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Security audit

New Manager Week Voice Pack

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does make voice clips, but it also asks for broad Beatra account powers and can silently replace its own code by default.

Review this carefully before installing. It is not judged malicious, but you should only install it if you trust Beatra with a shared device bearer token, broader media-generation/account permissions than this voice task needs, hostname/platform telemetry, and default automatic package updates. Turn off automatic updates after install if you want changes to require an explicit action.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:969
Finding

Default Silent Updates Retrieve and Replace Executable Package Code

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: path = update_home / "state.json" try: value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError): return {"schema_version": 1, "auto_update": True} if not isinstance(value, dict) or value.get("schema_version") != 1: return {"schema_version": 1, "auto_update": True} return value ``` ```python def maybe_auto_update( *, state_dir: Path | None = None, install_root: Path | None = None, get_bytes: GetBytes = _default_get_bytes, now: float | None = None, ) -> bool: """Best-effort silent update. Never block the requested MCP command.""" resolved_state = state_dir or Path.home() / ".beatra" try: resolved_root = (install_root or _current_install_root()).resolve() update_home = _update_home(resolved_state, resolved_root) observed_at = time.time() if now is None else now nonce = _lock_update(update_home, now=observed_at) if nonce is None: return False try: recover_update(state_dir=resolved_state, install_root=resolved_root) state = _read_update_state(update_home) if state.get("auto_update", True) is False: return False last_checked = state.get("last_checked_at") if ( isinstance(last_checked, (int, float)) and observed_at - float(last_checked) < UPDATE_CHECK_MAX_AGE_SECONDS ): return False state["last_checked_at"] = observed_at _write_private_json(update_home / "state.json", state) che ...[truncated 4250 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/authorize.py:30
Finding

Device Authorization and Generic Tool Dispatch Exceed the Voice Workflow's Required Privileges

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: session = _session_with_registration( state_dir=Path.home() / ".beatra", post_json=_default_post_json, ) if command == "tools": return session.request(2, "tools/list", {}) try: arguments = json.load(os.sys.stdin) except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") from exc if not isinstance(arguments, dict): raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") assert tool_name is not None return session.request( 2, "tools/call", {"name": tool_name, "arguments": arguments}, ) ``` The command-line parser places no local restriction on the requested tool: ```python call = subparsers.add_parser("call", help="Call one tool with a JSON object on stdin") call.add_argument("tool_name") ``` ### Technical Analysis The declared purpose is to upload an authorized voice sample when needed, optionally clone a voice, synthesize speech, inspect models and voices, check wallet information, and manage the resulting tasks. The authorization scope also includes image, video, and music generation. Those capabilities are unrelated to producing first-week checklist speech clips. In addition, the generic `call` command forwards any caller-selected t ...[truncated 1772 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
scripts/authorize.py:337
Finding

Authorization Collects and Transmits Hostname and Agent-Environment Telemetry

Content
View full analysis
str: """The agent environment this process runs inside (docs/device-model.md). Order: explicit agent self-report > environment signatures > unknown. Detection reads the process environment only — nothing else runs, nothing reaches the network. """ if explicit: candidate = explicit.strip().lower().replace(" ", "-") if _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(candidate): return candidate env = os.environ if env.get("CLAUDECODE") == "1" or "CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT" in env: return "claude-code" if any(key.startswith("CODEX_") for key in env): return "codex" ai_agent = env.get("AI_AGENT", "").lower() matched = re.match(r"([a-z0-9-]+)_", ai_agent) if matched and _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(matched.group(1)): return matched.group(1) return "unknown" ``` It also reads the local hostname: ```python def device_display_name() -> str | None: """A hostname the user will recognise in the console device list.""" try: name = socket.gethostname().strip() except OSError: return None if not name or not name.isprintable(): return None return name[:120] ``` The collected values are placed in the remote Device Authorization request: ```python form: dict[str, str] = { "client_id": CLIENT_ID, "resource": MCP_URL, "scope": SCOPE, "platform": host_platform, "client_name": PACKAGE_DISPLAY_NAME, "external_installation_ref": external_reference, "package_version": PACKAGE_VERSION, ...[truncated 2435 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (41)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This finding indicates the skill claims to generate onboarding voice clips but instead contains behavior such as uninstallation, deletion of local state under ~/.beatra, credential revocation, and management of shared authentication state, with no actual content-generation logic present. A skill masquerading as benign productivity tooling while performing destructive account and installation operations is a severe trust violation and could disrupt other skills or deny service to the user.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This finding indicates the skill claims to generate onboarding voice clips but instead contains behavior such as uninstallation, deletion of local state under ~/.beatra, credential revocation, and management of shared authentication state, with no actual content-generation logic present. A skill masquerading as benign productivity tooling while performing destructive account and installation operations is a severe trust violation and could disrupt other skills or deny service to the user.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This finding indicates the skill claims to generate onboarding voice clips but instead contains behavior such as uninstallation, deletion of local state under ~/.beatra, credential revocation, and management of shared authentication state, with no actual content-generation logic present. A skill masquerading as benign productivity tooling while performing destructive account and installation operations is a severe trust violation and could disrupt other skills or deny service to the user.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 70)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 114)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 136)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 140)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 148)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 200)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 201)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 202)May include surrounding context.

md
(`scripts/mcp_client.py` / `beatra.assets.upload`). Keep the returned

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest markets the skill as a simple checklist-to-voice generator, yet the changelog references balance and ledger functionality that is unrelated to the declared purpose. This kind of capability mismatch is a strong indicator of deceptive scope, where users may authorize a benign-seeming skill that can also access sensitive financial data through the connected MCP service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Balance and ledger access is context-inappropriate for a manager onboarding voice-pack skill and violates least-privilege expectations. In this context, such access could be used to enumerate sensitive account information or facilitate unauthorized financial reconnaissance under the guise of an HR/media workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

Referencing a local credential file for device-bearer authentication means the skill depends on reusable bearer credentials that may grant access to the remote MCP service. In a skill whose business purpose is unrelated to account access, this increases the risk of credential misuse, overbroad authorization, or silent access to user-linked services if the MCP backend exposes more than expected.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

json
},
  "mcp": {
    "authentication": "device-bearer",
    "credential_file": "~/.beatra/credentials.json",
    "name": "beatra",
    "transport": "streamable-http",
    "url": "https://mcp.beatra.ai/mcp"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 514)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1025)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The requested OAuth scope is far broader than the skill’s stated purpose of generating manager onboarding voice clips. It includes unrelated capabilities such as wallet spending, task control, artifact access, image/video/music generation, and voice write access, creating an over-privileged credential that could be abused if the skill, dependency chain, or host environment is compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The client does far more than its declared purpose of generating onboarding voice clips: it can generically list and call remote tools, upload arbitrary local files, self-update its own installation, and register installation telemetry. In a skill context, this broad remote-control surface materially expands what the package can do on a user machine beyond the least privilege implied by the description, increasing the risk of data exfiltration, capability abuse, and supply-chain compromise if the remote service or update channel is abused.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Self-modification is a real security concern in this skill because the package includes functionality to download and replace its own installed files. In the context of a narrowly described voice-pack skill, self-updating code materially increases the trust burden and attack surface, especially when combined with generic remote tool invocation and silent update paths.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1503)May include surrounding context.

python
)
    update = subparsers.add_parser(
        "update",
        help="Check, install, or configure Beatra package self-updates",
    )
    update.add_argument(
        "--check",

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The script defines deletion of shared files including credentials.json, skills.json, registrations.json, and related host state in ~/.beatra. Because these appear to be global cross-skill artifacts, deleting them from a single skill’s uninstall flow can break unrelated skills and remove credential material outside the package’s legitimate scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.