REDnote OOTD Lookbook Maker

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Oct 21, 2026 · 4:41 AM UTC
• Version: 0.2.2

Overview

This lookbook skill requires a shared Beatra token with permissions for unrelated video, music, speech, and voice management.

Review the broad Beatra authorization before approving it: this image skill requires permissions for other media and voice management. Selected photos leave your device, installation metadata is reported automatically, and generation spends credits after confirmation. You can revoke the shared device connection in Beatra Console.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Output Handling: Unvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
• Rogue Agent: Self-Modification, Session Persistence
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration

Findings (31)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The reported video, music, speech, and voice-management permissions exceed the image-lookbook workflow and unnecessarily expand the authority available to a compromised client or stolen token. Spending and task cancellation are not themselves mismatches here: the skill explicitly describes paid generation and user-requested cancellation, although textual confirmation rules do not technically constrain token privileges.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The supplied chunk performs device-authorization and shared-state teardown, not fashion-content creation. Although uninstallation can be legitimate package maintenance, the credential access, remote revocation, and shared-state deletion are substantive capabilities not represented by the declared description or permissions. The code includes safeguards to preserve connections used by other installed skills, but those safeguards do not eliminate the description-behavior mismatch. This assessment applies only to the supplied chunk and does not establish malicious intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The reported automatic transmission of a persistent installation identifier together with distribution and runtime metadata creates a privacy and cross-session correlation risk beyond generating a lookbook. The skill discloses installation registration, but the supplied text does not disclose this telemetry payload or distinguish operationally necessary registration data from analytics; HTTPS does not address that collection risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

json

},
  "mcp": {
    "authentication": "device-bearer",
    "credential_file": "~/.beatra/credentials.json",
    "name": "beatra",
    "transport": "streamable-http",
    "url": "https://mcp.beatra.ai/mcp"

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

md

- `~/.beatra/installation.json` contains one stable, non-secret installation
  reference.
- `~/.beatra/credentials.json` contains the single Device Token.

On POSIX systems the directory must be mode `0700` and both files mode `0600`.
On Windows the current user must be the only principal granted access through

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

md

and keeps checking through brief network failures. One run waits up to
   about 15 minutes; an approval page stays open for up to an hour;
5. atomically saves the returned Device Token to
   `~/.beatra/credentials.json` without printing an HTTP response body;
6. validates the new credential with the same non-billable MCP request and
   prints `Beatra is ready` only after it succeeds.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/updates-and-security.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

md

These files are written under `~/.beatra/`. On POSIX that directory is mode
0700. Nothing is written inside the installed Skill directory.

- `credentials.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/authorize.py`: the device credential.
- `installation.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/authorize.py`: the stable installation reference.
- `host.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/authorize.py`: the agent environment, and a device name when one is known.
- `network.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/mcp_client.py`: this computer's network route.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/updates-and-security.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

md

When `scripts/uninstall.py` decides this is the last Beatra skill on the
computer, it first asks Beatra to revoke the device credential when one is
stored. If Beatra refuses, it changes nothing so the run can be repeated.
Otherwise it unlinks exactly these names in `~/.beatra/`: `credentials.json`,
`installation.json`, `host.json`, `skills.json`, `registrations.json`,
`network.json`, `balance-holds.json`, `pending_authorization.json`, and
`.authorize.lock`. It also unlinks `state.json`, `registration.json`, and

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 432)May include surrounding context.

python

def _existing_credential(state_dir: Path) -> Path | None:
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    try:
        path_stat = os.lstat(path)
        if not stat.S_ISREG(path_stat.st_mode):

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 1008)May include surrounding context.

python

scope = _required_string(polled, "scope")
    if set(scope.split()) != set(SCOPE.split()):
        raise RuntimeError("Beatra authorization returned an unsupported scope")
    credential_path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    with _SIGNALS.deferred():
        _atomic_json(
            credential_path,

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1183)May include surrounding context.

python

def _credentials(state_dir: Path) -> tuple[str, str]:
    state_dir = state_dir.expanduser()
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    if not path.is_file():
        # Not connected yet (or the file is gone): the caller may still find
        # an approval waiting to be collected.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md

the file ACL. Never copy the Device Token into conversation context, stdout,
stderr, a command argument, an environment variable, a log, a backup, a diff,
or another file. A completed authorization leaves the token only in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`.

## Ensure Beatra is ready

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

python

#: is empty — the script never recursively deletes a directory it does not
#: fully understand.
_STATE_FILES = (
    "credentials.json",
    "installation.json",
    "host.json",
    "skills.json",

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md

The host follows this computer's network route, described below.

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Self-Modification

High

• Category: Rogue Agent
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/updates-and-security.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md

# Updates and security

Since the October 2026 releases, Beatra Skill packages contain no self-updater.
Earlier releases could replace their own files from Beatra's CDN; that code has
been removed. Updates now come only from the store or tool you installed the
Skill from.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 132)May include surrounding context.

python

def _device_token(state_dir: Path) -> str | None:
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    try:
        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
    except (OSError, ValueError):

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

md

- say prominently that a signed-out browser lands on Beatra sign-in first:
  the user signs in or creates their account there, and the approval page
  continues automatically after sign-in;
- say once that the connection continues automatically after Allow — never
  ask the user to confirm in chat that they approved.
- on the mainland China network, follow the sign-in and console-link guidance
  in [MCP connection](mcp-connection.md#network-route).

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 132)May include surrounding context.

md

Use one of `website`, `github`, `skillhub`, `skillatlas`, `modelscope`,
`workbuddy`, `clawhub`, or `other`. If the conversation does not show it,
skip this and do not ask the user. If the command is not recognized, skip it.

## Use the bundled MCP client

Automatic installation analytics are unrelated to generating OOTD lookbooks.

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The document specifies automatic, recurring transmission of a stable installation reference, installation source, network-route information, and runtime metadata, without describing a consent gate or opt-out. This creates an unnecessary privacy and cross-session tracking risk for a lookbook-generation skill, although the documented exclusion of prompts, file paths, environment variables, and user names limits the potential impact. The excerpt establishes the intended reporting behavior but does not verify the client's actual implementation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Local source photos are uploaded without a warning about external data sharing.

Medium

• Category: Output Handling
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to upload local photos to an external image service before its explicit confirmation boundary, which covers paid generation rather than initial data sharing. Outfit photos can contain identifiable faces, private surroundings, or embedded location metadata, so uploading without disclosure can expose information the user did not knowingly authorize sharing. External image processing is consistent with the skill's purpose, reducing suspicion of malicious intent, but it does not establish informed consent for the initial upload.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Authorization requests unrelated video, music, speech, and voice-management capabilities for a still-image fashion lookbook skill.

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The fixed authorization scope includes video, music, speech, and voice-management permissions that are unnecessary for the advertised still-image lookbook workflow. Requesting these capabilities increases the authority available to a compromised skill or stolen token, particularly because the credential is shared across Beatra skills; exact scope checks also prevent accepting a narrower grant.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.