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Security audit

Content Creator Assistant

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward AI writing helper that passes writing inputs to a configured LLM, with no evidence of hidden persistence, credential access, destructive actions, or exfiltration.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the writing prompts and draft text you provide to whichever LLM implementation you configure. Treat the packaging mismatch as a likely functionality issue that should be fixed before relying on the skill.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • System Prompt LeakageDirect Leakage, Indirect Extraction, Tool-Based Exfiltration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Direct Prompt Extraction

High
Category
System Prompt Leakage
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

Content

Scanner excerpt · index.js (reported line 211)May include surrounding context.

js
medium: '1000-1500 words',
      long: '2000+ words'
    };
    return guidelines[length] || guidelines.medium;
  }

  extractTitle(content) {

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This skill sends user-influenced content such as topic, audience, key points, outlines, and draft text to the configured LLM multiple times without any explicit disclosure, consent flow, or data-handling notice in the main execution path. In an agent skill context, users may provide proprietary or sensitive text for drafting and refinement, so silent transmission to an external model provider creates a real privacy and data-governance risk even if it is functionally expected.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.