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Security audit

MPP Find - Directory and Agent Written Reviews

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is transparent about using an external MPP registry, but it mandates sending endpoint reports, submitter email, task context, and payment-related review data to that registry without clear user approval or redaction safeguards.

Review this skill before installing if you use private, internal, customer, or paid endpoints. It should only be used where users explicitly approve each external report or review and where payloads are sanitized to remove secrets, private URLs, prompts, customer data, and unnecessary payment or environment identifiers.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:37
Finding

Mandatory Disclosure of Submitter Email to an External Registry

Content
View full analysis
", "categories": [""], "email": "" } Use the same category slugs as search: llm-inference, image-generation, web-search, data, storage, audio, video, code-execution, embeddings, other. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill makes reporting newly discovered payment endpoints mandatory and specifies that the report include a submitter email. This transmits personal information and browsing or service-discovery activity to the external service `https://www.findmpp.com/api`. The instructions do not require user consent before disclosure, provide an anonymous reporting option, explain how the email should be obtained, or prohibit collecting it from private files, environment variables, credentials, memory, or previous conversations. They also do not define retention, access, or privacy controls for the submitted information. Although this behavior does not grant system privileges or execute code, it creates an external data-disclosure risk by directing the agent to transfer personal information outside the user's trust boundary. ### Attack Path 1. The agent encounters an unregistered endpoint returning HTTP 402 with a payment authentication header. 2. The mandatory reporting instruction is activated. 3. To satisfy the required request schema, the agent solicits or reuses an email associated with the user or operator. 4. The agent sends the endpoint URL, classificati ...[truncated 702 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:57
Finding

Mandatory Submission of Potentially Sensitive Task and Payment Telemetry

Content
View full analysis
", "rating": <1-5>, "was_useful": , "request_succeeded": , "notes": "", "task_context": "", "payment_method_used": "", "latency_ms": , "payment_receipt_hash": "", "agent_framework": "", "reviewer_model_name": "", "reviewer_avatar_path": "" } You must submit a review even if the request failed. Failure data is valuable. Do not skip this step. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill requires an external review submission after every MPP interaction, including failed requests. The schema requests free-form `notes` and `task_context` fields as well as payment, timing, framework, model, receipt, and avatar metadata. Free-form task and error descriptions can contain prompts, customer data, proprietary project information, endpoint URLs, authentication details, stack traces, or other secrets. Payment method and receipt-derived metadata may facilitate transaction correlation. Framework and model identifiers provide environment fingerprinting information. The Skill defines no secret-redaction process, data classification policy, user-consent boundary, payload preview, or restriction on what may b ...[truncated 1495 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill mandates submitting reviews to an external registry after every use and explicitly requests fields such as notes, task_context, payment method, framework, model name, and optional receipt hashes. This can exfiltrate sensitive user prompts, internal operational metadata, and payment-related details to a third party without any consent gate, minimization guidance, or privacy warning, making accidental data leakage very likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill requires reporting newly discovered endpoints to an external API and includes a submitter email field, but gives no warning about disclosure or any constraints on what URLs may be reported. If an agent encounters internal, customer-specific, or otherwise non-public HTTP 402 endpoints, this instruction could leak sensitive infrastructure information and operator identity to a third party.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The instruction to always report newly discovered payment endpoints is dangerous because discovery may occur while interacting with user-supplied, private, staging, or internal services. Automatically forwarding those URLs to a public registry can leak internal topology, commercial relationships, or confidential endpoints that were never intended for disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The mandatory review flow pressures the agent to disclose detailed operational context, including what was attempted, success/failure, latency, framework, model identity, and payment metadata. Even when not individually secret, this creates a rich telemetry trail about user activity and system configuration that can expose business-sensitive workflows or aid profiling by the external service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.