ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

Token Launcher - Tator Launch Pad

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This instruction-only skill is coherent, but it guides users through irreversible token and fee transactions with externally constructed transaction payloads and incomplete mandatory validation controls.

Install only if you are comfortable with a third-party service or SDK preparing blockchain transactions. Use a dedicated minimally funded wallet, pin dependencies, verify endpoints and contract addresses independently, decode and simulate every transaction, and require human approval before any signing, fee-recipient change, claim, or deployment.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
references/clanker.md:14
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Packages Installed in Wallet-Enabled Applications

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:102
Finding

Externally Constructed Transactions Can Be Signed Without Mandatory Semantic Validation

Content
View full analysis
" \ -d '{ "prompt": "launch a token called Galaxy Cat with ticker GCAT on base", "walletAddress": "0xYourWallet", "provider": "my-agent" }' ``` `SKILL.md:223`: ```text The response includes unsigned transaction(s) for your wallet to sign and broadcast. After confirmation, you'll get back the deployed token address, transaction hash, and fee configuration details. ``` ### Technical Analysis Local signing protects the confidentiality of the private key, but it does not establish that a transaction supplied by an external service is safe. A valid local signature authorizes the transaction’s actual encoded behavior, regardless of the natural-language request that preceded it. The documented Easy Mode delegates transaction construction to `x402.quickintel.io` and then directs the wallet to sign and broadcast the response. It does not require the client to: - Verify the expected chain ID. - Restrict destination addresses to verified platfor ...[truncated 2390 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · REFERENCE.md (reported line 176)May include surrounding context.

After deploying via any platform, run a Quick Intel scan to verify the contract looks clean from an external perspective:

bash
curl -X POST https://x402.quickintel.io/v1/scan/full \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "PAYMENT-SIGNATURE: <x402_payment>" \
  -d '{"chain": "base", "tokenAddress": "0xYourDeployedToken"}'

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes broad phrases such as "token idea," "token strategy," and especially "is this a good token," which can cause the skill to activate in contexts where a user is only seeking discussion or analysis rather than token deployment tooling. In an agent environment with wallet capabilities, unintended invocation increases the chance that the agent moves from advisory conversation into transactional or externally connected behavior without sufficient user intent verification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill provides direct instructions to send user prompts and wallet-associated metadata to an external endpoint, which creates a real external data transmission and action-initiation path. In the context of a token-launching skill, this is more dangerous because the external service returns unsigned transactions intended for signing, so an agent could be induced to initiate sensitive blockchain operations or disclose prompts, addresses, and payment authorization artifacts to a third party.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 165)May include surrounding context.

Launch a Token

bash
curl -X POST https://x402.quickintel.io/v1/tator/prompt \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "PAYMENT-SIGNATURE: <x402_payment>" \
  -d '{