T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/common.py:27- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Executable Dependency
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Locations:
SKILL.md:10-13_meta.json:9-11scripts/common.py:27-44
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned executable dependency and insufficient supply-chain integrity controls
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
Installation instructions in
SKILL.md:10-13:bash pip install twitter-cli uv tool install twitter-cli pipx install twitter-cliDependency declaration in
_meta.json:9-11:json "dependencies": [ "twitter-cli (pip install twitter-cli)" ]Dependency execution in
scripts/common.py:27-44:python python = find_python() cmd = [python, "-m", "twitter_cli"] + args if json_output: # Avoid duplicate --json if "--json" not in args and "--yaml" not in args: cmd.append("--json") try: result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60, )Technical Analysis
The Skill instructs users to install
twitter-cliwithout specifying an exact reviewed version, package hash, lock file, or verified distribution source. It then executes the installed package as Python code throughpython -m twitter_cli.Although subprocess arguments are safely passed as a list and no shell injection was identified, this does not protect against malicious or compromised code inside the dependency itself. The effective implementation of authenticated Twitter operations is outside the reviewed project and can change independently after this Skill is audited.
The dependency receives user-controlled tweet text, tweet identifiers, image paths, and access to the local environment used to obtain browser-based Twitter authentication. Consequently, integrity compromise of the package would provide a direct code-execution path under the user's account.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, distribution account, build process, or a ...[truncated 1466 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
twitter-clito an exact version that has undergone security review. - Require artifact hash verification, such as a hashes-enforced requirements file or lock file generated from trusted artifacts.
- Document and verify the expected package publisher, canonical source repository, and distribution channel.
- Review dependency source code and release changes before updating the pinned version.
- Run the dependency in an isolated environment with the minimum necessary filesystem and browser-profile access.
- Avoid exposing unrelated environment variables, credentials, home-directory files, or browser profiles to the subprocess.
- Prefer an audited official Twitter API client using narrowly scoped credentials where operationally possible.
- Add automated dependency integrity and vulnerability scanning to the release process.
- Pin
