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Security audit

Pipeworx lorem

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a simple lorem-ipsum MCP connector with a disclosed setup command, though users should note its unpinned npm bridge dependency.

Before installing, understand that the setup will run an npm package and connect to Pipeworx's remote MCP service. Prefer a pinned mcp-remote version or a locked installation where possible, and run it in an environment without unnecessary secrets or file access.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:23
Finding

Unpinned npm Package Is Downloaded and Executed Automatically

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 23-27
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency execution
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "pipeworx-lorem": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "mcp-remote@latest", "https://gateway.pipeworx.io/lorem/mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Technical Analysis

The documented configuration invokes npx with the -y option to download and execute mcp-remote@latest without confirmation. The latest tag does not identify an immutable, reviewed package release. Consequently, the code executed by users can change after this Skill has been audited.

This creates a supply-chain risk: compromise of the npm package, its publisher account, or its release process could cause a malicious future version to be selected and executed automatically. The project contains no lockfile, exact version constraint, or integrity hash capable of ensuring that users execute the same dependency that was originally reviewed.

The remotely hosted MCP endpoint also lies outside this repository and cannot be audited from the provided artifact. However, the reviewed file does not establish that the endpoint itself is malicious, so this finding is limited to the confirmed unsafe dependency invocation.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the mcp-remote npm package, its publishing credentials, or its release pipeline.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious package version and assigns or causes it to receive the latest tag.
  3. A user applies the documented MCP configuration.
  4. npx -y mcp-remote@latest retrieves the attacker-controlled release without requesting confirmation.
  5. npx executes the malicious package in the local environment.
  6. The payload operates with the permissions and accessible environment of the user or agent process that launched the MCP server.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary local code execution w ...[truncated 529 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace mcp-remote@latest with an exact, audited version such as mcp-remote@X.Y.Z.
  • Install the dependency through a package manifest and committed lockfile rather than downloading it dynamically on every invocation.
  • Enforce package integrity verification using the package manager's lockfile integrity data or an equivalent cryptographic verification mechanism.
  • Remove -y where practical so unexpected downloads or package changes require explicit approval.
  • Review dependency provenance, publisher controls, release history, transitive dependencies, and published package contents before adoption.
  • Use automated dependency monitoring, but require security review and testing before updating the pinned version.
  • Run the MCP process in a restricted environment with minimal filesystem access, sanitized environment variables, limited network access, and no unnecessary credentials.
  • Independently assess and constrain the remote MCP service because its server-side implementation is not included in this repository.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep