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Security audit

Quantics Bank

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly a project guide, but it includes an under-controlled production deployment command that could publish a public site immediately.

Review this skill carefully before installing. Its general project guidance is straightforward, but do not run the production Vercel deploy command unless you have verified the Vercel account, target project, local build contents, and intended public release. Prefer a pinned Vercel CLI and a preview or approval step before production deployment.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:99
Finding

Unpinned Vercel CLI Execution in Production Deployment Workflow

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 99–103
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package execution
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

bash
npx vercel whoami
npx vercel deploy dist --prod --yes

Technical Analysis

The documented workflow invokes the Vercel CLI through npx without specifying a package version or requiring an audited, lockfile-controlled local installation. If the package is unavailable locally, npx may download and execute a current package release from the configured npm registry.

This creates a supply-chain risk because the code executed by the command can differ from the code reviewed when the Skill was authored. A compromised package release, npm registry, package maintainer account, or package-resolution configuration could result in arbitrary code execution under the invoking user's account.

The deployment command compounds the risk by combining unpinned code execution with --prod --yes. These options target production and suppress interactive confirmation, allowing the local dist directory to be published immediately.

Attack Path

  1. A user follows the deployment instructions in SKILL.md.
  2. The requested Vercel CLI is not present in the local project or package cache.
  3. npx resolves and downloads an unpinned version from the configured package registry.
  4. A compromised or unexpectedly modified package release executes with the user's local privileges.
  5. The package can access resources available to the process, potentially including environment variables, source files, npm configuration, and Vercel authentication material.
  6. The second command can deploy the contents of dist directly to the production Vercel environment without an interactive approval step.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide code execution with the privileges of the user running npx. Accessible Vercel credentials could allo ...[truncated 515 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Add a specifically reviewed Vercel CLI version to devDependencies, for example:

    bash
    npm install --save-dev --save-exact vercel@REVIEWED_VERSION
    
  2. Commit package.json and the generated lockfile, and use npm ci in development and CI to enforce lockfile-based installation.

  3. Invoke the locked dependency through a package script rather than allowing npx to resolve an arbitrary current release:

    json
    {
      "scripts": {
        "vercel:whoami": "vercel whoami",
        "deploy:production": "vercel deploy dist --prod"
      }
    }
    
  4. Avoid --yes for manual production deployment so the operator must confirm the target and action.

  5. Prefer a reviewed CI/CD pipeline with protected branches, required approvals, immutable dependency installation, and environment-scoped deployment credentials.

  6. Grant the deployment token only the minimum required Vercel permissions, keep it out of local documentation and source control, and rotate it if package compromise is suspected.

  7. Review dependency updates before changing the pinned CLI version and use package integrity checks and trusted registry configuration.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill provides a direct production deployment command for a public site, including --prod --yes, but does not warn the user that this will publish changes live. In this context, the omission is risky because the skill explicitly targets users who may be newly taking over the project, increasing the chance of accidental public deployment, data exposure, or unintended site changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends running npx vercel commands without pinning a specific package version. Because npx resolves and may download the latest package at execution time, users can get unexpected behavior or execute a compromised or breaking upstream release, which is a supply-chain risk in a deployment workflow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The deployment command uses npx vercel without a pinned version, which can fetch whatever version is current at runtime. In a deployment context this increases supply-chain and reproducibility risk, since an unexpected CLI version could change behavior, mishandle deployment settings, or execute malicious code if the upstream package is compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.