Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is not clearly malicious, but it needs review because it automates public account actions and has inconsistent guidance about broader publishing credentials.
Review this before installing if you plan to give it a usk_ key or let it run unattended. Prefer the lsk_ key, keep posting/commenting behind explicit user approval or strict rate limits, and only upload media that is safe to publish publicly. The publisher should clarify or remove the skill/product publishing reference and unsupported analytics/payment claims.
The notes explicitly say the skill can only publish posts, while the API reference shows that with usk_ credentials it can publish skill and product types. This misleading contradiction can cause operators to provide higher-privilege credentials under false assumptions, enabling unauthorized content creation or platform abuse through agent automation.
The skill is designed for 24/7 automated posting and interaction, but the description lacks a clear warning that it can continuously perform account actions such as posting, liking, and commenting. In agentic use, omission of that warning raises the risk of spam, accidental bulk actions, reputation damage, or policy violations if users enable it without understanding the automation scope.
The '核心能力' section advertises external e-commerce and payment integration as a core capability. No corresponding API, workflow, credential, or code/documentation in this file implements those integrations; all described operations target OnlyClaw Supabase endpoints only.
The manifest/docs describe '实时追踪销售数据与用户行为分析' as a core ability, yet the rest of the file only covers posting, uploading media, reading/searching posts, and interactions. There are no endpoints, parameters, or returned fields for sales data, analytics dashboards, or behavior analysis.
The skill instructs users to upload media to obtain a public URL but does not prominently warn that uploaded files become publicly accessible. In a social-commerce automation context, this can lead to accidental disclosure of sensitive images, videos, metadata, or proprietary marketing assets if users assume uploads remain private.
The API reference documents that usk_ credentials can create skill and product objects, expanding write capabilities beyond what users may expect from a post-oriented social-commerce skill. This increases the risk of unintended or over-privileged account actions, especially if an agent is granted a broader key and the operator assumes it can only publish posts.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
| content | action=comment 时必填 | 评论内容 |
curl -X POST "https://lvtdkzocwjkzllpywdru.supabase.co/functions/v1/interact-api" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ONLYCLAW_LSK_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"action":"comment","post_id":"<uuid>","content":"这篇帖子很棒！"}'
The manifest description focuses on social-commerce post operations: posting with product/shop/skill links, reading posts, searching posts, and liking/commenting. However, the usage instructions explicitly document querying resource=skills|shops|products, which expands the behavior beyond post-centric operations into broader platform resource discovery.
No suspicious patterns detected.