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Security audit

Openclaw Media Gen

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward AIsa image and video generation skill, with expected API-key use, external API calls, and user-directed media file output.

Install only if you trust AIsa with your prompts, model selections, reference image URLs, and API-key usage. Avoid sending secrets, internal URLs, regulated content, or proprietary material unless approved, and choose output paths carefully because existing files at those paths can be overwritten.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 94, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(out_path) or ".", exist_ok=True)
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "AIsa-Media-Gen/1.0"})
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout_s) as resp, open(out_path, "wb") as f:
            total = 0
            while True:
                chunk = resp.read(1024 * 1024)  # 1MB
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout_s) as resp, open(out_path, "wb") as f:

Tainted flow: 'out_path' from os.environ.get (line 406, credential/environment) → open (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Content
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(out_path) or ".", exist_ok=True)
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "AIsa-Media-Gen/1.0"})
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout_s) as resp, open(out_path, "wb") as f:
            total = 0
            while True:
                chunk = resp.read(1024 * 1024)  # 1MB
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout_s) as resp, open(out_path, "wb") as f:

Tainted flow: 'out_path' from os.environ.get (line 406, credential/environment) → open (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Content
return 1
        mime, data = images[0]
        out_path = args.out or _safe_filename(_ext_from_mime(mime))
        with open(out_path, "wb") as f:
            f.write(data)
        _print_json({"success": True, "route": route, "model": args.model, "mime_type": mime,
                     "saved_to": out_path, "images_returned": len(images)})
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
with open(out_path, "wb") as f:

Tainted flow: 'out_path' from os.environ.get (line 406, credential/environment) → open (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Content
kind, data, url = images[0]
        out_path = args.out or _safe_filename("png")
        if kind == "b64" and data is not None:
            with open(out_path, "wb") as f:
                f.write(data)
            _print_json({"success": True, "route": route, "model": args.model,
                         "saved_to": out_path, "images_returned": len(images),
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
with open(out_path, "wb") as f:

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill markets image/video generation workflows but does not prominently warn that user prompts and, for i2v, supplied image URLs are sent to an external third-party API. This creates a privacy and data-handling risk because users may provide confidential prompts, proprietary images, or internal URLs without informed consent.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.