T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:13
- Finding
- Unpinned Package Installation from a Third-Party Homebrew Tap## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 13-20 **Vulnerability Type**: `T08: Insecure Dependencies` **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```yaml { "id": "brew", "kind": "brew", "formula": "spogo", "tap": "steipete/tap", "bins": ["spogo"], "label": "Install spogo (brew)", }, ``` ### Technical Analysis The preferred `spogo` executable is obtained from the third-party Homebrew tap `steipete/tap`. The installation declaration does not pin a reviewed package version, repository commit, checksum, or cryptographic signature. Consequently, the code ultimately installed can change after this Skill has been reviewed. If the tap, its maintainer account, release pipeline, or distributed artifacts are compromised, a malicious formula or binary could be supplied without requiring any modification to `SKILL.md`. The reviewed Skill does not itself retrieve or execute a malicious payload, and there is no evidence that the named tap is currently malicious. The issue is the unbounded supply-chain trust placed in a mutable third-party source. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the third-party tap, its maintainer account, build pipeline, or release artifacts. 2. The attacker publishes a modified `spogo` formula or binary under the expected package name. 3. A user loads the Skill and follows or authorizes its preferred Homebrew installation path. 4. Homebrew retrieves the mutable package definition or artifact from the compromised source. 5. Malicious installation logic or application code executes with the privileges of the user running Homebrew. 6. The malicious dependency may access files, credentials, browser data, and network resources available to that user. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the invoking user's account. The accessible ...[truncated 286 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions - Prefer a package distributed through an official, independently reviewed repository. - If the third-party tap remains necessary, pin the dependency to a reviewed release or immutable commit. - Verify downloaded artifacts using an expected cryptographic checksum or trusted signature. - Document the package source, reviewed version, publisher, and integrity-verification procedure. - Review the Homebrew formula and upstream source before recommending installation. - Run the CLI with ordinary user privileges and avoid granting unnecessary filesystem or credential access. - Establish a controlled update process so new dependency versions are reviewed before adoption.