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Security audit

Fund Factsheet Page

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill's image-generation purpose is clear, but it grants broad Beatra account powers and silently updates its own code, so it needs review before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable granting this Beatra package broad shared account authorization, including billable and state-changing capabilities beyond factsheet image generation. Consider disabling automatic updates with the documented --auto off command, upload only reference files you intend to share with Beatra, and revoke the device authorization from the Beatra Console if you no longer trust or use the skill.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
scripts/authorize.py:32
Finding

Overprivileged Device Token and Unrestricted MCP Tool Forwarding

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: session = _session_with_registration( state_dir=Path.home() / ".beatra", post_json=_default_post_json, ) if command == "tools": return session.request(2, "tools/list", {}) try: arguments = json.load(os.sys.stdin) except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") from exc if not isinstance(arguments, dict): raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") assert tool_name is not None return session.request( 2, "tools/call", {"name": tool_name, "arguments": arguments}, ) ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill’s stated purpose is to generate fund factsheet page images from user-supplied content. Its legitimate runtime needs are therefore limited to image generation and editing, reference-file upload, model discovery, task status operations, and narrowly scoped wallet reads. The requested bearer-token scope also authorizes unrelated capabilities, including: - Video, music, and speech generation - Voice reads and writes - Broad artifact reads and writes - Wallet spending - Task cancellation In addition, `_run_command` accepts an arbitrary MCP tool name from the command line and forwards it to the remote endpoint. It does not enforce a package-specific allowlist matching the operations documented in `SKILL.md`. The remote server may still apply its own ...[truncated 1337 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Warning
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:969
Finding

Default Silent Remote Code Update Without Independently Anchored Signatures

Content
View full analysis
tuple[dict[str, Any], dict[str, bytes]]: archive_url, manifest_url = _release_urls(discovery) manifest_content = get_bytes( manifest_url, UPDATE_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, MAX_UPDATE_MANIFEST_BYTES, ) if _sha256(manifest_content) != discovery["manifest_sha256"]: raise RuntimeError("Beatra update manifest checksum does not match discovery") manifest = _json_object(manifest_content, "Beatra update manifest") manifest_files = _manifest_files(manifest, discovery=discovery) archive = get_bytes( archive_url, UPDATE_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, MAX_UPDATE_ARCHIVE_BYTES, ) if _sha256(archive) != discovery["archive_sha256"]: raise RuntimeError("Beatra update archive checksum does not match discovery") return manifest, _validated_archive(archive, manifest_files=manifest_files) ``` ```python def maybe_auto_update( *, state_dir: Path | None = None, install_root: Path | None = None, get_bytes: GetBytes = _default_get_bytes, now: float | None = None, ) -> bool: """Best-effort silent update. Never block the requested MCP command.""" resolved_state = state_dir or Path.home() / ".beatra" try: resolved_root = (install_root or _current_install_root()).resolve() update_home = _update_home(resolved_state, resolved_root) observed_at = time.time() if now is None else now nonce = _lock_update(update_home, now=observed_at) if nonce is None: return False try: recover_update( ...[truncated 3784 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

other

Note
Location
scripts/authorize.py:341
Finding

Unnecessary Hostname and Persistent Device Metadata Collection

Content
View full analysis
str: """The agent environment this process runs inside (docs/device-model.md). Order: explicit agent self-report > environment signatures > unknown. Detection reads the process environment only — nothing else runs, nothing reaches the network. """ if explicit: candidate = explicit.strip().lower().replace(" ", "-") if _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(candidate): return candidate env = os.environ if env.get("CLAUDECODE") == "1" or "CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT" in env: return "claude-code" if any(key.startswith("CODEX_") for key in env): return "codex" ai_agent = env.get("AI_AGENT", "").lower() matched = re.match(r"([a-z0-9-]+)_", ai_agent) if matched and _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(matched.group(1)): return matched.group(1) return "unknown" def device_display_name() -> str | None: """A hostname the user will recognise in the console device list.""" try: name = socket.gethostname().strip() except OSError: return None if not name or not name.isprintable(): return None return name[:120] ``` ```python form: dict[str, str] = { "client_id": CLIENT_ID, "resource": MCP_URL, "scope": SCOPE, "platform": host_platform, "client_name": PACKAGE_DISPLAY_NAME, "external_installation_ref": external_reference, "package_version": PACKAGE_VERSION, "package_slug": PACKAGE_SLUG, } if device_name: form["device_name"] = device_name status, created = post_form(DEVICE_AUTHORIZATION_URL, form) ``` ```python result = session.request( 2, "tools/call", { "name": "beatr ...[truncated 2569 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (40)

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Critical
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill asks for task-management capabilities like tasks:read and tasks:cancel despite being described as a page-studio layout tool. While less severe than wallet spending, these permissions could let a compromised token inspect or interfere with unrelated user workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The documented behavior extends to uninstall logic, reading and modifying ~/.beatra state, revoking authorization remotely, and deleting local files, none of which are disclosed by the creative-layout description. Hidden local state modification and deletion are risky because they can affect host integrity, remove data, or revoke credentials under the guise of a design skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The documented behavior extends to uninstall logic, reading and modifying ~/.beatra state, revoking authorization remotely, and deleting local files, none of which are disclosed by the creative-layout description. Hidden local state modification and deletion are risky because they can affect host integrity, remove data, or revoke credentials under the guise of a design skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The documented behavior extends to uninstall logic, reading and modifying ~/.beatra state, revoking authorization remotely, and deleting local files, none of which are disclosed by the creative-layout description. Hidden local state modification and deletion are risky because they can affect host integrity, remove data, or revoke credentials under the guise of a design skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

md
Submit once through bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py`. Poll

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 108)May include surrounding context.

md
Submit once through bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py`. Poll

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 112)May include surrounding context.

md
Submit once through bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py`. Poll

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 120)May include surrounding context.

md
Submit once through bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py`. Poll

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 171)May include surrounding context.

md
Submit once through bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py`. Poll

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 172)May include surrounding context.

md
Submit once through bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py`. Poll

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 173)May include surrounding context.

md
Submit once through bundled `scripts/mcp_client.py`. Poll

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

json
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 514)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1025)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The authorization helper requests a very broad OAuth scope set that far exceeds the stated purpose of a fund factsheet page-layout skill. Granting unnecessary permissions violates least privilege and increases blast radius if the skill, its dependencies, or stored tokens are abused; in particular, the token could be reused for unrelated artifact access, media generation, task control, and other account actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill asks for task-management capabilities like tasks:read and tasks:cancel despite being described as a page-studio layout tool. While less severe than wallet spending, these permissions could let a compromised token inspect or interfere with unrelated user workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The client contains broad capabilities far beyond a fund factsheet page-layout skill: generic remote MCP tool invocation, silent self-update, upload primitives, host fingerprinting, and installation telemetry. This overbroad design expands the trust boundary so that a seemingly narrow creative skill can act as a general remote-control client, increasing the risk of abuse, unexpected data flows, and post-install capability changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The package can download manifests and archives from remote infrastructure and replace files in its own installation directory. Even with checksum and path checks, self-modifying code is especially dangerous in a skill whose declared function is static page generation, because future behavior can materially change after installation and outside the user's immediate review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Exposing self-update as a built-in command confirms that the skill is designed to modify its own code after deployment. In a skill advertised for simple fund-page rendering, this materially increases operational and supply-chain risk because the installed capability set can change independently of the original reviewed package.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1503)May include surrounding context.

python
)
    update = subparsers.add_parser(
        "update",
        help="Check, install, or configure Beatra package self-updates",
    )
    update.add_argument(
        "--check",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The presence of credentials.json in the uninstall target set shows that the skill is aware of and able to remove shared credential material. Access to authentication artifacts by a non-auth, non-platform skill is dangerous because it broadens the set of code that can affect secrets, increasing the chance of credential misuse, accidental deletion, or abuse by a modified package.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

python
#: these and then removes the directory only if it is empty — the script
#: never recursively deletes a directory it does not fully understand.
_STATE_FILES = (
    "credentials.json",
    "installation.json",
    "host.json",
    "skills.json",