Homestay Welcome Talking Clips

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Oct 21, 2026 · 3:18 AM UTC
• Version: 0.2.4

Overview

This welcome-video skill needs review because it requires broader account access than its task needs, and its removal checks can disrupt other Beatra skills.

Consider waiting for narrower account permissions and corrected removal checks. Connecting grants shared Beatra spending access; selected photos and audio are processed remotely, and installation analytics are automatic. Approve the complete clip count and estimated cost, and use the Beatra Console when you intend to revoke device access.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Output Handling: Unvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
• Rogue Agent: Self-Modification, Session Persistence

Findings (33)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The supplied chunk implements connection retirement and local-state cleanup, not script writing or talking-clip generation. Although an uninstaller can legitimately support a larger skill, revoking shared device authorization and deleting shared state are substantive capabilities not represented in the declared purpose. The code includes conservative inventory checks and a dry-run option; these safeguards limit the effects but do not eliminate the description–behavior mismatch. This assessment applies only to the supplied chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The reported automatic analytics transmit a persistent installation reference and detailed environment metadata unrelated to producing welcome clips, creating a privacy and cross-session correlation risk. The supplied SKILL.md describes public version checks but does not disclose this analytics collection or a consent mechanism. HTTPS and an official service destination would not resolve undisclosed collection; the actual reporting implementation is not supplied for verification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 93% confidence

Finding

The reported music-generation and voice-management scopes exceed the documented welcome-clip workflow, increasing the consequences of credential theft or unauthorized client operations. Spending authority itself is consistent with the explicitly disclosed paid workflow, but a broadly shared credential creates unnecessary exposure, and conversational approval requirements do not technically constrain its authority. The scope requests are reported by the static analysis; their implementation is not included here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · manifest.json (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

json

},
  "mcp": {
    "authentication": "device-bearer",
    "credential_file": "~/.beatra/credentials.json",
    "name": "beatra",
    "transport": "streamable-http",
    "url": "https://mcp.beatra.ai/mcp"

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

md

- `~/.beatra/installation.json` contains one stable, non-secret installation
  reference.
- `~/.beatra/credentials.json` contains the single Device Token.

On POSIX systems the directory must be mode `0700` and both files mode `0600`.
On Windows the current user must be the only principal granted access through

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

md

and keeps checking through brief network failures. One run waits up to
   about 15 minutes; an approval page stays open for up to an hour;
5. atomically saves the returned Device Token to
   `~/.beatra/credentials.json` without printing an HTTP response body;
6. validates the new credential with the same non-billable MCP request and
   prints `Beatra is ready` only after it succeeds.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 1008)May include surrounding context.

python

scope = _required_string(polled, "scope")
    if set(scope.split()) != set(SCOPE.split()):
        raise RuntimeError("Beatra authorization returned an unsupported scope")
    credential_path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    with _SIGNALS.deferred():
        _atomic_json(
            credential_path,

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/mcp_client.py (reported line 1183)May include surrounding context.

python

def _credentials(state_dir: Path) -> tuple[str, str]:
    state_dir = state_dir.expanduser()
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    if not path.is_file():
        # Not connected yet (or the file is gone): the caller may still find
        # an approval waiting to be collected.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md

the file ACL. Never copy the Device Token into conversation context, stdout,
stderr, a command argument, an environment variable, a log, a backup, a diff,
or another file. A completed authorization leaves the token only in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`.

## Ensure Beatra is ready

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

python

#: is empty — the script never recursively deletes a directory it does not
#: fully understand.
_STATE_FILES = (
    "credentials.json",
    "installation.json",
    "host.json",
    "skills.json",

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp-connection.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md

The host follows this computer's network route, described below.

They share the one full-scope Device Token stored in
`~/.beatra/credentials.json`. Installing or switching packages must not trigger
another authorization when that credential is already valid. Do not add,
enable, trust, or configure a host Beatra Connector. Never print or move the
token into command arguments, environment variables, logs, chat, or another

Self-Modification

High

• Category: Rogue Agent
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/updates-and-security.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md

# Updates and security

Since the October 2026 releases, Beatra Skill packages contain no self-updater.
Earlier releases could replace their own files from Beatra's CDN; that code has
been removed. Updates now come only from the store or tool you installed the
Skill from.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/updates-and-security.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

md

These files are written under `~/.beatra/`. On POSIX that directory is mode
0700. Nothing is written inside the installed Skill directory.

- `credentials.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/authorize.py`: the device credential.
- `installation.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/authorize.py`: the stable installation reference.
- `host.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/authorize.py`: the agent environment, and a device name when one is known.
- `network.json` (POSIX mode 0600), written by `scripts/mcp_client.py`: this computer's network route.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/updates-and-security.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

md

When `scripts/uninstall.py` decides this is the last Beatra skill on the
computer, it first asks Beatra to revoke the device credential when one is
stored. If Beatra refuses, it changes nothing so the run can be repeated.
Otherwise it unlinks exactly these names in `~/.beatra/`: `credentials.json`,
`installation.json`, `host.json`, `skills.json`, `registrations.json`,
`network.json`, `balance-holds.json`, `pending_authorization.json`, and
`.authorize.lock`. It also unlinks `state.json`, `registration.json`, and

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/authorize.py (reported line 432)May include surrounding context.

python

def _existing_credential(state_dir: Path) -> Path | None:
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    try:
        path_stat = os.lstat(path)
        if not stat.S_ISREG(path_stat.st_mode):

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/uninstall.py (reported line 132)May include surrounding context.

python

def _device_token(state_dir: Path) -> str | None:
    path = state_dir / "credentials.json"
    try:
        value = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
    except (OSError, ValueError):

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 106)May include surrounding context.

md

- say prominently that a signed-out browser lands on Beatra sign-in first:
  the user signs in or creates their account there, and the approval page
  continues automatically after sign-in;
- say once that the connection continues automatically after Allow — never
  ask the user to confirm in chat that they approved.
- on the mainland China network, follow the sign-in and console-link guidance
  in [MCP connection](mcp-connection.md#network-route).

Installation-source reporting uses conversation-derived information without a user-facing privacy notice.

Medium

• Category: Output Handling
• Confidence: 87% confidence

Finding

The instructions direct the agent to derive installation-source attribution from the conversation and record it after authentication without a user-facing disclosure. This creates a limited privacy concern because attribution could become associated with the user's installation or account, although the fixed category list limits exposure and the supplied document does not establish whether the command transmits it remotely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/installation-and-auth.md (reported line 132)May include surrounding context.

md

Use one of `website`, `github`, `skillhub`, `skillatlas`, `modelscope`,
`workbuddy`, `clawhub`, or `other`. If the conversation does not show it,
skip this and do not ask the user. If the command is not recognized, skip it.

## Use the bundled MCP client

Automatic installation telemetry is unrelated to producing homestay welcome clips.

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 93% confidence

Finding

The file documents a recurring beatra.installations.register call that reports a stable installation reference, installation source, network route, and runtime characteristics. This installation-analytics capability is separate from authorization and is not needed to write welcome scripts or animate authorized stills, nor is it declared in the manifest's stated scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 86% confidence

Finding

The documented npx skills update command can download and execute an unpinned npm package when no suitable local installation exists. A compromised or unexpectedly changed package could execute code with the caller's permissions; this is an update-tool supply-chain risk, not an unpinned MCP server. Its placement in optional maintenance instructions reduces exposure compared with automatic execution during ordinary tasks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

MCP server referenced without pinned version: 'npx skills'.

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 86% confidence

Finding

The global-install variant also invokes the unpinned skills npm package through npx, potentially executing newly retrieved code with the caller's permissions. This is the same supply-chain issue as the other finding on this line, rather than a separate MCP-server vulnerability; global updating can additionally affect skills used across projects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The workflow permits multiple paid clips per still despite the manifest's explicit one-still, one-clip scope.

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The instruction to split longer narration into segments, each requiring a new speech and video call, conflicts with the advertised one-still, one-clip scope and can multiply paid operations. Production-card and approval requirements reduce the risk of unauthorized spending, but the workflow still directs scope expansion rather than requiring narration to fit the promised single clip.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The workflow submits the host's photo and approved audio to Beatra for video generation without a privacy disclosure.

Medium

• Category: Output Handling
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to submit a source image and narration audio to an external video-generation service. Although it requires production cards and separate video authorization, it does not warn that potentially identifiable imagery and audio will be processed by that service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.