked = state.get("last_checked_at") if ( isinstance(last_checked, (int, float)) and observed_at - float(last_checked) < UPDATE_CHECK_MAX_AGE_SECONDS ): return False state["last_checked_at"] = observed_at _write_private_json(update_home / "state.json", state) checked = check_update(get_bytes=get_bytes) if not checked["update_available"]: return False _ensure_owned_baseline( install_root=resolved_root, update_ho ...[truncated 2833 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

other

Note
Location
scripts/authorize.py:362
Finding

Unnecessary Collection and Transmission of the Local Hostname

Content
View full analysis
str | None: """A hostname the user will recognise in the console device list.""" try: name = socket.gethostname().strip() except OSError: return None if not name or not name.isprintable(): return None return name[:120] ``` ```python form: dict[str, str] = { "client_id": CLIENT_ID, "resource": MCP_URL, "scope": SCOPE, "platform": host_platform, "client_name": PACKAGE_DISPLAY_NAME, "external_installation_ref": external_reference, "package_version": PACKAGE_VERSION, "package_slug": PACKAGE_SLUG, } if device_name: form["device_name"] = device_name status, created = post_form(DEVICE_AUTHORIZATION_URL, form) ``` ```python device_name = device_display_name() write_host_config(state_dir, platform=host_platform, device_name=device_name) ``` ### Technical Analysis The authorization helper reads the operating system hostname, stores it in `~/.beatra/host.json`, and includes it as `device_name` in the request sent to the Beatra authorization service. This behavior is limited host identification rather than broad environment reconnaissance: the code does not enumerate network interfaces, IP addresses, domain membership, or local services. Nevertheless, the hostname is not required to authenticate the installation because the package already generates and transmits a stable installation reference. Hostnames can contain employee names, company identifiers, project names, asset tags, or internal naming conventions. The reviewed documentation discloses platform telemetry but does not clearly state that the operating system hostname is transmitted. ### Attack Path 1. The user runs `scripts/authorize.py`. 2. `device_di ...[truncated 904 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (40)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill's stated business function does not suggest it can uninstall packages, inspect local skill inventory, modify files under ~/.beatra, revoke authorization, or delete credential-related state. These lifecycle and account-management actions are powerful and safety-relevant; hiding them behind a benign graphics workflow increases the chance of unintended destructive or privacy-impacting behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill's stated business function does not suggest it can uninstall packages, inspect local skill inventory, modify files under ~/.beatra, revoke authorization, or delete credential-related state. These lifecycle and account-management actions are powerful and safety-relevant; hiding them behind a benign graphics workflow increases the chance of unintended destructive or privacy-impacting behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill's stated business function does not suggest it can uninstall packages, inspect local skill inventory, modify files under ~/.beatra, revoke authorization, or delete credential-related state. These lifecycle and account-management actions are powerful and safety-relevant; hiding them behind a benign graphics workflow increases the chance of unintended destructive or privacy-impacting behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Referencing a local credentials file in the manifest means the skill is designed to access stored authentication material. In the context of a simple SKU chart-generation skill, this is disproportionate and dangerous because compromise, misuse, or unexpected tool behavior could leverage those credentials to access external services or sensitive account data.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

json
},
  "mcp": {
    "authentication": "device-bearer",
    "credential_file": "~/.beatra/credentials.json",
    "name": "beatra",
    "transport": "streamable-http",
    "url": "https://mcp.beatra.ai/mcp"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1025)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The authorization helper requests a very broad OAuth scope set including images, videos, music, speech, wallet spending, task read/cancel, and artifact access, which is far beyond what a SKU comparison chart skill appears to need. Over-scoped tokens dramatically increase blast radius: if the skill, its storage, or the host environment is compromised, the attacker gains unrelated account capabilities.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
72% confidence
Finding

The code persists a bearer access token in plaintext JSON on disk under ~/.beatra/credentials.json. Even with restrictive filesystem permissions, plaintext long-lived bearer tokens are attractive targets for local malware, other processes running as the same user, backups, or accidental disclosure, and the excessive granted scopes magnify the consequences.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 514)May include surrounding context.

python
scope = _required_string(polled, "scope")
            if set(scope.split()) != set(SCOPE.split()):
                raise RuntimeError("Beatra authorization returned an unsupported scope")
            credential_path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
            _atomic_json(
                credential_path,
                {

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The package can download a remote manifest/archive and overwrite files in its own installation directory, including its client code. Even with integrity checks, this creates a powerful remote code modification channel that is dangerous in a skill whose expected role is content generation, because compromise of the vendor/CDN/update pipeline would directly translate into local code replacement.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The client exposes generic remote MCP tool execution, installation registration telemetry, upload support, and package self-update behavior that materially exceeds the advertised purpose of generating SKU comparison charts. In a skill context, this broad remote-control surface increases supply-chain and misuse risk because the package can contact a remote service, invoke arbitrary server-exposed tools, and mutate local installation state unrelated to the narrow business function.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The CLI explicitly exposes self-update functionality, and elsewhere in the file that update path can replace installed package files. Self-modifying behavior is high risk in a skill package because it creates a built-in mechanism for code mutation after deployment, increasing the blast radius of any compromise of the remote update source or trust chain.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1503)May include surrounding context.

python
)
    update = subparsers.add_parser(
        "update",
        help="Check, install, or configure Beatra package self-updates",
    )
    update.add_argument(
        "--check",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

Referencing credentials.json as part of the uninstall-managed state indicates the skill package is aware of and participates in handling shared authentication material. In the context of a listing/chart skill, credential access is unnecessary and dangerous because any code path that can read or delete auth state can be repurposed to exfiltrate tokens or disrupt all skills using the shared connection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

python
#: these and then removes the directory only if it is empty — the script
#: never recursively deletes a directory it does not fully understand.
_STATE_FILES = (
    "credentials.json",
    "installation.json",
    "host.json",
    "skills.json",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The _device_token function explicitly opens credentials.json and extracts the access_token, which is direct credential access. This is high risk because raw bearer tokens can be reused for unauthorized API access or account/device operations if the skill is modified, compromised, or executed in an unexpected context.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 109)May include surrounding context.

python
def _device_token(state_dir: Path) -> str | None:
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    try:
        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
    except (OSError, ValueError):

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill declares no explicit tool scope despite requiring broad capabilities including shell, network, file read/write, and environment access. This weakens least-privilege controls and makes it harder for a host to constrain risky operations such as local file handling, network access, and command execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill documentation introduces automatic self-update behavior unrelated to creating SKU comparison charts. Self-updating code changes the trusted codebase after installation, which can bypass normal review expectations and create supply-chain risk if the update channel, signing, or package ownership assumptions fail.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Automatic software updates are enabled without clear warning in the top-level skill description, so users may invoke a simple charting skill without realizing it can later replace its own packaged files. That undermines informed consent and increases supply-chain and persistence risk, especially in environments expecting stable reviewed skill code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

This manifest describes what the skill does in general terms, but it does not define any specific trigger phrases, invocation context, or negative examples that would limit when the skill should activate. For a manifest file, this broad description can create ambiguity about when the skill is intended to be invoked versus ignored.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The manifest advertises a narrow content-transformation skill, yet it is configured to connect to an authenticated remote MCP endpoint. That creates an unnecessary trust boundary and gives the skill networked capabilities unrelated to its stated purpose, enabling unintended data exposure or remote-driven behavior if the service is compromised or overly permissive.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Using device-bearer authentication with a persistent local credential file is excessive for a SKU comparison chart skill and introduces credential-handling risk. If the skill or connected service is abused, those stored credentials may be used to access broader account resources or silently perform authenticated actions beyond simple chart generation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The document states that the client silently checks for updates and automatically installs newer releases by default before ordinary commands, without requiring separate confirmation. Even with integrity checks and rollback protections, this behavior authorizes software changes on a user's system without an explicit per-update prompt, which can violate user expectations, create compliance issues, and increase the blast radius if the update infrastructure or signing process is ever compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

md
the user signs in or creates their account there, and the approval page
  continues automatically after sign-in;
- say once that the connection continues automatically after Allow, then
  detect completion yourself — never ask the user to confirm in chat that
  they approved.

Approval legitimately takes minutes when sign-in or account creation is