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Security audit

rednote-cover-maker

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill can create REDnote cover images, but it also asks for broad Beatra account permissions and silently updates its own package code by default.

Review before installing. Only proceed if you are comfortable with a shared Beatra token that can access more than image-cover generation and with automatic package updates being enabled by default. Consider disabling auto-updates with `python3 scripts/mcp_client.py update --auto off`, watch the Beatra approval scope carefully, and revoke the device from the Beatra Console if you no longer trust or use it.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/authorize.py:34
Finding

Overprivileged Device Token Grants Unrelated Media and Spending Capabilities

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: session = _session_with_registration( state_dir=Path.home() / ".beatra", post_json=_default_post_json, ) if command == "tools": return session.request(2, "tools/list", {}) try: arguments = json.load(os.sys.stdin) except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") from exc if not isinstance(arguments, dict): raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") assert tool_name is not None return session.request( 2, "tools/call", {"name": tool_name, "arguments": arguments}, ) ``` ### Technical Analysis The declared function is the creation and refinement of REDnote cover images. Its legitimate authorization requirements are therefore limited to image generation or editing, explicitly selected file uploads, model discovery where necessary, and access to the resulting tasks and artifacts. The requested bearer-token scope additionally includes: - Video generation - Music generation - Speech generation - Voice read and write access - General wallet spending - Broad artifact access - Task cancellation These privileges are not required to generate a cover image. In particular, `wallet:spend` and unrelated media-generation scopes materially increase the financial and account-level consequences of ...[truncated 1456 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:969
Finding

Default Silent Self-Update Allows Post-Review Remote Code Replacement

Content
View full analysis
bool: """Best-effort silent update. Never block the requested MCP command.""" resolved_state = state_dir or Path.home() / ".beatra" try: resolved_root = (install_root or _current_install_root()).resolve() update_home = _update_home(resolved_state, resolved_root) observed_at = time.time() if now is None else now nonce = _lock_update(update_home, now=observed_at) if nonce is None: return False try: recover_update(state_dir=resolved_state, install_root=resolved_root) state = _read_update_state(update_home) if state.get("auto_update", True) is False: return False last_checked = state.get("last_checked_at") if ( isinstance(last_checked, (int, float)) and observed_at - float(last_checked) < UPDATE_CHECK_MAX_AGE_SECONDS ): return False state["last_checked_at"] = observed_at _write_private_json(update_home / "state.json", state) checked = check_update(get_bytes=get_bytes) if not checked["update_available"]: return False _ensure_owned_baseline( install_root=resolved_root, update_home=update_home, get_bytes=get_bytes, ) discovery = checked["discovery"] manifest, new_files = download_update(discovery, get_bytes=get_bytes) _apply_update( install ...[truncated 3452 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
scripts/authorize.py:340
Finding

Hostname, Agent Environment, and Stable Installation Identity Are Collected and Transmitted

Content
View full analysis
str: """The agent environment this process runs inside (docs/device-model.md). Order: explicit agent self-report > environment signatures > unknown. Detection reads the process environment only — nothing else runs, nothing reaches the network. """ if explicit: candidate = explicit.strip().lower().replace(" ", "-") if _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(candidate): return candidate env = os.environ if env.get("CLAUDECODE") == "1" or "CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT" in env: return "claude-code" if any(key.startswith("CODEX_") for key in env): return "codex" ai_agent = env.get("AI_AGENT", "").lower() matched = re.match(r"([a-z0-9-]+)_", ai_agent) if matched and _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(matched.group(1)): return matched.group(1) return "unknown" def device_display_name() -> str | None: """A hostname the user will recognise in the console device list.""" try: name = socket.gethostname().strip() except OSError: return None if not name or not name.isprintable(): return None return name[:120] ``` The collected values are included in the remote authorization request: ```python form: dict[str, str] = { "client_id": CLIENT_ID, "resource": MCP_URL, "scope": SCOPE, "platform": host_platform, "client_name": PACKAGE_DISPLAY_NAME, "external_installation_ref": external_reference, "package_version": PACKAGE_VERSION, "package_slug": PACKAGE_SLUG, } if device_name: form["device_name"] = device_name statu ...[truncated 3061 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (38)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Critical
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The authorization scope requests videos:generate, but the skill is described as creating REDnote covers and post images, not videos. Unnecessary video-generation access broadens the impact of token misuse and indicates the skill is requesting privileges inconsistent with its declared purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The same skill package also documents uninstall/revocation flows that read and delete local state and credentials and manage shared connection lifecycle unrelated to creating covers. Combining destructive account/package operations with a creative media skill broadens the blast radius if the skill is misused or misunderstood and makes user expectations unreliable.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The same skill package also documents uninstall/revocation flows that read and delete local state and credentials and manage shared connection lifecycle unrelated to creating covers. Combining destructive account/package operations with a creative media skill broadens the blast radius if the skill is misused or misunderstood and makes user expectations unreliable.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The same skill package also documents uninstall/revocation flows that read and delete local state and credentials and manage shared connection lifecycle unrelated to creating covers. Combining destructive account/package operations with a creative media skill broadens the blast radius if the skill is misused or misunderstood and makes user expectations unreliable.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Automatic package update/installation is not necessary to fulfill the stated task of making REDnote covers and introduces an unjustified code-download-and-replace capability. Even with integrity checks, this creates a significant supply-chain risk because the skill can change itself and rewrite package files during routine usage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

json
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 514)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1025)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The authorization flow requests a very broad OAuth scope set far beyond what a REDnote cover/image generator should need. Over-scoped tokens violate least-privilege and materially increase blast radius if the credential is abused, leaked, or the skill later performs actions outside its stated purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The authorization scope requests videos:generate, but the skill is described as creating REDnote covers and post images, not videos. Unnecessary video-generation access broadens the impact of token misuse and indicates the skill is requesting privileges inconsistent with its declared purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The authorization scope requests videos:generate, but the skill is described as creating REDnote covers and post images, not videos. Unnecessary video-generation access broadens the impact of token misuse and indicates the skill is requesting privileges inconsistent with its declared purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The client includes broad self-update functionality, remote package download, archive extraction, file replacement, and installation-state handling that are unrelated to generating REDnote cover images. Even with several integrity checks, this materially expands the attack surface: compromise of the vendor update channel or logic flaws in update handling would let remote content modify local installation files, which is especially risky for a creative-image skill whose stated purpose does not require code management.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Exposing self-update/self-modification capability inside the skill is a significant integrity risk because the package can rewrite its own installed files. In the context of a REDnote cover generator, self-modification is unrelated to the advertised purpose and makes the skill much more dangerous: any compromise of the update path could transform a benign media tool into arbitrary code delivered through trusted local files.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1503)May include surrounding context.

python
)
    update = subparsers.add_parser(
        "update",
        help="Check, install, or configure Beatra package self-updates",
    )
    update.add_argument(
        "--check",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The explicit targeting of credentials.json indicates the package is aware of and able to remove credential-bearing state from the shared Beatra directory. In the context of a cover-maker skill, touching credential files is over-privileged and dangerous because compromise or misuse of this code path could affect authentication material outside the skill’s expected scope.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

python
#: these and then removes the directory only if it is empty — the script
#: never recursively deletes a directory it does not fully understand.
_STATE_FILES = (
    "credentials.json",
    "installation.json",
    "host.json",
    "skills.json",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The function reads access_token from credentials.json and uses it to call a remote revoke endpoint. Reading bearer tokens from shared local state is sensitive credential access; in a skill whose advertised function is image generation, this is especially risky because it enables authentication actions outside the user’s reasonable expectations and could be repurposed for token misuse if the package were altered or compromised.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 109)May include surrounding context.

python
def _device_token(state_dir: Path) -> str | None:
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    try:
        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
    except (OSError, ValueError):

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill declares an image-cover workflow, but the instructions reveal capabilities that include filesystem access, network communication, shell execution, environment access, and package modification without any explicit tool-scope declaration or least-privilege boundary. That mismatch makes it harder for a host or reviewer to constrain what the skill may do and increases the chance that powerful capabilities are exposed beyond what is necessary for cover generation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Early documentation frames the skill as creating a single cover, while later sections reveal hidden auto-update behavior during command execution. This inconsistency undermines informed consent and makes the runtime trust model more dangerous because users may believe they are invoking a bounded media task when software modification can also occur.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill promises image generation but also performs silent self-updates and package installation behavior during normal command execution. Hidden update/install logic creates a supply-chain and trust-boundary problem because executable behavior can change without a separate, informed approval step from the user.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Automatic package updates without separate confirmation allow the skill's code and behavior to change during ordinary use. That weakens user control and creates a supply-chain exposure window, particularly for a skill that already has network, file, and execution-related capabilities.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The document explicitly states that the client silently checks for and automatically installs newer releases without separate confirmation. Even with integrity and origin verification described later, silent self-update that modifies installed files without an explicit user approval step creates supply-chain and user-consent risk, especially if the update infrastructure, signing process, or release channel is ever compromised. In the context of an agent skill, normalizing unattended file replacement is more dangerous because users may not expect a content-generation tool to alter local software automatically.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.