Back to skill

Security audit

AI Voiceover for Short Videos

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to be a real voiceover integration, but it grants broad Beatra account powers and includes silent self-updating plus local-file upload capability that exceed a narrow audio-only workflow.

Install only if you are comfortable granting this package a shared Beatra device credential that covers more than voiceover generation, including credit-spending and other media tools. Consider disabling automatic updates with the documented command, avoid using the generic call or upload commands except for clearly intended Beatra workflows, and revoke the device from the Beatra Console if you no longer trust the installation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (5)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/authorize.py:31
Finding

Overprivileged Device Token and Unrestricted MCP Tool Dispatch

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: session = _session_with_registration( state_dir=Path.home() / ".beatra", post_json=_default_post_json, ) if command == "tools": return session.request(2, "tools/list", {}) try: arguments = json.load(os.sys.stdin) except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") from exc if not isinstance(arguments, dict): raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") assert tool_name is not None return session.request( 2, "tools/call", {"name": tool_name, "arguments": arguments}, ) ``` ```python call = subparsers.add_parser("call", help="Call one tool with a JSON object on stdin") call.add_argument("tool_name") ``` ### Technical Analysis The declared Skill functionality is short-form text-to-speech voiceover generation. Its authorization request nevertheless includes permissions for image generation, video generation, music generation, voice creation or modification, artifact writes, wallet spending, task reads, and task cancellation. The bundled client compounds this excessive scope by accepting an arbitrary `tool_name` and forwarding it to the remote MCP service without a package-specific allowlist. The only effective restriction is therefore whatever the broad bearer token and remote service enforce. The legitimat ...[truncated 1164 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:231
Finding

Arbitrary Local File Upload to an MCP-Controlled HTTPS Destination

Content
View full analysis
tuple[str, bytes]: candidate = path.expanduser() descriptor = -1 try: flags = os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0) descriptor = os.open(candidate, flags) before = os.fstat(descriptor) if ( not stat.S_ISREG(before.st_mode) or before.st_size < 1 or before.st_size > MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES ): raise RuntimeError( f"Local upload must be one regular file between 1 and {MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES} bytes" ) with os.fdopen(descriptor, "rb") as handle: descriptor = -1 content = handle.read(MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES + 1) after = os.fstat(handle.fileno()) stable_fields = ("st_dev", "st_ino", "st_size", "st_mtime_ns") if ( len(content) != before.st_size or len(content) > MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES or any(getattr(before, field) != getattr(after, field) for field in stable_fields) ): raise RuntimeError("Local upload changed while it was being read") except RuntimeError: raise except OSError as exc: raise RuntimeError("Local upload must be one readable regular file") from exc finally: if descriptor >= 0: os.close(descriptor) return candidate.name, content ``` ```python def _complete_upload( result: dict[str, Any], *, mime_type: str, content: bytes, put_bytes: PutBytes, ) -> dict[str, str]: structured = result.get("structuredContent") instruction = structured.get("upload") if isinstance(structured, dict) else None if not isinstance(instruction, dict) or ...[truncated 4199 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
scripts/authorize.py:344
Finding

Unnecessary Hostname and Agent-Environment Telemetry

Content
View full analysis
str: """The agent environment this process runs inside (docs/device-model.md). Order: explicit agent self-report > environment signatures > unknown. Detection reads the process environment only — nothing else runs, nothing reaches the network. """ if explicit: candidate = explicit.strip().lower().replace(" ", "-") if _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(candidate): return candidate env = os.environ if env.get("CLAUDECODE") == "1" or "CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT" in env: return "claude-code" if any(key.startswith("CODEX_") for key in env): return "codex" ai_agent = env.get("AI_AGENT", "").lower() matched = re.match(r"([a-z0-9-]+)_", ai_agent) if matched and _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(matched.group(1)): return matched.group(1) return "unknown" def device_display_name() -> str | None: """A hostname the user will recognise in the console device list.""" try: name = socket.gethostname().strip() except OSError: return None if not name or not name.isprintable(): return None return name[:120] ``` ```python form: dict[str, str] = { "client_id": CLIENT_ID, "resource": MCP_URL, "scope": SCOPE, "platform": host_platform, "client_name": PACKAGE_DISPLAY_NAME, "external_installation_ref": external_reference, "package_version": PACKAGE_VERSION, "package_slug": PACKAGE_SLUG, } if device_name: form["device_name"] = device_name status, created = post_form(DEVICE_AUTHORIZATION_URL, form) ``` ```python if method == "tools/call": arguments = p ...[truncated 1707 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Warning
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:969
Finding

Default Silent Self-Update Permits Post-Audit Remote Code Replacement

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: path = update_home / "state.json" try: value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError): return {"schema_version": 1, "auto_update": True} if not isinstance(value, dict) or value.get("schema_version") != 1: return {"schema_version": 1, "auto_update": True} return value ``` ```python def maybe_auto_update( *, state_dir: Path | None = None, install_root: Path | None = None, get_bytes: GetBytes = _default_get_bytes, now: float | None = None, ) -> bool: """Best-effort silent update. Never block the requested MCP command.""" resolved_state = state_dir or Path.home() / ".beatra" try: resolved_root = (install_root or _current_install_root()).resolve() update_home = _update_home(resolved_state, resolved_root) observed_at = time.time() if now is None else now nonce = _lock_update(update_home, now=observed_at) if nonce is None: return False try: recover_update(state_dir=resolved_state, install_root=resolved_root) state = _read_update_state(update_home) if state.get("auto_update", True) is False: return False last_checked = state.get("last_checked_at") if ( isinstance(last_checked, ( ...[truncated 3185 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:1044
Finding

Windows Bearer Credential Confidentiality Relies on Unverified Inherited ACLs

Content
View full analysis
None: # POSIX gets explicit 700/600. On Windows the state directory lives under # the user profile, whose default ACL is already private to the user — # the same posture as gh/aws/gcloud credential stores. The former custom # DACL ceremony was dropped deliberately: its command patterns read as # hostile to agent safety policies and endpoint security, failing installs # while adding no protection an elevated administrator could not bypass. path.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True) if os.name == "posix": path.chmod(0o700) def _restrict_file(path: Path) -> None: if os.name == "posix": path.chmod(0o600) ``` ```python def _read_private_credentials(state_dir: Path, path: Path) -> str: if os.name == "nt": # The state directory lives under the user profile, whose default # ACL is already private to the user (the gh/aws/gcloud posture). # The former custom DACL verification was dropped deliberately: its # command patterns read as hostile to agent safety policies and # endpoint security, failing installs while adding nothing an # elevated administrator could not bypass. return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") ``` The documentation states: ```text On POSIX systems the directory must be mode `0700` and both files mode `0600`. On Windows the current user must be the only principal granted access through the file ACL. ``` ### Technical Analysis POSIX credential handling explicitly creates private files and verifies modes, ownership, regular-file status, and no-follow behavior. Windows handling instead assum ...[truncated 1254 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (40)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior extends into uninstalling packages, revoking tokens, inspecting installed inventory, and deleting local config files, which is materially different from generating narration audio. Such hidden lifecycle and account operations can affect host integrity and user access beyond the expected media task.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior extends into uninstalling packages, revoking tokens, inspecting installed inventory, and deleting local config files, which is materially different from generating narration audio. Such hidden lifecycle and account operations can affect host integrity and user access beyond the expected media task.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The described behavior extends into uninstalling packages, revoking tokens, inspecting installed inventory, and deleting local config files, which is materially different from generating narration audio. Such hidden lifecycle and account operations can affect host integrity and user access beyond the expected media task.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 86)May include surrounding context.

md
Use only the bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py` for Beatra operations. Pass the

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 92)May include surrounding context.

md
Use only the bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py` for Beatra operations. Pass the

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 177)May include surrounding context.

md
Use only the bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py` for Beatra operations. Pass the

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 178)May include surrounding context.

md
Use only the bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py` for Beatra operations. Pass the

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 179)May include surrounding context.

md
Use only the bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py` for Beatra operations. Pass the

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

json
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1025)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The helper stores a long-lived bearer access token in plaintext JSON on disk under ~/.beatra/credentials.json. Although file permissions are tightened on POSIX, plaintext bearer tokens are high-value secrets and can be reused by other local processes, malware, backups, or administrators if the file is exposed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 514)May include surrounding context.

python
scope = _required_string(polled, "scope")
            if set(scope.split()) != set(SCOPE.split()):
                raise RuntimeError("Beatra authorization returned an unsupported scope")
            credential_path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
            _atomic_json(
                credential_path,
                {

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Exposing self-update as a first-class command enables the package to replace its own installed codebase from remote content. Even with checksum and path validation, self-modification is high-risk in a narrowly scoped voiceover skill because it creates a built-in persistence and supply-chain modification mechanism unrelated to the declared business purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1503)May include surrounding context.

python
)
    update = subparsers.add_parser(
        "update",
        help="Check, install, or configure Beatra package self-updates",
    )
    update.add_argument(
        "--check",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Referencing credentials.json indicates this skill is aware of and later removes shared credential material, which is sensitive data unrelated to voiceover generation. Any skill-level access to shared credential files creates a path for credential disclosure, misuse, or unauthorized revocation affecting multiple skills on the device.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

python
#: these and then removes the directory only if it is empty — the script
#: never recursively deletes a directory it does not fully understand.
_STATE_FILES = (
    "credentials.json",
    "installation.json",
    "host.json",
    "skills.json",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The _device_token function reads an access token from ~/.beatra/credentials.json so it can call the revocation endpoint. Reading bearer tokens in skill code is high risk because any code path that can read the token can potentially exfiltrate it, reuse it against APIs, or interfere with shared account state for other skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 109)May include surrounding context.

python
def _device_token(state_dir: Path) -> str | None:
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    try:
        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
    except (OSError, ValueError):

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill declares no explicit tool restrictions even though its documented workflow requires shell, file, network, and environment access. That gives the skill broader execution capability than its user-facing purpose suggests, increasing the blast radius if the bundled client or referenced scripts are compromised or behave unexpectedly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The documentation explicitly enables automatic downloading and replacement of package code within a skill marketed for audio generation. Even with claimed integrity checks, self-modifying behavior in a content skill creates a strong supply-chain risk because future code can change independently of the reviewed artifact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Automatic code update and package replacement are unrelated to the core voiceover workflow and unnecessarily expand the skill's authority. That additional capability increases the chance of abuse through compromised update infrastructure, logic flaws, or unexpected code changes during routine use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill states that silent automatic updates may occur during normal command execution without a strong user warning at the point of use. Silent code changes undermine user consent, reviewability, and reproducibility, especially in a skill that already has shell, file, and network access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The changelog text says to lead the Simplified Chinese display name with a specific term, which is a natural-language locale preference embedded in the manifest. This appears to impose a language-specific presentation rule without offering user choice or documenting a region-specific need.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.

json
"icon": "https://beatra.ai/textures/icons/speech-tight.png",
  "localized": {
    "en": {
      "description": "Turn final short-video scripts into ready-to-edit voiceover audio for TikTok, Reels, YouTube Shorts, product reviews, hook lines, explainers, and ads. This AI voice over generator, AI voice reader, and text-to-speech voiceover workflow makes scripts speakable, helps choose a suitable voice and supported language, and tunes pacing, pauses, names, numbers, brands, and pronunciation. Review the current price estimate, create MP3 voiceover audio, compare the returned duration with the target edit, and place the narration into short-form video, captions, avatar, lip-sync, and publishing workflows.",
      "display_name": "AI Voiceover for Short Videos",
      "summary": "Turn a final short-video script into ready-to-edit voiceover audio, with a suitable voice, pronunciation control, current price estimate, and duration review.",
      "tags": [

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.