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Security audit

RFP Cover Stills

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is not clearly malicious, but it asks for broad Beatra account powers and silently updates its own code for a narrow cover-image purpose.

Review before installing. Use this only if you are comfortable granting a shared Beatra token with powers beyond image generation, storing that token locally, allowing selected reference files to be uploaded, sending device/platform metadata to Beatra, and accepting default silent package updates. Disable auto-updates with the documented command if you need reviewed code to remain fixed, and revoke the Beatra device from the console if you no longer trust the installation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/authorize.py:34
Finding

Overprivileged Device Token and Unrestricted Remote Tool Dispatch

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: session = _session_with_registration( state_dir=Path.home() / ".beatra", post_json=_default_post_json, ) if command == "tools": return session.request(2, "tools/list", {}) try: arguments = json.load(os.sys.stdin) except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") from exc if not isinstance(arguments, dict): raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") assert tool_name is not None return session.request( 2, "tools/call", {"name": tool_name, "arguments": arguments}, ) ``` ```python call = subparsers.add_parser("call", help="Call one tool with a JSON object on stdin") call.add_argument("tool_name") ``` ### Technical Analysis The declared Skill functionality is the creation and editing of RFP-cover still images. The requested authorization nevertheless includes video generation, music generation, speech generation, voice read/write, general artifact write/read, wallet spending, task reading, and task cancellation. The bundled client compounds the excessive scope by accepting an arbitrary `tool_name` from the command line and forwarding it directly to the remote MCP endpoint. It does not enforce a package-level allowlist of the tools required for the RFP workflow. The server may independently enforce authorization a ...[truncated 1292 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:969
Finding

Silent Retrieval and Installation of Mutable Remote Code

Content
View full analysis
bool: """Best-effort silent update. Never block the requested MCP command.""" resolved_state = state_dir or Path.home() / ".beatra" try: resolved_root = (install_root or _current_install_root()).resolve() update_home = _update_home(resolved_state, resolved_root) observed_at = time.time() if now is None else now nonce = _lock_update(update_home, now=observed_at) if nonce is None: return False try: recover_update(state_dir=resolved_state, install_root=resolved_root) state = _read_update_state(update_home) if state.get("auto_update", True) is False: return False last_checked = state.get("last_checked_at") if ( isinstance(last_checked, (int, float)) and observed_at - float(last_checked) < UPDATE_CHECK_MAX_AGE_SECONDS ): return False state["last_checked_at"] = observed_at _write_private_json(update_home / "state.json", state) checked = check_update(get_bytes=get_bytes) if not checked["update_available"]: return False _ensure_owned_baseline( install_root=resolved_root, update_home=update_home, get_bytes=get_bytes, ) discovery = checked["discovery"] manifest, new_files = download_update(discovery, get_bytes=get_bytes) _apply_update( ...[truncated 3122 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
scripts/authorize.py:346
Finding

Unnecessary Hostname and Agent-Environment Telemetry

Content
View full analysis
str: """The agent environment this process runs inside (docs/device-model.md). Order: explicit agent self-report > environment signatures > unknown. Detection reads the process environment only — nothing else runs, nothing reaches the network. """ if explicit: candidate = explicit.strip().lower().replace(" ", "-") if _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(candidate): return candidate env = os.environ if env.get("CLAUDECODE") == "1" or "CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT" in env: return "claude-code" if any(key.startswith("CODEX_") for key in env): return "codex" ai_agent = env.get("AI_AGENT", "").lower() matched = re.match(r"([a-z0-9-]+)_", ai_agent) if matched and _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(matched.group(1)): return matched.group(1) return "unknown" def device_display_name() -> str | None: """A hostname the user will recognise in the console device list.""" try: name = socket.gethostname().strip() except OSError: return None if not name or not name.isprintable(): return None return name[:120] ``` ```python form: dict[str, str] = { "client_id": CLIENT_ID, "resource": MCP_URL, "scope": SCOPE, "platform": host_platform, "client_name": PACKAGE_DISPLAY_NAME, "external_installation_ref": external_reference, "package_version": PACKAGE_VERSION, "package_slug": PACKAGE_SLUG, } if device_name: form["device_name"] = device_name status, created = post_form(DEVICE_AUTHORIZATION_URL, form) ``` ```python result = session.request( ...[truncated 2265 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:1044
Finding

Windows Bearer Credential Privacy Is Assumed Rather Than Enforced

Content
View full analysis
None: # POSIX gets explicit 700/600. On Windows the state directory lives under # the user profile, whose default ACL is already private to the user — # the same posture as gh/aws/gcloud credential stores. The former custom # DACL ceremony was dropped deliberately: its command patterns read as # hostile to agent safety policies and endpoint security, failing installs # while adding no protection an elevated administrator could not bypass. path.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True) if os.name == "posix": path.chmod(0o700) def _restrict_file(path: Path) -> None: if os.name == "posix": path.chmod(0o600) ``` Credential reading on Windows performs no ACL or ownership validation: ```python def _read_private_credentials(state_dir: Path, path: Path) -> str: if os.name == "nt": # The state directory lives under the user profile, whose default # ACL is already private to the user (the gh/aws/gcloud posture). # The former custom DACL verification was dropped deliberately: its # command patterns read as hostile to agent safety policies and # endpoint security, failing installs while adding nothing an # elevated administrator could not bypass. return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8") ``` The documentation states a stronger guarantee than the implementation provides: ```text On Windows the current user must be the only principal granted access through the file ACL. ``` ### Technical Analysis On POSIX, the client creates a private direc ...[truncated 1609 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (41)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Critical
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The videos:generate scope is unnecessary for a static cover-art skill and expands token power beyond the declared use case. This mismatch between capability and business purpose makes misuse more damaging and less likely to be noticed by users approving the authorization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The referenced behavior includes uninstall/disconnect logic that reads local Beatra state, accesses credentials, makes revocation requests, and deletes local files, none of which matches the advertised image-creation purpose. Hidden lifecycle-management actions are risky because they expand the skill into credential and system-state manipulation beyond the user's likely expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The referenced behavior includes uninstall/disconnect logic that reads local Beatra state, accesses credentials, makes revocation requests, and deletes local files, none of which matches the advertised image-creation purpose. Hidden lifecycle-management actions are risky because they expand the skill into credential and system-state manipulation beyond the user's likely expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The referenced behavior includes uninstall/disconnect logic that reads local Beatra state, accesses credentials, makes revocation requests, and deletes local files, none of which matches the advertised image-creation purpose. Hidden lifecycle-management actions are risky because they expand the skill into credential and system-state manipulation beyond the user's likely expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 88)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 120)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 124)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 132)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 183)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 184)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 185)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 164)May include surrounding context.

md
[uninstall and disconnect](references/uninstall-and-disconnect.md).

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 51)May include surrounding context.

json
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill requests a very broad OAuth scope set, including images, videos, music, speech, voices, artifacts, tasks, and wallet access, even though the stated purpose is generating a static RFP cover still. Overbroad authorization violates least privilege and increases blast radius if the skill, its environment, or its token storage is abused.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The videos:generate scope is unnecessary for a static cover-art skill and expands token power beyond the declared use case. This mismatch between capability and business purpose makes misuse more damaging and less likely to be noticed by users approving the authorization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The videos:generate scope is unnecessary for a static cover-art skill and expands token power beyond the declared use case. This mismatch between capability and business purpose makes misuse more damaging and less likely to be noticed by users approving the authorization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
72% confidence
Finding

This code stores a bearer access token in plaintext JSON under the user's home directory. Although the implementation uses atomic writes and restrictive POSIX permissions, plaintext long-lived token storage still presents credential exposure risk on shared systems, through backups, local compromise, or platforms where ACL assumptions do not hold.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 514)May include surrounding context.

python
scope = _required_string(polled, "scope")
            if set(scope.split()) != set(SCOPE.split()):
                raise RuntimeError("Beatra authorization returned an unsupported scope")
            credential_path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
            _atomic_json(
                credential_path,
                {

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The package includes a network-delivered self-update mechanism that downloads manifests and archives, verifies them, and replaces local package files. Even though there are integrity checks, a self-modifying client is high risk in a skill whose stated purpose is simple document-cover generation because it expands trust from the installed code to a remote distribution pipeline and allows functionality to change after installation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The client exposes generic remote MCP access, file upload, tool invocation, installation registration, and update behavior that substantially exceeds the declared purpose of generating RFP cover stills. In the context of a narrowly described procurement graphics skill, this creates an unjustified remote-control surface through which the package can transmit local data, invoke unrelated backend capabilities, and change behavior over time.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.