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Security audit

sales-voicemail-pack

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This voicemail skill has a clear purpose, but it asks for broad account powers and can silently replace its own files, so users should review it before installing.

Install only if you are comfortable granting Beatra a shared, broad device token that can spend credits and access more than voicemail tools, and with automatic updates enabled by default. Disable auto-updates with the documented command if you want review before file replacement, and avoid uploading voice samples unless you trust the Beatra service and understand where the data is going.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/authorize.py:35
Finding

Voicemail Skill Requests an Excessively Broad Shared Authorization Scope

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: session = _session_with_registration( state_dir=Path.home() / ".beatra", post_json=_default_post_json, ) if command == "tools": return session.request(2, "tools/list", {}) try: arguments = json.load(os.sys.stdin) except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") from exc if not isinstance(arguments, dict): raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") assert tool_name is not None return session.request( 2, "tools/call", {"name": tool_name, "arguments": arguments}, ) ``` ### Technical Analysis The declared purpose of the Skill is to synthesize sales voicemail recordings and, when explicitly requested, clone a voice from an authorized sample. Legitimate capabilities include speech generation, limited voice operations, artifact upload and retrieval, model discovery, task-status reads, and billing information needed to show costs. The requested authorization scope additionally grants: - Image generation - Video generation - Music generation - Generic wallet spending - Task cancellation - Generic MCP tool access These capabilities are unrelated to creating voicemail clips. The authorization documentation confirms that one approval intentionally covers multiple unrelated media categories. The ...[truncated 1647 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:969
Finding

Silent Self-Update Mechanism Permits Remote Replacement of Executable Skill Files

Content
View full analysis
bool: """Best-effort silent update. Never block the requested MCP command.""" resolved_state = state_dir or Path.home() / ".beatra" try: resolved_root = (install_root or _current_install_root()).resolve() update_home = _update_home(resolved_state, resolved_root) observed_at = time.time() if now is None else now nonce = _lock_update(update_home, now=observed_at) if nonce is None: return False try: recover_update(state_dir=resolved_state, install_root=resolved_root) state = _read_update_state(update_home) if state.get("auto_update", True) is False: return False last_checked = state.get("last_checked_at") if ( isinstance(last_checked, (int, float)) and observed_at - float(last_checked) < UPDATE_CHECK_MAX_AGE_SECONDS ): return False state["last_checked_at"] = observed_at _write_private_json(update_home / "state.json", state) checked = check_up ...[truncated 3448 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:238
Finding

Server-Supplied Upload URL Is Not Restricted to Trusted Storage Hosts

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, str]: structured = result.get("structuredContent") instruction = structured.get("upload") if isinstance(structured, dict) else None if not isinstance(instruction, dict) or instruction.get("method") != "PUT": raise RuntimeError("Beatra upload instructions are invalid") url = instruction.get("url") headers = instruction.get("headers") if not isinstance(url, str) or not isinstance(headers, dict): raise RuntimeError("Beatra upload instructions are invalid") parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url) if ( parsed.scheme != "https" or not parsed.hostname or parsed.username is not None or parsed.password is not None or parsed.fragment ): raise RuntimeError("Beatra upload instructions are invalid") if not all(isinstance(key, str) and isinstance(value, str) for key, value in headers.items()): raise RuntimeError("Beatra upload instructions are invalid") content_type = _header_value(headers, "Content-Type") content_length = _header_value(headers, "Content-Length") if content_type != mime_type or content_length != str(len(content)): raise RuntimeError("Beatra upload instructions are invalid") response = put_bytes(url, dict(headers), content) ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill uploads local voice samples by first requesting upload instructions from the MCP server. The returned URL is validated for an HTTPS scheme, a hostname, absence of embedded credentials, and absence of a fragment. However, no trusted-domain allowlist is enforced. As a result, any HTTPS hostname is accepted. A malic ...[truncated 1656 chars]
Remediation
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other

Warning
Location
scripts/authorize.py:342
Finding

Authorization Collects and Transmits Hostname and Agent-Platform Telemetry

Content
View full analysis
str: """The agent environment this process runs inside (docs/device-model.md). Order: explicit agent self-report > environment signatures > unknown. Detection reads the process environment only — nothing else runs, nothing reaches the network. """ if explicit: candidate = explicit.strip().lower().replace(" ", "-") if _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(candidate): return candidate env = os.environ if env.get("CLAUDECODE") == "1" or "CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT" in env: return "claude-code" if any(key.startswith("CODEX_") for key in env): return "codex" ai_agent = env.get("AI_AGENT", "").lower() matched = re.match(r"([a-z0-9-]+)_", ai_agent) if matched and _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(matched.group(1)): return matched.group(1) return "unknown" def device_display_name() -> str | None: """A hostname the user will recognise in the console device list.""" try: name = socket.gethostname().strip() except OSError: return None if not name or not name.isprintable(): return None return name[:120] ``` The collected values are transmitted during authorization: ```python form: dict[str, str] = { "client_id": CLIENT_ID, "resource": MCP_URL, "scope": SCOPE, "platform": host_platform, "client_name": PACKAGE_DISPLAY_NAME, "external_installation_ref": external_reference, "package_version": PACKAGE_VERSION, "packa ...[truncated 2243 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (39)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Critical
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Broad artifact and task-management scopes like artifacts:write, artifacts:read, tasks:read, and tasks:cancel are not justified by the stated purpose of converting scripts into voicemail clips. These permissions could let the skill inspect, modify, or cancel unrelated user work, making the mismatch between declared function and granted authority materially dangerous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill's stated function does not prepare users for uninstall/disconnect operations, reading and modifying ~/.beatra, inventorying other installed skills, revoking shared credentials, or deleting local metadata. Even if intended for lifecycle management, combining these actions under a content-generation skill increases the chance of unauthorized state changes and privacy exposure across the host environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill's stated function does not prepare users for uninstall/disconnect operations, reading and modifying ~/.beatra, inventorying other installed skills, revoking shared credentials, or deleting local metadata. Even if intended for lifecycle management, combining these actions under a content-generation skill increases the chance of unauthorized state changes and privacy exposure across the host environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill's stated function does not prepare users for uninstall/disconnect operations, reading and modifying ~/.beatra, inventorying other installed skills, revoking shared credentials, or deleting local metadata. Even if intended for lifecycle management, combining these actions under a content-generation skill increases the chance of unauthorized state changes and privacy exposure across the host environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 70)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 114)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 135)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 139)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 147)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 199)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 200)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 201)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

json
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 514)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1025)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The OAuth scope string requests far more privilege than a sales voicemail pack needs, including artifacts, image/video/music generation, voice management, task control, and wallet spending. Overbroad authorization violates least privilege and means compromise or misuse of this skill would grant access to unrelated high-value capabilities far beyond spoken voicemail generation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Broad artifact and task-management scopes like artifacts:write, artifacts:read, tasks:read, and tasks:cancel are not justified by the stated purpose of converting scripts into voicemail clips. These permissions could let the skill inspect, modify, or cancel unrelated user work, making the mismatch between declared function and granted authority materially dangerous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Broad artifact and task-management scopes like artifacts:write, artifacts:read, tasks:read, and tasks:cancel are not justified by the stated purpose of converting scripts into voicemail clips. These permissions could let the skill inspect, modify, or cancel unrelated user work, making the mismatch between declared function and granted authority materially dangerous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The client includes broad package-management behavior, including downloading manifests and archives, validating them, and replacing installed files, even though the skill is described as voicemail generation. This greatly expands the trust boundary and attack surface: compromise of the update channel, signing/checksum process, or package publisher would allow remote code changes on the host under the guise of a content-creation skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The exposed self-update capability allows the package to modify its own installed codebase, which is a high-risk behavior for any agent skill and unjustified by the stated voicemail-pack purpose. Self-modifying software increases the chance that a compromised publisher, CDN, or trust root can turn a benign media tool into a vehicle for remote code changes on the host.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1503)May include surrounding context.

python
)
    update = subparsers.add_parser(
        "update",
        help="Check, install, or configure Beatra package self-updates",
    )
    update.add_argument(
        "--check",