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Security audit

GoldenSeed

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed helper for installing and using a deterministic-randomness Python package, with a supply-chain caution from its unpinned dependency.

Install this only in a virtual environment, consider pinning and reviewing a specific golden-seed release before use, and do not use its deterministic output for passwords, keys, security tokens, gambling, or any cryptographic purpose.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
install.sh:3
Finding

Unpinned and Unverified Third-Party Package Installation

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Locations:

  • install.sh:3
  • README.md:66
  • SKILL.md:36

Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through an unpinned and unverified external dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code Snippets

install.sh:3:

bash
pip install golden-seed

README.md:66:

bash
pip install golden-seed

SKILL.md:36:

bash
pip install golden-seed

Technical Analysis

The installation script and documentation direct users to install golden-seed from the default Python package index without an exact version, package hash, lockfile, or other integrity control. The project does not include the dependency's implementation, so its behavior cannot be audited from the supplied files.

Because the requirement is unpinned, package resolution can select a release published after this project was reviewed. Python packages may execute package-controlled build or installation logic, and their modules execute code when imported. Consequently, compromise of the upstream project, its publishing credentials, the package index, or the dependency-resolution path could introduce code that was not present during this audit.

This finding does not establish that the current golden-seed package is malicious. It identifies an unsafe dependency installation mechanism whose effective code can change independently of the reviewed project.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the upstream package, a maintainer account, or another relevant package distribution channel.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the package name resolved by pip.
  3. A user or agent executes install.sh or follows the installation command in the documentation.
  4. pip resolves the mutable package release without checking an audit-approved version and cryptographic hash.
  5. Malicious code can run during package build or installation, or later when the documented gq ...[truncated 814 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the dependency to an explicitly reviewed version rather than installing the latest available release:
    text
    golden-seed==<reviewed-version>
    
  2. Record cryptographic hashes in a requirements file and enforce them during installation:
    bash
    python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
    
  3. Generate and retain a lockfile or hash-pinned requirements file through a controlled dependency-review process.
  4. Install the package in a dedicated virtual environment and avoid running pip as root or with sudo.
  5. Audit the selected package artifact, including its build configuration, installation hooks, imported modules, and transitive dependencies.
  6. Prefer including or vendoring the minimal deterministic generator implementation when licensing and maintenance requirements permit, allowing the effective code to be reviewed with the skill.
  7. Update install.sh, README.md, and SKILL.md so every installation path uses the same pinned and hash-verified dependency specification.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents a functional capability: generating deterministic entropy streams for testing and procedural generation. However, the supplied code chunk is only an installation script that installs a Python package. It does not itself implement, expose, or verify the described behavior. Because the actual code’s observable behavior is package installation rather than the declared entropy-generation functionality, this is a mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.