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Security audit

School Finder

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This school search skill is coherent and purpose-aligned, with the main cautions being external Camino AI API use and mutable install examples.

Before installing, prefer a pinned or versioned source if available, verify that the Camino AI package and publisher are the ones you intend to trust, and install only this skill rather than the full suite unless you need it. Searches may send precise locations or home-related queries to Camino AI, so use a dedicated API key and avoid submitting sensitive locations unless that is acceptable.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:12
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Installation Commands Create Supply-Chain Risk

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
install school-finder ``` 2. Pin GitHub installations to a reviewed immutable commit hash or signed release tag rather than the repository's default branch. 3. Publish and verify cryptographic checksums or package signatures where the installation mechanism supports them. 4. Recommend installation of only the `school-finder` skill by default. Present suite-wide installation as an explicit optional action with a clear explanation of the additional trust surface. 5. Maintain lockfiles or equivalent integrity metadata for installation tooling and review dependency changes before updating pinned versions. 6. Document the expected package publisher, repository owner, version, and commit so users can verify provenance before executing installation commands. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (10)

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

Add your key to Claude Code:

Add to your ~/.claude/settings.json:

json
{

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill documents shell-based execution (./scripts/school-finder.sh, curl) but does not declare any tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates an execution-trust gap where an agent may invoke shell capabilities without explicit least-privilege constraints, increasing the chance of unintended command execution or unsafe composition with other skills.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The installation command uses npx skills add https://github.com/barneyjm/camino-skills without pinning a version, tag, or commit. This allows future upstream changes or repository compromise to alter what gets installed, creating a supply-chain risk for anyone following the instructions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This skill-specific install example still references the GitHub repo through npx skills add without any pinned revision. Users may believe they are installing a stable, reviewed skill, but the fetched content can change over time or be replaced if the source is compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The command npx clawhub@latest install school-finder explicitly tracks the latest version, which is mutable and can introduce unreviewed or malicious updates. In security-sensitive agent ecosystems, using latest increases supply-chain exposure and undermines reproducibility.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

Instant Trial (no signup required): Get a temporary API key with 25 calls:

bash
curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email": "you@example.com"}' \
  https://api.getcamino.ai/trial/start

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The script sends user-supplied query parameters such as latitude, longitude, radius, and search terms to an external API via curl. While the code is functional, there is no user-facing notice at the point of execution explaining that provided location data will be transmitted to a third-party service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

md
curl -s -X GET \
    -H "X-API-Key: $CAMINO_API_KEY" \
    -H "X-Client: claude-code-skill" \
    "https://api.getcamino.ai/query?${QUERY_STRING}" | jq .

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

md
curl -s -X GET \
    -H "X-API-Key: $CAMINO_API_KEY" \
    -H "X-Client: claude-code-skill" \
    "https://api.getcamino.ai/query?${QUERY_STRING}" | jq .

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/school-finder.sh (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

sh
curl -s -X GET \
    -H "X-API-Key: $CAMINO_API_KEY" \
    -H "X-Client: claude-code-skill" \
    "https://api.getcamino.ai/query?${QUERY_STRING}" | jq .