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Security audit

Pipeworx geo

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s geography features are clear, but its documented MCP setup runs an unpinned npm package automatically on the user’s machine.

Install only if you trust Pipeworx and the npm package used as the MCP bridge. Prefer pinning mcp-remote to a reviewed exact version, using a lockfile or managed install, and running the MCP server with minimal filesystem and credential access. Do not send sensitive home addresses, private coordinates, or confidential site locations unless that external service is acceptable for your use case.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:51
Finding

Automatic Execution of an Unpinned npm Dependency

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 51–53
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and automatically executed third-party dependency
Risk Level: High

json
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "mcp-remote@latest", "https://gateway.pipeworx.io/geo/mcp"]
}

Technical Analysis

The MCP configuration invokes npx with the -y option to download and execute mcp-remote@latest automatically. The latest tag is mutable, so the package code executed at installation time can differ from the version available when the skill was reviewed.

Because npx executes the downloaded package locally, a compromised npm package, maintainer account, publishing pipeline, or future malicious release could result in arbitrary code execution. The -y option removes the interactive confirmation that might otherwise alert the user to package installation.

This is an insecure supply-chain configuration because neither an exact package version nor an integrity digest is specified. The effective executable payload is therefore outside the reviewed project and can change without any modification to SKILL.md.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the mcp-remote npm package, its maintainer account, or its release pipeline.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release and assigns it to the latest distribution tag.
  3. A user enables the documented MCP configuration.
  4. npx -y retrieves the attacker-controlled package without requesting confirmation.
  5. The package executes locally with the privileges of the user or agent process.
  6. The malicious package can access data and perform operations available to that process.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the permissions of the account running the MCP server. Depending on the execution environment, this may expose readable files, environment variables, agent-accessible credentials, network resources, ...[truncated 417 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace mcp-remote@latest with an exact, reviewed version such as mcp-remote@x.y.z.
  2. Install the dependency through a committed package manifest and lockfile that records the resolved package and integrity hash.
  3. Remove -y where interactive installation is appropriate so unexpected downloads require explicit approval.
  4. Configure npm to use a trusted registry and enforce lockfile integrity during installation.
  5. Review the selected package version and its transitive dependencies before deployment.
  6. Run the MCP process in a sandbox or container with minimal filesystem, credential, and network access.
  7. Use automated dependency monitoring, but require review and testing before updating the pinned version.
  8. Where practical, install an internally mirrored and verified package artifact rather than retrieving executable code dynamically at startup.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

Example: geocode the Colosseum

bash
curl -s -X POST https://gateway.pipeworx.io/geo/mcp \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"geocode","arguments":{"query":"Colosseum, Rome, Italy"}}}'