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Security audit

nutrition-panel-art

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to be a real nutrition-panel image workflow, but it asks for broad shared Beatra account authority and can silently replace its own installed code.

Install only if you trust Beatra with a shared, persistent account token that can authorize more than nutrition-panel images and with a client that updates itself automatically by default. Disable automatic updates with the documented command before use if you want reviewed code to stay pinned, and avoid uploading sensitive reference files until upload destinations are constrained.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:969
Finding

Silent Automatic Updates Trust Unsigned Remote Release Metadata

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: path = update_home / "state.json" try: value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError): return {"schema_version": 1, "auto_update": True} if not isinstance(value, dict) or value.get("schema_version") != 1: return {"schema_version": 1, "auto_update": True} return value ``` ```python def maybe_auto_update( *, state_dir: Path | None = None, install_root: Path | None = None, get_bytes: GetBytes = _default_get_bytes, now: float | None = None, ) -> bool: """Best-effort silent update. Never block the requested MCP command.""" resolved_state = state_dir or Path.home() / ".beatra" try: resolved_root = (install_root or _current_install_root()).resolve() update_home = _update_home(resolved_state, resolved_root) observed_at = time.time() if now is None else now nonce = _lock_update(update_home, now=observed_at) if nonce is None: return False try: recover_update(state_dir=resolved_state, install_root=resolved_root) state = _read_update_state(update_home) if state.get("auto_update", True) is False: return False last_checked = state.get("last_checked_at") if ( isinstance( ...[truncated 4006 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/authorize.py:31
Finding

Nutrition Image Skill Requests Broad Unrelated OAuth Privileges

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: session = _session_with_registration( state_dir=Path.home() / ".beatra", post_json=_default_post_json, ) if command == "tools": return session.request(2, "tools/list", {}) try: arguments = json.load(os.sys.stdin) except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") from exc if not isinstance(arguments, dict): raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") assert tool_name is not None return session.request( 2, "tools/call", {"name": tool_name, "arguments": arguments}, ) ``` ### Technical Analysis The declared functionality is the creation and editing of nutrition-panel still images, with optional reference-image uploads, model-price lookup, task polling, wallet reads, and user-requested cancellation. The requested Device Token scope additionally includes: - Video generation. - Music generation. - Speech generation. - Voice reading and writing. - Broad wallet-spending authority. - General artifact access. - Task cancellation across the shared connection. These permissions are not required for the declared nutrition-image workflow. The client also exposes a generic `call` command that accepts any tool name without enforcing a package-specific allowlist. Server-side authorization is therefore the primary boundary, b ...[truncated 1748 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
scripts/authorize.py:346
Finding

Authorization Collects and Transmits Hostname and Agent Environment Metadata

Content
View full analysis
str: """The agent environment this process runs inside (docs/device-model.md). Order: explicit agent self-report > environment signatures > unknown. Detection reads the process environment only — nothing else runs, nothing reaches the network. """ if explicit: candidate = explicit.strip().lower().replace(" ", "-") if _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(candidate): return candidate env = os.environ if env.get("CLAUDECODE") == "1" or "CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT" in env: return "claude-code" if any(key.startswith("CODEX_") for key in env): return "codex" ai_agent = env.get("AI_AGENT", "").lower() matched = re.match(r"([a-z0-9-]+)_", ai_agent) if matched and _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(matched.group(1)): return matched.group(1) return "unknown" def device_display_name() -> str | None: """A hostname the user will recognise in the console device list.""" try: name = socket.gethostname().strip() except OSError: return None if not name or not name.isprintable(): return None return name[:120] ``` ```python form: dict[str, str] = { "client_id": CLIENT_ID, "resource": MCP_URL, "scope": SCOPE, "platform": host_platform, "client_name": PACKAGE_DISPLAY_NAME, "external_installation_ref": external_reference, "package_version": PACKAGE_VERSION, "package_slug": PACKAGE_SLUG, } if device_name: form["device_name"] = device_name status, created = post_form(DEVICE_AUTHORIZA ...[truncated 2210 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:216
Finding

Upload Grants Can Redirect User-Selected File Content to Any HTTPS Host

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, str]: structured = result.get("structuredContent") instruction = structured.get("upload") if isinstance(structured, dict) else None if not isinstance(instruction, dict) or instruction.get("method") != "PUT": raise RuntimeError("Beatra upload instructions are invalid") url = instruction.get("url") headers = instruction.get("headers") if not isinstance(url, str) or not isinstance(headers, dict): raise RuntimeError("Beatra upload instructions are invalid") parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url) if ( parsed.scheme != "https" or not parsed.hostname or parsed.username is not None or parsed.password is not None or parsed.fragment ): raise RuntimeError("Beatra upload instructions are invalid") if not all(isinstance(key, str) and isinstance(value, str) for key, value in headers.items()): raise RuntimeError("Beatra upload instructions are invalid") content_type = _header_value(headers, "Content-Type") content_length = _header_value(headers, "Content-Length") if content_type != mime_type or content_length != str(len(content)): raise RuntimeError("Beatra upload instructions are invalid") response = put_bytes(url, dict(headers), content) artifact_id = response.get("artifact_id") if not isinstance(artifact_id, str) or not artifact_id: raise RuntimeError("Beatra upload returned an invalid response") return {"type": "artifact", "artifact_id": artifact_id} ``` ### Technical Analysis The upload workflow first obtains an upload instruction from the MCP service and then ...[truncated 2140 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (47)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill's documented references include uninstall/disconnect behavior, revocation, reading and modifying ~/.beatra state, inspecting installed skills, and deleting local credential/config files, none of which are implied by a nutrition-art workflow. Packaging administrative lifecycle operations alongside a content task can enable destructive actions on unrelated local state if triggered or misapplied.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill's documented references include uninstall/disconnect behavior, revocation, reading and modifying ~/.beatra state, inspecting installed skills, and deleting local credential/config files, none of which are implied by a nutrition-art workflow. Packaging administrative lifecycle operations alongside a content task can enable destructive actions on unrelated local state if triggered or misapplied.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill's documented references include uninstall/disconnect behavior, revocation, reading and modifying ~/.beatra state, inspecting installed skills, and deleting local credential/config files, none of which are implied by a nutrition-art workflow. Packaging administrative lifecycle operations alongside a content task can enable destructive actions on unrelated local state if triggered or misapplied.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 119)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 123)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 131)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 182)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 183)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 184)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The changelog describes financial/top-up, balance, and ledger behavior that is unrelated to the advertised nutrition-panel image generation purpose. This kind of capability mismatch is a strong indicator of deceptive packaging, repurposed code, or hidden scope that could mislead reviewers and users about what the skill may actually do.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Financial account capabilities implied by the changelog are unjustified for a nutrition-label rendering skill and violate least-privilege expectations. Even if only described textually here, such unexplained financial functionality materially increases the risk of hidden account access, transaction-related actions, or user deception.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest declares use of a local credential file containing bearer credentials for an external MCP service. For a nutrition-panel art skill, access to reusable credentials is especially sensitive because compromise, misuse, or overbroad use of that token could enable unauthorized access to remote services beyond simple image-generation tasks.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 51)May include surrounding context.

json
},
  "mcp": {
    "authentication": "device-bearer",
    "credential_file": "~/.beatra/credentials.json",
    "name": "beatra",
    "transport": "streamable-http",
    "url": "https://mcp.beatra.ai/mcp"

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Silent automatic updates that install code and replace package files without separate confirmation are high-risk in the context of a nutrition label art skill, because they grant an unrelated path to modify the local installation. Even with verification checks described, this creates a supply-chain and integrity risk surface that is unjustified by the skill's business function.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 514)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1025)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The OAuth scope set is extremely broad for a skill whose stated purpose is generating nutrition panel artwork. It requests spending, task control, artifacts access, and multiple media-generation capabilities unrelated to nutrition labels, violating least privilege and increasing the blast radius if the token is abused, leaked, or the skill is compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The client does far more than nutrition-panel rendering: it can self-update installed code, register installations, upload local files, and invoke arbitrary remote MCP tools by name via the generic 'call' command. In the context of a narrowly described nutrition-label skill, this is dangerous because it materially expands the trust boundary and gives the package remote-code-delivery and broad remote-action capabilities unrelated to its stated purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The package exposes explicit self-update functionality that can modify its own installed files. In a skill advertised for nutrition-panel art, self-modification is a significant expansion of capability because it enables remote code replacement and persistence changes independent of the host's normal review/update controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1503)May include surrounding context.

python
)
    update = subparsers.add_parser(
        "update",
        help="Check, install, or configure Beatra package self-updates",
    )
    update.add_argument(
        "--check",