T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:17- Finding
Unrestricted File and Program Launch Without User Confirmation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 17–19
Vulnerability Type: Unsafe invocation of arbitrary files and programs
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown - The assistant will use `Invoke-Item` to open files - No need to wait for confirmation as Windows programs are UI-based - Opens any file for which Windows has a default player or program to manage itTechnical Analysis
The skill instructs the agent to pass files to PowerShell's
Invoke-Itemwithout requiring user confirmation and without defining restrictions on file type, source, or location. On Windows,Invoke-Itemdoes not merely display passive content: it invokes the operating system action associated with the supplied item.If the target is an executable or another active file type, this behavior may launch code under the current user's security context. Documents and media can also invoke registered applications and expose their attack surface. The statement that confirmation is unnecessary because applications are UI-based is therefore not a valid security control.
The reviewed skill contains no path-validation procedure, trusted-directory restriction, file-extension allowlist, executable-content rejection, or confirmation boundary for active content.
Attack Path
- An attacker causes an executable, script-associated file, shortcut, or crafted active document to exist at a location accessible to the user.
- The attacker or misleading context prompts the agent to open or launch that item.
- The agent follows the skill's instruction not to request confirmation.
- The agent supplies the target to
Invoke-Item. - Windows invokes the target itself or its registered handler under the current user's privileges.
- Any resulting code or application behavior gains access to resources available to that user.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation can cause unintended local program execution or processing of malicious content. Result ...[truncated 324 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Require explicit user confirmation before launching executables, shortcuts, scripts, installers, macro-enabled documents, or other active content.
- Resolve the target to a canonical absolute path before invocation and verify that it remains within a user-approved or trusted directory.
- Use a strict allowlist of passive file types required by the skill's legitimate purpose.
- Reject executable and script-capable extensions by default, including
.exe,.com,.bat,.cmd,.ps1,.msi,.scr,.lnk, and similar active formats. - Validate the actual file type rather than relying exclusively on its extension.
- Clearly display the resolved path, file type, and application that will handle the item before seeking confirmation.
- Treat files from downloads, temporary directories, network shares, removable media, and other untrusted sources as high risk.
- Invoke the selected handler through a constrained implementation rather than accepting arbitrary command text or user-controlled PowerShell expressions.
- Log launch decisions and failures without recording sensitive file contents.
