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Security audit

bilibili-video-storyboard

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed storyboard tool, but it also installs a broad Beatra account client with full-scope credentials and silent self-updates, so it needs careful review before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable giving Beatra a shared device token with broad media, task, artifact, voice, and spending-related permissions, and with the package silently updating itself by default. Consider turning auto-update off before use and review the Beatra approval page, billing implications, hostname/platform metadata, and uninstall behavior carefully.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/authorize.py:30
Finding

Overprivileged Shared Device Token and Unrestricted MCP Tool Dispatch

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: session = _session_with_registration( state_dir=Path.home() / ".beatra", post_json=_default_post_json, ) if command == "tools": return session.request(2, "tools/list", {}) try: arguments = json.load(os.sys.stdin) except json.JSONDecodeError as exc: raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") from exc if not isinstance(arguments, dict): raise RuntimeError("Tool arguments on stdin must be one JSON object") assert tool_name is not None return session.request( 2, "tools/call", {"name": tool_name, "arguments": arguments}, ) ``` ### Technical Analysis The declared Skill workflow produces a written storyboard and optionally generates one to four image key frames. Its legitimate remote requirements are limited to model discovery, image generation or transformation, selected artifact uploads, task inspection, and user-requested task cancellation. The authorization request instead obtains a shared Device Token containing unrelated privileges, including: - Video generation - Music generation - Speech generation - Voice read and write operations - General wallet spending authority The bundled client compounds this overprivilege by accepting an arbitrary `tool_name` and arbitrary JSON arguments from standard input. It does ...[truncated 1875 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
scripts/authorize.py:344
Finding

Undisclosed Hostname and Agent-Environment Telemetry

Content
View full analysis
str: """The agent environment this process runs inside (docs/device-model.md). Order: explicit agent self-report > environment signatures > unknown. Detection reads the process environment only — nothing else runs, nothing reaches the network. """ if explicit: candidate = explicit.strip().lower().replace(" ", "-") if _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(candidate): return candidate env = os.environ if env.get("CLAUDECODE") == "1" or "CLAUDE_CODE_ENTRYPOINT" in env: return "claude-code" if any(key.startswith("CODEX_") for key in env): return "codex" ai_agent = env.get("AI_AGENT", "").lower() matched = re.match(r"([a-z0-9-]+)_", ai_agent) if matched and _PLATFORM_VALUE.fullmatch(matched.group(1)): return matched.group(1) return "unknown" ``` It also collects the machine hostname: ```python def device_display_name() -> str | None: """A hostname the user will recognise in the console device list.""" try: name = socket.gethostname().strip() except OSError: return None if not name or not name.isprintable(): return None return name[:120] ``` The collected values are added to the authorization request: ```python form: dict[str, str] = { "client_id": CLIENT_ID, "resource": MCP_URL, "scope": SCOPE, "platform": host_platform, "client_name": PACKAGE_DISPLAY_NAME, "external_installation_ref": external_reference, "package_ve ...[truncated 2999 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
scripts/mcp_client.py:970
Finding

Enabled-by-Default Silent Replacement of Executable Skill Files

Content
View full analysis
dict[str, Any]: path = update_home / "state.json" try: value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")) except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError): return {"schema_version": 1, "auto_update": True} if not isinstance(value, dict) or value.get("schema_version") != 1: return {"schema_version": 1, "auto_update": True} return value ``` The automatic update path downloads and applies remotely supplied package files: ```python def maybe_auto_update( *, state_dir: Path | None = None, install_root: Path | None = None, get_bytes: GetBytes = _default_get_bytes, now: float | None = None, ) -> bool: """Best-effort silent update. Never block the requested MCP command.""" resolved_state = state_dir or Path.home() / ".beatra" try: resolved_root = (install_root or _current_install_root()).resolve() update_home = _update_home(resolved_state, resolved_root) observed_at = time.time() if now is None else now nonce = _lock_update(update_home, now=observed_at) if nonce is None: return False try: recover_update(state_dir=resolved_state, install_root=resolved_root) ...[truncated 4472 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (36)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

One described behavior set suggests the package includes lifecycle management, revocation, uninstall, and local state handling rather than only content generation. When a skill's actual function diverges from its stated purpose, users and platforms cannot make informed trust decisions, which is especially dangerous when credentials and local installation state are involved.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

One described behavior set suggests the package includes lifecycle management, revocation, uninstall, and local state handling rather than only content generation. When a skill's actual function diverges from its stated purpose, users and platforms cannot make informed trust decisions, which is especially dangerous when credentials and local installation state are involved.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

One described behavior set suggests the package includes lifecycle management, revocation, uninstall, and local state handling rather than only content generation. When a skill's actual function diverges from its stated purpose, users and platforms cannot make informed trust decisions, which is especially dangerous when credentials and local installation state are involved.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The manifest declares a credential file path for device-bearer authentication, which means the skill depends on locally stored bearer credentials to access a remote MCP service. If the skill runtime or connected tooling exposes that file path or allows unintended access to the credential contents, those tokens could be abused to impersonate the user against the Beatra service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

json
},
  "mcp": {
    "authentication": "device-bearer",
    "credential_file": "~/.beatra/credentials.json",
    "name": "beatra",
    "transport": "streamable-http",
    "url": "https://mcp.beatra.ai/mcp"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.

text

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 207)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 514)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1025)May include surrounding context.

python
```

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The authorization scope requests far more capability than a storyboard skill reasonably needs, including wallet spending, task control, voice management, and multiple media-generation domains. If the stored bearer token is compromised or the backend misuses the granted scopes, the skill gains unnecessary authority that expands blast radius well beyond storyboard creation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The package can download a manifest and archive from remote infrastructure and overwrite its own installed files, including scripts/mcp_client.py. Although the updater includes several integrity checks, it still grants the remote update authority code-execution-by-replacement power, which is especially risky for a skill whose expected purpose is storyboard generation rather than ongoing software management.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The client is marketed as a Bilibili storyboard skill, but it includes a broad remote-control client with generic tools/list, tools/call, upload, telemetry, and update capabilities unrelated to the declared user function. That mismatch expands the trust boundary significantly: anyone installing a content-creation skill is also installing a general-purpose remote service client that can invoke arbitrary server-provided capabilities under the user's credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Exposing self-update as a first-class CLI operation confirms the package is designed to modify its own installed code on demand. In the context of a creative storyboard skill, self-modification is a dangerous excess capability because compromise of the update channel or backend policy could turn the skill into a remote code replacement mechanism.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1503)May include surrounding context.

python
)
    update = subparsers.add_parser(
        "update",
        help="Check, install, or configure Beatra package self-updates",
    )
    update.add_argument(
        "--check",

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This uninstall script is scoped to a Bilibili storyboard skill but is designed to manipulate shared Beatra device state in ~/.beatra, including revoking a device authorization and deleting shared state files. Even if intended for legitimate uninstall cleanup, bundling cross-skill credential and state management into an ordinary content-creation skill creates a powerful side effect that can disconnect other skills or remove shared client state if inventory logic is wrong, corrupted, or abused.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The script explicitly targets credentials.json as part of the files it may delete from the shared ~/.beatra state directory. While deletion is not exfiltration, direct handling of shared credential material by an unrelated skill is sensitive because it grants the package influence over authentication state and can break other installed skills if isolation assumptions fail.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

python
#: these and then removes the directory only if it is empty — the script
#: never recursively deletes a directory it does not fully understand.
_STATE_FILES = (
    "credentials.json",
    "installation.json",
    "host.json",
    "skills.json",

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The code constructs and sends an authenticated POST request to the Beatra device revocation endpoint using a bearer token read from local state. In the context of a storyboard-generation skill, remote revocation capability is unnecessary to core functionality and materially increases the blast radius of the package by allowing it to disable the device authorization used by the platform.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This function reads access_token from ~/.beatra/credentials.json and uses it for a privileged API call. Accessing bearer tokens from a shared credential store inside a non-platform skill violates least privilege; any flaw, tampering, or repurposing of this script could abuse the token to revoke or otherwise act on device authorization beyond the skill's expected storyboard role.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 109)May include surrounding context.

python
def _device_token(state_dir: Path) -> str | None:
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    try:
        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
    except (OSError, ValueError):

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill declares no explicit tool scope while documentation indicates capabilities spanning environment access, file I/O, shell, and network operations. This broad undeclared authority increases the chance of unintended privilege use and makes it harder for users or hosts to apply least-privilege controls.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The manifest presents a creative storyboard tool, but the documentation introduces autonomous software update and package replacement. This hidden secondary function undermines informed consent and increases the likelihood that users invoke the skill without understanding that it can modify installed software.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill includes self-updating package installation and replacement behavior unrelated to storyboard generation. Any mechanism that can download and replace local package files materially expands the trust boundary and creates a software supply-chain risk if the update channel, verification process, or host integration is compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Automatic updates that install without separate confirmation allow code on the host to change after initial trust is granted. Even if updates are intended to be safe, silent installation removes an important review checkpoint and can convert a low-risk skill into a high-risk one if the upstream distribution path is ever compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The manifest defines fixed localized variants for English, Japanese, and Chinese, but does not state that the user can choose the language or that the locale is automatically selected based on user preference. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a natural-language locale policy issue.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.

json
"icon": "https://beatra.ai/textures/icons/bilibili-video-storyboard-0.1.1.png",
  "localized": {
    "en": {
      "description": "Create a Bilibili video storyboard from a topic, title, outline, or script. This AI Bilibili storyboard maker turns a long-form video idea into a chapter-led shot list, Bilibili video script, camera direction, narration and B-roll cues, and one to four storyboard key frames for explainers, reviews, tutorials, vlogs, gameplay, animation, and creative videos.",
      "display_name": "Bilibili Video Storyboard",
      "summary": "Turn a Bilibili topic, title, outline, or script into a chapter-led shot list and one to four key storyboard frames for an explainer, review, tutorial, vlog, gameplay, or creative video.",
      "tags": [

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.